Assistant Professor
Department of Political Science
412 Zulauf Hall
Northern Illinois University
DeKalb, IL 60115-2854
815-753-7044
rcorbett@niu.edu
Political Philosophy, American Political Thought
| COURSES | OVERVIEW | BOOKS | ARTICLES | PAPERS |
| Number | Name | Room | Days | Time |
| POLS 150-1 | Democracy in America | DU 252 | TuTh | 11–12:15 |
| POLS 651-1 | Topics in Modern Political Philosophy: Locke's Two Treatises | DU 466 | Th | 3:30–6:15 |
| Office Hours | ZU 412 | Tu | 10–11; 2–4 | |
| All courses have Blackboard webpages. Please submit all work there. | ||||
| Spring 2010 | POLS 350-1 | Ancient Political Philosophy | DU 252 | TuTh | 11–12:15 |
| POLS 352-1 | Nietzsche and Postmodern Politics | DU 459 | TuTh | 2-3:15 |
| Office Hours | ZU 412 | TuTh | 10–11; 3:30–4 | |
Ross J. Corbett (Ph.D., University of Toronto) is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at Northern Illinois University and teaches courses relating to the history of political philosophy and the theoretical foundations of the American regime. He currently serves as field convenor for political theory and on the political science graduate committee. Before coming to NIU he taught for three years at Brown University as a postdoctoral research associate in the Political Theory Project.
His research explores issues of emergency powers, the rule of law, and legalism. He has published in The Review of Politics, The History of Political Thought, and The Good Society. His recent book, The Lockean Commonwealth (SUNY 2009), reappraises John Locke's thoughts on the need for an executive to be able to meet emergencies, the importance of the rule of law, and what happens when it seems that the two clash.
State University of New York Press, 2009
The tension between executive prerogative in times of emergency and the importance of maintaining and preserving the rule of law has been a perennial concern for modern democratic states. The Lockean Commonwealth reappraises John Locke’s contribution to this timely topic. By paying careful attention to the arguments put forward in Locke’s famous Two Treatises on Government, Ross J. Corbett advances a new interpretation of Locke’s political agenda, one that argues that the interplay between “prerogative” and “legislative supremacy” formed the axis around which turned the practical component of Locke’s political theory. With a firm grasp of Locke’s historical context, Corbett is able to show how Locke’s attempts to balance these competing interests provides insight, not only into the development of the liberal democratic state, but also into questions that trouble us to this day and into questions of political life more generally.
[SUNY] [AMAZON]
Abstract: The turn to John Locke’s doctrine of prerogative sheds light on the problem of crisis government, but is out of place in discussions of American politics. The specifics of Locke’s doctrine are tied to his narrowly positivistic conception of law, a conception that was rejected in Anglo-American jurisprudence. We permit more discretion within the law, rendering that discretion safe through a system of checks and balances, and so there is less justification for stepping outside of the law. What appeals to the deficiency of law in the American context in fact do is seek to sidestep checks and balances, not remedy the inherent defects of law.
Abstract: Aristotle continues to be associated with natural law. Some scholars see this association as untenable; other adhere to Aquinas’ reading, even if unconsciously. This article departs from both. It restores the plausibility of an Aristotelian natural law, but concludes that it is ultimately incompatible with Aristotle’s doctrine. It is plausible because Aristotle does suggestively point toward it. He does so, however, in order to distance himself subtly from it. He must do so subtly because what he in fact points to is a confusion attendant with the virtue of justice.
Abstract: This article examines the relation between John Locke's doctrine of prerogative and constitutional government. Scholars have shown increased interest in Locke's doctrine in recent years, yet there is disagreement about its precise character. The Two Treatises of Government can be read such that this power is the result of the social compact and, thus, is a constitutional means of addressing emergencies. This paper instead argues that prerogative as it appears in the Two Treatises must be understood to be a natural power and, consequently, beyond constitutional control. It stands outside of the constitution because its logic denies that a good constitution is sufficient for liberal government. [PDF]
Abstract: This paper addresses some difficulties arising from how liberal democracies address crises. It presents and compares two alternative methods for controlling executive discretion while permitting enough flexibility to preserve the public good. The first tightly constrains the executive with laws while acknowledging that some necessary actions will have to be performed extralegally. The second permits almost anything to be done within the ordinary powers of government, so long as it is done with the concurrence of an independent office. This paper argues that the second is preferable to the first but that there is no unobjectionable institutional solution to the problem of crisis government. It leaves for another place the application of its conclusions to the American constitution and the war on terrorism. [PDF]
Abstract: The war on terrorism has revived discussion of how liberal democracies ought to approach dangers which defy or at least seem to defy lawful treatment. Debate is split into those who conclude that the executive must be given a relatively free hand in such cases and those seeking to balance flexibility with accountability. The assumption of all involved is that someone must be authoritative, each side differing only on who should have that authority. There is a proper way to handle emergencies, it is assumed, so it falls to political theorists to identify it. This is mistaken. It relies upon the possibility of giving rules to prudence, the impossibility of which is precisely what emergencies and challenges to the capacity of law to address them demonstrate. Even answering that all should be trusted to the chief executive is to say that there is a single, right answer. This paper traces this tendency to the intellectual atmosphere created by those who have absorbed the conceptual categories of Carl Schmitt. [WORD]
Abstract: Aristotle continues to be cited as the father of natural law theory. Aristotle’s discussions of natural justice and absolute kingship are better read as a denial that there could be a natural law. [WORD]
Abstract: One of the easier targets for criticism is political legalism, or the conviction that government action is justifiable only as the application of pre-existing general laws to particular cases. This conviction is open to two objections: 1) circumstances can arise which require immediate redress and for which the existing law is poorly suited, and 2) justice cannot be expressed without distortion as a set of rules of the sort desired by political legalism. Different philosophers focus on different objections, yet a generalization can be made: the first is the special concern of modernity, the latter of the Ancient natural right tradition. Locke justifies extralegal public action on the basis of flux, which is in turn a reflection of Machiavelli’s fortuna. Aristotle, on the other hand, devotes his discussion of extralegality to the second problem. It is clear, however, that Aristotle’s objection to political legalism cannot have (nor was it meant to) the same immediately salient implications for actual political practice as the Lockean/Machiavellian objection does. The difference in focus is explained by differing conceptions of the role of philosophy in political thought. The moderns saw the philosopher as properly giving immediate direction to political life, thereby calling into question any account of justice that did not give this direction. The moderns fail by their own standard, however, for in refusing to comprehensively address Aristotle’s question they fail to give meaningful philosophic direction to statesmen faced with the necessity to transcend the laws. In this way, Machiavelli’s amoralism is more philosophically at home with his political philosophy, whereas Locke must either assert a moral fiat or have recourse to ancient natural right. [PDF]
Abstract: Both Locke and Aristotle suggest that deviations from the rule of law may be necessary, but their primary reasons differ: the former attributes these failures to the constant flux of things, while the latter emphasizes the irreducibility of virtue to law. Yet a careful reading of each shows that they recognize the other's point. Aristotle acts as a guide to why this difference in emphasis concerning extralegal action reveals their deep disagreement regarding the relationship of philosophy and politics. [PDF]
Abstract: This paper examines the place of the judiciary in the Lockean commonwealth. For reasons which shall become clear, it is more an explanation of this issue than its resolution. Part I lays out why the Lockean judiciary ought to present more of a problem than it often does. Part II is an analysis of Blackstone’s method of legal interpretation. There I argue that this method — and, consequently, the common law tradition — has much in common with a natural law-style jurisprudence. Part III draws the conclusion that Locke’s political society, as he presents it, must forbid to judges the discretion which Blackstone would grant and which they traditionally exercised in England. Part IV addresses an insurmountable barrier to the interpretation I advance in part III, but one that does not permit us to revise the conclusion of that part. We are, therefore, left with a contradiction — one that we cannot so easily dismiss as another of Locke’s famous inconsistencies. I conclude with a possible explanation of this contradiction. [WORD]