Instructor: Brendon Swedlow

Political Science (POLS) 529-1

bswedlow@niu.edu 815.753.7061

NIU Spring 2005

Office: 418 Zulauf Hall                                 

Mondays 3:30-6:10 p.m.

Hours: MW 1-1:50 p.m.

DuSable 328

 

Topics in Public Policy:

Risk Regulation

in Illinois, the U.S., and Europe

 

Seminar Overview

 

Why do some people worry about terrorist attacks while others fear genetically modified foods? Why do governments regulate and spend money on mitigating some kinds of threats much more than others? What are the causes and consequences of often dramatic differences in risk regulation?

 

This seminar will expose you to a wide range of studies documenting sometimes great differences in how people perceive and regulate risks. We begin with U.S. and European differences, including recent conflict over the so-called “precautionary principle.” Due to the difficulty of comparing the regulatory activities of such large, diverse regions, scholars do not agree on what all the differences are, much less on what their causes and consequences are.

 

Some scholars maintain that the differences within regions and countries are greater than those between them. We will see that there are big differences between expert and public risk perceptions in both the U.S. and Europe. Expert and media risk and regulatory representations also differ hugely. There are also striking differences in risk perceptions among various population subgroups. Not surprisingly, government policies reflect public perceptions and media representations more than those of experts.

 

How do people differ in risk perception and regulation, and what are the causes and consequences of these differences? These are the three basic questions we will try to answer – for the U.S., Europe, and Illinois. Various causes and consequences are suggested, but only a few scholars offer theoretically-based explanations. Social psychologists have dominated the field, emphasizing psychological explanations for risk perception. These have been challenged by sociologists, anthropologists, and political scientists, who offer cultural and economic explanations. None of these explanations, however, rely on major theories of the policymaking process, which would seem to be important if we are trying to explain not only risk perceptions but regulations.

 

Seminar Objectives

 

The objectives of this seminar are to:

·        Give you an understanding of U.S. and European similarities and differences in risk perception and regulation, both across and within countries and regions

·        Give you an understanding of the causes and consequences of U.S. and European differences in risk perception and regulation

·        Learn about and compare three major theories that attempt to explain differences in risk perception and/or regulation: cultural theory, post-materialism, and psychometric theory

·        Learn about and compare several major theories or frameworks for understanding the policy process: cultural theory, institutional rational choice, multiple streams, and advocacy coalitions

·        Think about how to operationalize, integrate, and test these varied explanations for risk perception and regulation

·        Operationalize and test cultural theory and post-material explanations for differences in risk perception and regulation in Illinois

·        Learn how to work together as a team to accomplish these objectives

 

Weekly Reading

 

Weekly reading is listed below. I may add, subtract, or substitute items for those currently listed, as needed to achieve seminar objectives. Additions and substitutions may be the result of sources that you uncover as you begin doing research tasks to support our case studies of risk regulation in Illinois.

Most readings are available on e-reserves. The url link is posted on the seminar Blackboard site. Four books are available at the Holmes Student Center and from online bookstores, like Amazon.com. HSC apparently does not have used copies; Amazon.com did the last time I checked. The four required books are:

 

Allan Mazur, True Warnings and False Alarms: Evaluating Fears about the Health Risks of Technology, 1948-1971. Washington, DC: Resources for the Future, 2004.

 

Paul A. Sabatier, ed. Theories of the Policy Process. Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1999.

 

Michiel Schwarz and Michael Thompson. Divided We Stand: Redefining Politics, Technology, and Social Choice. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1990.

 

Sheila Jasanoff. The Fifth Branch: Science Advisers as Policymakers. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1990.

 

Weekly Discussion papers

 

Unless otherwise directed, you should write a 2-3 page discussion paper about each week’s readings. This paper can be completed any time up to and including the Sunday night before we meet. Please post your paper to the seminar Blackboard discussion board.

Weekly discussion papers, participation in weekly discussion, and performance of tasks (to be discussed in seminar) contributing to our shared research on risk regulation in Illinois together constitute twenty percent (20%) of your seminar grade.

I will sometimes ask you to address specific questions or issues in your discussion papers. Generally, I am going to be thinking of ways we can use the readings, discussion papers, and seminar discussion to inform or advance our research on risk regulation in Illinois. I am open to your suggestions on how to focus discussion paper assignments to achieve these objectives.

In the absence of any more specific guidance, I would like you to answer questions like the following in writing your discussion papers:

·        What are the similarities and differences in risk perception and regulation in the U.S. and Europe, both across and within these regions?

·        What are the causes and consequences of any similarities and differences in risk perception and regulation in the U.S. and Europe?

·        How do we know the answers to these questions? What kinds of studies have been done? What are the strengths and weaknesses of these studies? How might we design better studies?

·        Are the causes and consequences we are offered in explanations for similarities and differences in risk perception and regulation integrated into theories that relate causes and consequences to these differences? If so, what are these theories?

·        What are theoretical explanations? Why are they important? How do we operationalize, compare, integrate, and test theories of the policy process? Are there reasons that theories of risk regulation should be different than theories of policymaking?

·        What is cultural theory? What is post-materialistic theory? What is psychometric theory? How have these theories been operationalized, compared, integrated, and tested? What are the results of these efforts? What are the next steps?

·        How are we going to operationalize, compare, integrate, and test cultural and post-material theories of risk perception and regulation in Illinois? Does the concept of a cultural policy advocacy coalition help?

 

The Seminar Paper and Case Study of Risk Regulation in Illinois

 

For your seminar paper, I would like you to do a case study of the perception and regulation of a particular risk in Illinois. Ideally, the risk you study will be one that we select from a U.S. and European risk universe of 2878 risks that I helped create and you will study it in the same way as everyone else in the seminar. (If your interests lie elsewhere, please see discussion below.)

We will use cultural and post-material theory to identify domains of risk in the risk universe that these theories predict should be perceived and regulated differently. The risk universe has 18 major categories and 92 subcategories of risk. We will use social theory and these categories and subcategories to construct perhaps three to four risk domains.

We will then randomly select perhaps 10 risks from each domain, giving us 30 to 40 risks total. You will have some choice in which of these risks you want to study, but it is important that we study an approximately equal number of risks from each domain. Right now I am thinking that we will also concentrate our selection among risks appearing with the greatest frequency on the risk lists from which the risk universe was constructed. This will increase the chance that the risks are in fact regulated in Illinois and elsewhere and that there is information available about them.

An alternative scenario for selecting risks to study would involve the same process of identifying theoretically relevant domains, but then limit ourselves to studying those risks that fell in those domains when my collaborators and I previously selected 100 risks from the 2878 to compare regulatory trends in the U.S. and Europe. Advantages of this approach would include being able to build on the prior work. Disadvantages would include perhaps not having enough risks in each domain to study. Maybe some combination of selection methods can be used.

We also need to identify cities and/or counties in Illinois that vary on political and economic dimensions that cultural theory and post-material explanations claim are important causes of differences in risk perception and regulation. Right now I think this means that we want cities or counties that are or have been controlled by different political parties and that are or have been comparatively rich or poor. For practical reasons, I am hoping that we can find cities and/or counties fitting this description along the I-88 corridor.

The idea is that each of you will study the perception and regulation of your risk in two or more cities or counties. The risk you are studying may only be regulated at the city or county level, or it may be left to private entities within the county to deal with that risk. Or, the risk may be regulated at the federal, state, and/or regional level, so you would have to study how these regulations were implemented in the cities or counties.

Your initial research should rely on publicly available sources of information. Please do not contact anyone for this study until we have discussed how to do this in seminar. We need to get institutional review board (IRB) approval before doing human subjects research. This is a federal requirement implemented by the university and is itself an example of risk regulation. Interviewees have to be informed of the risks and benefits of participating in research projects.

I know that at least a couple of you have risk-related topics that you wish to pursue in your seminar papers that may differ from the project I have described. This is fine. However, I do expect everyone to participate in discussion and the execution of tasks that relate to the project I have described. Also, even if you are not interested in doing a project-related case study, there may be other project-related papers that you could write. Let’s talk as soon as possible to address any questions you may have about participation in this project or doing your own project.

Finally, I want to let you know that I will be teaching two courses next year that can be vehicles for your continued involvement in risk-related research. In Fall 2005, I will offer POLS 495 Seminar in Current Topics: U.S. Legal Institutions in Comparative Perspective. In Spring 2006, I will offer POLS 324 Politics of Energy and the Environment, with a linked 524 graduate seminar. Graduate students participating in the current risk regulation seminar who continue with POLS 524 will have the opportunity to help direct undergraduate research on risk regulation.

Draft seminar papers will be due on a date to be announced. Final seminar papers are due Monday, May 9th. Seminar papers are eighty percent (80%) of your final grade.

 

Department of Political Science Announcements

Undergraduate Writing Awards

 

The Department of Political Science will recognize, on an annual basis, outstanding undergraduate papers written in conjunction with 300-400 level political science courses or directed studies. Authors do not have to be political science majors or have a particular class standing. Winners are expected to attend the Department's spring graduation ceremony where they will receive a certificate and $50.00. Papers, which can be submitted by students or faculty, must be supplied in triplicate to a department secretary by February 28, 2005.  All copies should have two cover pages - one with the student's name and one without the student's name. Only papers written in the previous calendar year can be considered for the award. However, papers completed in the current spring semester are eligible for the following year's competition even if the student has graduated.

 

Statement Concerning Students with Disabilities

 

Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, NIU is committed to making reasonable accommodations for persons with documented disabilities. Those students with disabilities that may have some impact on their coursework and for which they may require accommodations should notify the Center for Access-Ability Resources (CAAR) on the fourth floor of the Health Services Building. CAAR will assist students in making appropriate accommodations with course instructors. It is important that CAAR and instructors be informed of any disability-related needs during the first two weeks of the semester.

 

Department of Political Science Web Site

 

Undergraduates are strongly encouraged to consult the Department of Political Science web site on a regular basis. This up-to-date, central source of information will assist students in contacting faculty and staff, reviewing course requirements and syllabi, exploring graduate study, researching career options, tracking department events, and accessing important details related to undergraduate programs and activities. To reach

the site, go to http://polisci.niu.edu.

 

 

WEEK 1  NO CLASS MEETING JANUARY 17 (MARTIN LUTHER KING DAY)

 

 

WEEK 2  INTRODUCTION TO RESEARCH PROJECT ON RISK REGULATION

 

Swedlow, Brendon.  (2004).  “Who Regulates? Which Risks? How? Why? With What Consequences? Understanding before Reforming U.S. Risk Regulation,” Adapted from Research Proposal to SRF, pp. 1-5.

 

Swedlow, Brendon.  (2003).  Draft “Guidance for Case Study Authors” for the Reality of Precaution Project, Center for Environmental Solutions, Duke University. pp. 1-15.

 

Swedlow, Brendon. (2003).  Draft “Methodological Appendix” for the Reality of Precaution Project, Center for Environmental Solutions, Duke University. pp. 1-31.

 

Hammitt, James K., Jonathan B. Wiener, Brendon Swedlow, Denise Kall, and Zheng Zhou. (2004). “Precautionary Regulation in Europe and the United States: A Quantitative Comparison.” Presented at Risk Management in a Complex World: The Fourth Transatlantic Dialogue on Precaution, September 19-21, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina. pp. 1-38.

 

Visit the Duke CES webpage (http://www.env.duke.edu/solutions) and click on the link for “Conferences” and then look through the “Dialogues on Precaution in the U.S. and Europe” to learn more about the Duke CES project.

 

Wildavsky, Aaron. (1989). “The Organization of Time in Scholarly Activities Carried Out under American Conditions in Resource-Rich Universities.” In Aaron Wildavsky, Craftways: On the Organization of Scholarly Work. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers. pp. 41-56.

 

Wildavsky, Aaron. (1993). “Reading with a Purpose.” In Aaron Wildavsky, Craftways: On the Organization of Scholarly Work. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers. pp. 25-38.

 

WEEK 3: CASE STUDIES AND THEORY-BUILDING ON RISK REGULATION

 

[From the discussion board:] Please post your first discussion paper here. Copy and paste text into dialogue box if possible; if not, post as attachment in MSWord or as a RTF. Draw on description of Risk Regulation project in Week Two and Sabatier's writings on theories of policymaking and Mazur's True Warnings and False Alarms (and my review of the book) in Week Three to discuss how our study of risk regulation in Illinois needs to be designed to contribute to theory-building and empirical understanding about policymaking generally, and risk regulation in particular. If you want to address issues raised in someone else's discussion paper, please feel free to do so in your discussion paper, or in a posting to their posted paper.

 

Sabatier, Paul A. (1999). “The Need for Better Theories.” In Theories of the Policy Process. Paul A. Sabatier, ed. Boulder, Co: Westview Press. pp. 3-17.

 

Sabatier, Paul A. (1999). “Fostering the Development of Policy Theory.” In Theories of the Policy Process. Boulder, Co: Westview Press. pp. 261-275.

 

Mazur, Allan. (2004).  True Warnings and False Alarms: Evaluating Fears about the Health Risks of Technology, 1948-1971. Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future.  pp. 1-166.

 

Swedlow, Brendon. (Forthcoming 2005).  Review of Mazur’s True Warnings and False Alarms. In Environmental Science and Policy.  pp. 1-6.

 

SUPPLEMENTAL READING AND/OR RELATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

Wildavsky, Aaron. (1995). “Rejecting the Precautionary Principle.” In Aaron Wildavsky, But Is It True? A Citizen’s Guide to Environmental Health and Safety Issues. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.  pp. 427-447.

 

Harremoes, Poul, David Gee, Malcolm MacGarvin, Andy Stirling, Jane Keys, Brian Wynne, and Sofia Guedes Vaz. (2002). “Twelve Late Lessons.” In The Precautionary Principle in the 20th Century: Late Lessons from Early Warnings.  Poul Harremoes, David Gee, Malcolm MacGarvin, Andy Stirling, Jane Keys, Brian Wynne, and Sofia Guedes Vaz, eds. London: Earthscan Publications. pp. 185-215.

 

Gerring, John. (2004). “What is a Case Study and What is it Good for?” American Political Science Review, 98, 2: 341-354.

 

George, Alexander. (1979). “Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison.” In Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy, ed. Paul Gordon Lauren. New York: Free Press.

 

McKeown, Timothy. (1999). “Case Studies and the Statistical World View.” International Organization 53 (Winter): 161-190.

 

George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett. (2004). Case Studies and Theory Development.  Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.

 

Eckstein, Harry. [1975] (1992). “Case Studies and Theory in Political Science.” In Harry Eckstein, Regarding Politics: Essays on Political Theory, Stability, and Change. Berkeley: University of California Press.

 

WEEK 4: THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND RISK TRADEOFF ANALYSIS

 

Here are two sets of questions to guide your reading and discussion papers for this week:
(1) What is the precautionary principle? What are the official U.S. and E.U. positions on the principle? Why do Americans and Europeans differ regarding this principle of risk regulation?
(2) What is the current U.S. approach to risk regulation, as indicated by OIRA Director John Graham's various statements? What is risk tradeoff analysis, and to what extent has it been incorporated in U.S. approaches to risk regulation? (If you're able, poke around the OIRA portion of the OMB website to gather further insight into White House initiatives in the risk and regulatory areas.)

Lofstedt, Ragnar. (2002). “Introductory paper.” The Precautionary Principle: risk, regulation, and politics. Merton College, Oxford, April 5-11. Accessed through 21st Century Trust, www.21stcenturytrust.org/precprin.htm, on October 30, 2002.

 

European Commission, (2000). “Commission Adopts Communication on the Precautionary Principle,” [Press Release], IP/00/96, February 2, Brussels, The Netherlands. pp. 1-2. Accessed through European Commission,

http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/00/96&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en, on January 11, 2005.

Lofstedt, Ragnar. (2004). “The Swing of the Regulatory Pendulum in Europe: From Precautionary Principle to Regulatory Impact Analysis.” AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper 04-07. pp. 1-35.

 

Graham, John D. (2002). “The Role of Precaution in Risk Assessment and Management: An American’s View.” Remarks prepared for The U.S., Europe, Precaution and Risk Management: A Comparative Case Study Analysis of the Management of Risk in a Complex World, [The First Transatlantic Dialogue on Precaution], January 11-12, Brussels, The Netherlands. pp. 1-5. Accessed through Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, Executive Office of the President, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/eu_speech.html, on January 11, 2005.

 

Graham, John D. (2004). “Perils of the ‘Precautionary Principle’.” PERC Reports, 22, 1: 3-6. Reprint of speech given to Heritage Foundation, October 20, 2003.

 

Graham, John D. (2004). Remarks prepared for Risk Management in a Complex World: The Fourth Transatlantic Dialogue on Precaution. September 19, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina. pp. 1-4. Accessed through Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, Executive Office of the President, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/speeches/risk_mgmt_speech09-2004.html, on January 11, 2005.

 

Wiener, Jonathan Baert and John D. Graham. (1995). “Resolving Risk Tradeoffs.” In John D. Graham and Jonathan Baert Wiener, eds.  Risk vs. Risk: Tradeoffs in Protecting Health and the Environment. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. pp. 226-271.

 

SUPPLEMENTAL READING AND/OR RELATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

Graham, John D. and Jonathan Baert Wiener. (1995). “Confronting Risk Tradeoffs.” In John D. Graham and Jonathan Baert Wiener, eds.  Risk vs. Risk: Tradeoffs in Protecting Health and the Environment. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. pp. 1-41.

 

WEEK 5: COMPARING RISK REGULATION IN THE U.S. AND EUROPE

 

Please note: Refer to syllabus I gave you or the one posted under "course information" here to identify required readings for this week. All of these readings and additional optional readings are on e-reserves. With this week's reading and discussion paper, we're trying to begin to answer some of the core questions for the seminar:

• What are the similarities and differences in risk perception and regulation in the U.S. and Europe, both across and within these regions?
• What are the causes and consequences of any similarities and differences in risk perception and regulation in the U.S. and Europe?
• How do we know the answers to these questions? What kinds of studies have been done? What are the strengths and weaknesses of these studies? How might we design better studies?
• Are the causes and consequences we are offered in explanations for similarities and differences in risk perception and regulation integrated into theories that relate causes and consequences to these differences? If so, what are these theories?

 

Kraemer, Ludwig. (2004). “The Roots of Divergence: A European Perspective.” In Green Giants? Environmental Policies of the United States and the European Union, Norman J. Vig and Michael G. Faure, eds. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. pp. 53-72.

 

Wiener, Jonathan B. (2003). “Whose Precaution Afterall? A Comment on the Comparison and Evolution of Risk Regulatory Systems.” Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 13: 207-262.

 

Faure, Michael G. and Norman J. Vig. (2004). “Conclusion: The Necessary Dialogue.” pp. 347-375. In Green Giants? Environmental Policies of the United States and the European Union, Norman J. Vig and Michael G. Faure, eds. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. pp. 53-72.

 

Vogel, David. (2001). “Ships Passing in the Night: The Changing Politics of Risk Regulation in Europe and the United States.” European University Institute Working Papers, RSC No. 2001/16, pp. 1-37.

 

Lofstedt, Ragnar E. and David Vogel with Commentaries by Ortwin Renn, David Slater, and Michael D. Rogers. (2001). “The Changing Character of Regulation: A Comparison of Europe and the United States.” Risk Analysis, 21, 3: 399-416.

 

Lofstedt, Ragnar and David Vogel. (2001). “Response to Commentaries.” Risk Analysis, 21, 4: 577-78.

 

Winston Harrington, Richard D. Morgenstern, Thomas Sterner, and J. Clarence (Terry) Davies. (2004). “Lessons from the Case Studies.” In Winston Harrington, Richard D. Morgenstern, and Thomas Sterner, eds. Choosing Environmental Policy: Comparing Instruments and Outcomes in the United States and Europe. Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future. pp. 240-270.

 

Kagan, Robert A. (2000). “The Consequences of Adversarial Legalism.” In Regulatory Encounters: Multinational Corporations and American Adversarial Legalism, Robert A. Kagan and Lee Axelrad, eds.  Berkeley: University of California Press. pp. 372-413.

 

SUPPLEMENTAL READING AND/OR RELATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

Brickman, Ronald, Sheila Jasanoff, and Thomas Ilgen. (1985). “Cross-National Analysis and Regulatory Reform.” In Ronald Brickman, Sheila Jasanoff, and Thomas Ilgen, Controlling Chemicals: The Politics of Regulation in the United States and Europe. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. pp. 301-317.

 

Harrington, Winston, Richard D. Morgenstern, and Thomas Sterner. (2004). “Overview: Comparing Instrument Choices.”  In Winston Harrington, Richard D. Morgenstern, and Thomas Sterner, eds. Choosing Environmental Policy: Comparing Instruments and Outcomes in the United States and Europe. Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future. pp. 1-22.

 

Kagan, Robert A. (2000). “How Much Do National Styles of Law Matter?” In Regulatory Encounters: Multinational Corporations and American Adversarial Legalism, Robert A. Kagan and Lee Axelrad, eds.  Berkeley: University of California Press. pp. 1-30.

 

WEEK 6: ACTUAL, PERCEIVED, REPORTED, AND REGULATED RISKS

 

Questions for this week are the same as for last week, with the additional question: What does this week's reading add to the understandings you achieved as a result of the last couple of weeks of reading? All but three of the readings are available on e-reserves and those three should be available by Friday at the latest.

 

Rohrmann, Bernd and Ortwin Renn. (2000). “Risk Perception Research: An Introduction.” In Cross-Cultural Risk Perception: A Survey of Empirical Studies. Ortwin Renn and Bernd Rohrmann, eds. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 12-53.

 

Bostrom, Ann. (1997). “Risk Perceptions: Experts vs. Lay People.” Duke Environmental Law and Policy Forum, 8: 101-113.

 

Swedlow, Brendon. (1995). “Reporting Environmental Science.” In Aaron Wildavsky, But Is It True? A Citizen’s Guide to Environmental Health and Safety Issues. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.  pp. 375-394.

 

Tengs, Tammy O., Miriam E. Adams, Joseph S. Pliskin, Dana Gelb Safran, Joanna E. Siegal, Milton C. Weinstein, and John D. Graham. (1995). “Five-hundred life-saving interventions and their cost effectiveness.” Risk Analysis, 15, 3: 369-90.

 

Marris, Claire, Brian Wynne, Peter Simmons, and Sue Weldon. (2002). “Public Perceptions of Agricultural Biotechnologies in Europe.” Summary for Final Report of the PABE Research Project. pp. 1-10. Full report available at http://www.pabe.net.

 

Scruggs, Lyle. (2002). “Objective Threats and Post-material Values as Causes of Environmental Concern in the European Union.” Paper presented at the International Sociological Assocation’s 15th World Congress, Brisbane, Australia, July 7-13. pp. 1-26.

 

Wildavsky, Aaron. (1991). “The Media’s American Egalitarians.” In Aaron Wildavsky, The Rise of Radical Egalitarianism. Washington, D.C.: American University Press. pp. 115-132.

 

Wildavsky, Aaron. (1989). “On Collaboration.” In Aaron Wildavsky, Craftways: On the Organization of Scholarly Work. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers. pp. 103-118.

 

WEEK 7: CONCEPTIONS AND THEORIES OF POLICY-MAKING

 

Questions to guide reading; questions to guide writing of discussion paper: What is cultural theory? How might it help explain differences in risk perception and regulation? What are policymaking arenas? What explains incremental versus sudden, dramatic changes in policy? What are policy advocacy coalitions? How might we integrate these concepts and theories into more powerful explanations of differences in risk perception and regulation?

 

Timmermans, Arco. (2001). “Arenas as Institutional Sites for Policymaking: Patterns and Effects in Comparative Perspective.” Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 3, 3: 311-337.

 

True, James L. Bryan D. Jones, and Frank R. Baumgartner. (1999). “Punctuated-Equilibrium Theory: Explaining Stability and Change in American Policymaking.” In Theories of the Policy Process. Paul A. Sabatier, ed. Boulder, Co: Westview Press. pp. 97-115.

 

Sabatier, Paul A. and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith. (1999). “The Advocacy-Coalition Framework: An Assessment.” In Theories of the Policy Process. Paul A. Sabatier, ed. Boulder, Co: Westview Press. pp. 117-166.

 

Swedlow, Brendon. (2002). “Toward Cultural Analysis in Policy Analysis: Picking Up Where Aaron Wildavsky Left Off.” Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 4: 267-285.

 

Swedlow, Brendon. (1994). “Cultural Influences on Policies Concerning Mental Illness.” In Politics, Policy, and Culture.  Dennis J. Coyle and Richard J. Ellis, eds. Boulder, Co.: Westview Press. pp. 71-89.

 

Swedlow, Brendon. (2001). “Aaron Wildavsky, Cultural Theory, and Budgeting.” In Aaron Wildavsky, Budgeting and Governing, Brendon Swedlow, ed. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers. pp. 335-357.

 

 

SUPPLEMENTAL READING AND/OR RELATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

Ostrom, Elinor. (1999). “Institutional Rational Choice: An Assessment of the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework.” In Theories of the Policy Process. Paul A. Sabatier, ed. Boulder, Co: Westview Press. pp. 35-71.

 

Zahariadis, Nikolaos. (1999). “Ambiguity, Time, and Multiple Streams.” In Theories of the Policy Process. Paul A. Sabatier, ed. Boulder, Co: Westview Press. pp. 73-93.

 

Blomquist, William. (1999). “The Policy Process and Large-N Comparative Studies.” In Theories of the Policy Process. Paul A. Sabatier, ed. Boulder, Co: Westview Press. pp. 301-230.

 

Hajer, Maarten A. (1993). “Discourse Coalitions and the Institutionalization of Practice: The Case of Acid Rain in Britain.” In The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis and Planning, Frank Fischer and John Forester, eds. Durham: Duke University Press. pp. 43-76.

 

Sabatier, Paul A. (1998). “The advocacy coalition framework: revisions and relevance for Europe.” Journal of European Public Policy 5, 1: 98-130.

 

Dudley, Geoffrey, Wayne Parsons, Claudio M. Radaelli, and Paul Sabatier. (2000). “Symposium: Theories of the Policy Process.” Journal of European Public Policy, 7, 1: 122-140.

 

Collier, David and James E. Mahon, Jr. (1993). “Conceptual ‘Stretching’ Revisited: Adapting Categories in Comparative Analysis.” American Political Science Review, 87, 4: 845-855.

 

WEEK 8: A CULTURAL THEORY OF RISK AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE

 

Questions to focus your reading and discussion paper for this week: Are there different versions of cultural theory? If so, how do they differ? How might cultural theory be used to explain risk perception and regulation? What are its strengths and weaknesses? Are its weaknesses fatal or can they be fixed? How would you fix them?

 

Michiel Schwarz and Michael Thompson. (1990). Divided We Stand: Redefining Politics, Technology, and Social Choice. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

 

Johnson, Branden B. (1987). “The Environmentalist Movement and Grid/Group Analysis: A Modest Critique.” In The Social and Cultural Construction of Risk: Essays on Risk Selection and Perception. Branden B. Johnson and Vincent T. Covello, eds. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. pp. 147-175.

 

Coyle, Dennis J. (1994). “’This Land is Your Land, This Land is My Land’: Cultural Conflict in Environmental and Land Use Regulation.” In Politics, Policy, and Culture.  Dennis J. Coyle and Richard J. Ellis, eds. Boulder, Co.: Westview Press. pp. 33-50.

 

SUPPLEMENTAL READING AND/OR RELATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

Douglas, Mary and Aaron Wildavsky. (1982). Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Technical and Environmental Dangers. Berkeley: University of California Press.

 

Rayner, Steve. (1987). “Risk and Relativism in Science for Policy.” In The Social and Cultural Construction of Risk: Essays on Risk Selection and Perception. Branden B. Johnson and Vincent T. Covello, eds. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. pp. 5-23.

 

Adams, John. (1995). Risk. London: UCL Press.

 

Beck, Ulrich. (1999). “From Industrial Society to Risk Society: Questions of Survival, Social Structure, and Ecological Enlightenment.” In Ulrich Beck, World Risk Society. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers. pp. 48-71.

 

WEEK 9: NO CLASS MARCH 12-20TH, SPRING BREAK

 

WEEK 10: CULTURAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES OF RISK PERCEPTION

 

Questions to guide your reading and discussion paper writing: How has cultural theory been operationalized in survey research? That is, what kinds of questions have been asked to identify respondents with hierarchical, individualistic, and egalitarian cultural biases? How well do these cultural bias measures predict risk perceptions and environmental concerns? Are there problems with the way cultural theory has been operationalized? How might these measures be used and any problems remedied to study risk regulation in Illinois?

 

Wildavsky, Aaron and Karl Dake. (1990). “Theories of Risk Perception: Who Fears What and Why?” Daedalus 119, 4: 41-60. Reprinted in Aaron Wildavsky, The Rise of Radical Egalitarianism. Washington, D.C.: American University Press. pp. 133-150.

 

Ellis, Richard J. and Fred Thompson. (1997). “Culture and the Environment in the Pacific Northwest.” American Political Science Review, 91, 4: 885-897. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28199712%2991%3A4%3C885%3ACATEIT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-E

 

Slovic, Paul, James Flynn, C.K. Mertz, Marc Poumadere, and Claire Mays. (2000). “Nuclear Power and the Public: A Comparative Study of Risk Perception in France and the United States.” In Cross-Cultural Risk Perception: A Survey of Empirical Studies. Ortwin Renn and Bernd Rohrmann, eds. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 55-102.

 

Kahan, Dan M. and Donald Braman. (2003). “More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 151, 4: 1291-1325.

http://www.niulib.niu.edu:2481/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/pnlr151&id=1305&collection=journals

 

Douglas, Mary. (2003). “Being Fair To Hierarchists.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 151, 4: 1349-1370. http://www.niulib.niu.edu:2481/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/pnlr151&id=1363&collection=journals

 

Kahan, Dan M. and Donald Braman. (2003). “Caught in the Crossfire: A Defense of the Cultural Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions.” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 151, 4: 1395-1416. http://www.niulib.niu.edu:2481/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/pnlr151&id=1409&collection=journals

 

Rohrmann, Bernd. (2000). “Cross-Cultural Studies on the Perception and Evaluation of Hazards.” In Cross-Cultural Risk Perception: A Survey of Empirical Studies. Ortwin Renn and Bernd Rohrmann, eds. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 103-144.

 

SUPPLEMENTAL READING AND/OR RELATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

Renn, Ortwin and Bernd Rohrmann. (2000). “Cross-Cultural Risk Perception: State and Challenges.” In Cross-Cultural Risk Perception: A Survey of Empirical Studies. Ortwin Renn and Bernd Rohrmann, eds. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 211-233.

 

Wildavsky, Aaron. (1993). “The Comparative Study of Risk Perception: A Beginning.” In Risk is a Construct: Perceptions of Risk Perception. Bayerische Rueck, ed. Munich: Knesebeck. pp. 179-195.

 

Jenkins-Smith, Hank C. and Walter K. Smith. (1994). “Ideology, Culture, and Risk Perception.” In Politics, Policy, and Culture.  Dennis J. Coyle and Richard J. Ellis, eds. Boulder, Co.: Westview Press. pp. 17-32.

 

Douglas, Mary. (1997). “The Depoliticization of Risk.” In Culture Matters: Essays in Honor of Aaron Wildavsky. Richard J. Ellis and Michael Thompson, eds. Boulder, Co: Westview Press. pp. 121-132.

 

Marris, Claire, Ian H. Langford, and Timothy O’Riordan. (1998). “A Quantitative Test of the Cultural Theory of Risk Perception: Comparison with the Psychometric Paradigm.” Risk Analysis, 18, 5: 635-647.

 

Sjoeberg, Lennart. (2000). “Factors in Risk Perception.” Risk Analysis, 20, 1: 1-11.

 

Weber, Elke U. and Christopher K. Hsee. (2000). “Culture and Individual Judgment and Decision Making.” Applied Psychology: An International Review, 49, 1: 32-61.

 

WEEK 11: DANIEL ELAZAR’S AMERICAN POLITICAL SUBCULTURES

 

Questions to guide your reading and discussion papers this week: What are Daniel Elazar's political cultures? How did these political cultures arise? What does he use them to explain? How is his conception of political culture similar to and different from the Cultural Theory of Douglas, Wildavsky, and those working with their cultural concepts? How might Elazar's political cultural concepts and measures of political cultures help us study political cultural influences on risk perception and regulation in Illinois?

 

Elazar, Daniel J. (1994). “The Political Subcultures of the United States.” In Daniel J. Elazar, The American Mosaic: The Impact of Space, Time and Culture on American Politics. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. pp. 229-257.

 

Thompson, Michael, Richard Ellis, and Aaron Wildavsky. (1990). “American Political Subcultures.” In Michael Thompson, Richard Ellis, and Aaron Wildavsky, Cultural Theory. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. pp. 233-245.

 

Elazar, Daniel J. (1994). “The Three-Dimensional Location of the United States.” In Daniel J. Elazar, The American Mosaic: The Impact of Space, Time and Culture on American Politics. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. pp. 1-39.

 

Elazar, Daniel J. (1986). “Political Culture and the Geology of Local Politics.” In Daniel J. Elazar, Cities of the Prairie Revisited: The Closing of the Metropolitan Frontier. Lincoln, NB: Nebraska University Press. pp. 82-111.

 

Dran, Ellen B., Robert B. Albritton, and Mikel Wyckoff. (1991). “Surrogate vs. Direct Measures of Political Culture: Explaining Participation and Policy Attitudes in Illinois.” Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 21, 2: 15-30.

 

WEEK 12: CULTURES, FEDERALISM, REGULATION, AND MANAGEMENT

 

Considerations and questions to guide reading and discussion this week: This week’s readings bring cultural theory to bear on institutions, showing how federal, administrative, and regulatory institutions might be expected to differ culturally. What are the cultural manifestations of these differences described by Wildavsky and Hood? What are the likely consequences of these different institutional cultures for risk regulation? How might they be related to the cultural differences in risk perception we've seen in the public? How might any of this help our study of risk regulation in Illinois?

 

Wildavsky, Aaron. (1998). “Federalism Means Inequality.” In Aaron Wildavsky, Federalism and Political Culture, David Schleicher and Brendon Swedlow, eds. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers. pp. 39-54.

 

Hood, Christopher. (1998). “Control and Regulation in Public Management.”  In Christopher Hood, The Art of the State: Culture, Rhetoric, and Public Management. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 49-70.

 

Hood, Christopher. (1998). “Doing Public Management the Hierarchist Way.” In Christopher

Hood, The Art of the State: Culture, Rhetoric, and Public Management. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 73-97.

 

Hood, Christopher. (1998). “Doing Public Management the Individualist Way.” In Christopher

Hood, The Art of the State: Culture, Rhetoric, and Public Management. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 98-119.

 

Hood, Christopher. (1998). “Doing Public Management the Egalitarian Way.” In Christopher

Hood, The Art of the State: Culture, Rhetoric, and Public Management. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 120-144.

 

Hammer, Dean and Aaron Wildavsky. (1989). “The Open-Ended, Semi-Structured Interview: An (Almost) Operational Guide.” In Aaron Wildavsky, Craftways: On the Organization of Scholarly Work. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers. pp. 57-101.

 

 

SUPPLEMENTAL READING AND/OR RELATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

Hood, Christopher. (1998). “Doing Public Management the Fatalist Way?” In Christopher

Hood, The Art of the State: Culture, Rhetoric, and Public Management. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 145-167.

 

WEEK 13: RISK REGULATION REGIMES AND ILLINOIS POLITICS & POLICY

 

Questions to guide your reading, writing, and research this week: What are risk regulation regimes? Why do they matter? How far does context shape content in risk regulation regimes? Given that Christopher Hood also authored last week's reading applying cultural theory to public administration, why is so little of the context and content of his risk regulation regimes characterized in a cultural way? Is it because things other than cul