Theories of International Relations POLS 680

Fall 2008

Professor:                               Daniel R. Kempton
Meeting time and place:        3:30-6:10 PM, Thursday, 464 DU
Office Hours:                         Tue, 1:30 pm - 4:30, Wed 10:30 am-11:55, and by appointment.
Office address: Zulauf 402     phone: 753-7055
Mobile phone:                        815-762-6877 (for immediate needs)
E-Mail:                           (I normally check my e-mail 3-4 times per week.)

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Course description/objectives:
The study of international relations is an extremely eclectic and rapidly growing field. It has no single universally accepted approach. Instead there are literally dozens of approaches, each advocated by different reputable scholars. While some approaches have become increasingly popular and others have fallen into disuse, many approaches coexist. At times scholars will select their approach based on the particular question they seek to answer. In other instances scholars will combine approaches or use competing approaches side by side in order to answer a single question.  Often there are also competing methodologies used within the same theoretical approach.

Typically, each theoretical approach identifies a particular variable (or set of variables) that its proponents believe is particularly useful in explaining, describing and predicting international relations. In this course, the approaches are divided up by the level of the independent variable used to explain international relations. The initial approaches focus on the attributes of individual decision makers. Later approaches focus on the attributes of groups of decision makers; the attributes of individual states; and ultimately on the attributes of the international system. At each of these "levels of analysis" there are competing approaches.

A confounding problem is that the approaches may seek to explain differing dependent variables. Most approaches will seek to explain international relations, or foreign policy. However both terms are very ambiguous and may be used in a variety of ways. Consider, for example, the definitions of foreign policy. First, foreign policy may refer to the long-term plan or strategy of a nation. With this definition, foreign policy is implicitly rational. Second, foreign policy sometimes refers to specific decisions. While such decisions obviously relate to a long-term plan or strategy, they often also entail compromises with various environmental constraints. Finally, many authors use foreign policy to refer to the actual behavior of states, which may not be entirely the results of decisions or planning.

 Because the approaches to the study of international relations are too numerous to be adequately examined in a single course, this course is not designed to provide the student with an exhaustive knowledge of the field. Instead, it will provide a sample of works from a number of the more prevalent approaches. The student, therefore, is expected to acquire a basic knowledge of the major systemic and subsystemic approaches to the study of international relations, and to develop a basic familiarity with some of the key works within each major approach. In addition, students are required to draw their own conclusions about each approach. In particular students must assess the strengths and weaknesses of each approach and, the conditions under which it fruitfully can be applied to explain, predict or describe foreign policy. For example, is an approach useful for both developed and underdeveloped states? Can it explain the behavior of dictatorships as well as democracies?  It is useful for small states, as well as large one?  Can it explain crisis and non-crisis policy? Does it better describe long term policies, specific decisions or the actions of states?  Is it better for explaining economic or military policy?  Is its utility limited to specific types of decisions?  These are the types of questions that will be addressed in class and should be considered in the papers.

The course will assist students in two separate but related areas. First, it provides basic preparation for the comprehensive examinations. Although students will be expected to do additional reading in preparation for the examinations (see the recommended list), the course provides an introduction to the major theoretical approaches in international relations. Second, the student will hopefully gain some understanding of particular approaches relevant to his/her own research interests. In this way, the course may provide the theoretical knowledge necessary for the eventual completion of a starred paper, and M.A. thesis, or a Ph.D. dissertation.

Course requirements:
1. Required/recommended texts:
Each student is expected to read the assigned readings as listed in the course outline in preparation for his/her participation in the weekly seminar. Participation in class discussions is not only welcome, it is required. The recommended readings list is made up of readings students may consult in their eventual preparation for their comprehensive examinations or in their research. Recommended readings are not required and will not be discussed in class, nor will any knowledge of them be presumed. Also listed among the supplemental readings are a number of books which provide an overview of international relations theory.  For the sake of expense, I have tried to select a large number of readings from one collection this year.  I have thus ordered copies of this text for purchase.  However, it may be found cheaper on line.  There are only two texts that I would recommend all students purchase:

1.      Phil Williams, Donald M. Goldstein, and Jay M. Shafritz, Classic Readings and Contemporary Debates in International Relations (3d edn), Cengage Learning (formerly Thomson-Wadsworth), 2006.

2.      Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd Edn, Longman, 1999.

Students should also read at least some of the news stories posted for POLS 285 (see below).


* Supplemental readings are not required! There is no expectation that they will be read during the semester. However, a student "may" wish to consult some of the supplemental readings when using the approach in a future research project or in preparation for dissertation research.


2. Discussion: This course is a seminar, which means that student participation is expected and required.   Seminar participation will be worth approximately 15 percent of the semester grade.  Your course participation grade will be based on three factors:

    a. the quality and quantity of your participation in class discussions;   

    b. regular attendance at class; and

    c. a minimum of five comments posted on the Blackboard discussion group on the undergraduate international relations course, POLS 285-1.

When posting comments on the undergraduate board, you may raise issues that derive from the news stories on posted on the POLS 285 blackboard space, or you may respond to the queries and comments of undergraduate enrolled in POLS 285.  While graduate participants in the discussion group should pose thoughtful questions to the newsgroup and are free to challenge the comments posted by undergraduate participants, they should also display the degree of respect and professionalism that is expected from an instructor in the discipline.  Students are welcome to attend sessions of POLS 285, but are not required to do so and are not responsible for material covered in POLS 285. We will briefly discuss the news on the POLS 285 blackboard space (see above) at the beginning of each class.  Your participation grade will compose 15 percent of your semester grade.

3. Written assignments:
Option A: Students will write five short critiques, approximately one every other class period. Please decide whether you prefer the A or B readings by the third week of class.  Each paper is worth 13% of the course grade. The critiques should be between five and seven pages in length (double-spaced) and are due at the beginning of class during which they are to be discussed. In the critique, the student is asked to briefly comment on each of the works assigned for that week. For each work, the student should answer the following questions. i. What is the central theoretical proposition or thesis of this study? ii. What are the major strengths and weaknesses of this study? The student should then evaluate the utility of the approach as a whole. This section should answer the following types of questions. i. Is the approach testable? ii. Does it entail a cultural bias? iii. What types of foreign policy can it explain? iv. Is it parsimonious?
Option B: Students will write two critiques of the type described above and, one term paper. Each of the short papers will be worth 12.5% and the term paper will be worth 40% of the final grade.  The term paper will employ one or two of the theories presented in the class to explain a particular foreign policy or specific decision. This option is designed to allow students to fulfill their starred paper requirement.

4. Final Examination:

At the end of the course each student will take a final examination. The final will be an essay exam, which will resemble the comprehensive examination in content and format. Prior to the examination sample questions will likely be provided. Thus, the examination will test your knowledge of the material presented and provide the student with valuable practice for his/her comprehensives. The examination will be worth 20% of the final grade.


Grading Summary:

15% participation

65% papers (5 X 13%; or 2 X 12.5% + 40%)

20% final examination

Plagiarism Statement:
"The attempt of any student to present as his or her own work that which he or she has not produced is regarded by the faculty and administration as a serious offense. Students are considered to have cheated if they copy the work of another during an examination or turn in a paper or an assignment written, in whole or in part, by someone else. Students are guilty of plagiarism, intentional or not, if they copy material from books, magazines, or other sources or if they paraphrase ideas from such sources without acknowledging them. Students guilty of, or assisting others in, either cheating or plagiarism on an assignment, quiz, or examination may receive a grade of F for the course involved and may be suspended or dismissed from the university." Northern Illinois University Undergraduate Catalog.

Reading List:

1. Distribution of the Syllabi and Discussion of Course Requirements (August 28)

2. The Level of Analysis Problem and the Quest for Theory (September 4)

  1. Singer, J. David, "The Level of Analysis Problem in International Relations," In Williams, Goldstein and Shafritz, chp. 18.
  2. Berkowtiz, B.D., "Level of Analysis Problems in International Studies," International Interactions, vol. 12, no. 3, 1986, pp. 199-227.

3.                              Steven M. Walt, "International Relations: One World, Many Theories." Foreign Policy, Spring, 1998, 29-46.



1.                              Kenneth Waltz, Man the State, and War, New York: Columbia University Press, 1959. Chapters 1 & 8.

2.                              Yalem, Ronald J., "The Level of Analysis Problem Reconsidered. The Year-Book of World Affairs. pp. 306-326, 1977.

3.                              Moul, William B. 1973. The Level of Analysis Problem Revisited. Canadian Journal of Political Science. no. 3, 6:494-513.

  1. Yalte T. Fergusen and Richard W. Mansbach, The State, Conceptual Chaos and the Futre of International Relations Theory, GSIS Monograph Series in World Affairs, Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989.
  2. Ole Holsti, "Theories of International Relations and Foreign Policy:  Realism and its Challengers," Foundations of International Relations Theory.

6.                              James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of International Relations, 5th Edn, 2001, Chapter 1.


3. The Issue of Rationality (Rational Decision Making) (September 11) A

  1. Allison, Graham and Philip Zelikow. 1999. Essence of Decision (Chpts. 1 & 2).
  2. Verba, S. "Assumptions of Rationality and non-Rationality in Models of the International System. In James Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy, 2nd ed., 217-234.
  3. Stephen Walt, “Rigor or Rigor Mortis? Rational Choice and Security Studies” International Security, Spring 1999.

4.                              Robert Powell, “Bargaining Theory and International Conflict,” American Review of Political Science, 5, 2002, pp. 1-30.


1. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, (Chpt. 3).
2. Dahl, Robert. 1957. The Concept of Power. Behavioral Scientist, no. 2, July, pp. 201-215.
3. Haas, Ernest B. 1953. "The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda. World Politics, no. 4, 5:442-477.
4. Morgenthau, Hans. 1946. Scientific Man vs. Power Politics.
5. International Studies Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 2, 1981. (debate on neo-realism)
6. Ostrom, Elinor, "A Behavioral Approach to Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action," American Political Science Review, March 1998, 92(1), pp. 1-22.
7. George, Alexander and Richard L. Smoke, "Deterrence and Foreign Policy," World Politics, 41, 2:170-182, 1989.
8. Jervis, Robert, "Rational Deterrence: Theory and Practice," WP, 41, 2:208-224, 1989.
9. Lebow, R.N. and Janice G. Stein, "Rational Deterrence: I think, therefore I Am," World Politics, 41, 2:208-224, 1989.
10. Downs, George W., "The Rational Deterrence Debate," WP, 41, 2:224-238, 1989.
11. Kahn, Herman. 1965. On Escalation.
12. Schelling, Thomas. 1966. The Strategy of Conflict.
13. George, Alexander L. and Richard Smoke. 1974. Deterrence in American Foreign Policy.
14. Jervis, Robert. 1979. Deterrence Theory Revisited. World Politics, Jan, pp. 289-324.
15. Russet, Bruce. 1983. The Prisoners of Insecurity.
16. Jervis, Robert. 1984. The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy.
17. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, (Chpt. 9).
18. Kahn, Herman. 1961. On Thermonuclear War.
19. Schelling, Thomas. 1966. Arms and Influence.
20. Kahn, Herman. 1975. Security in the Nuclear Age.
21. Green, Phillip. 1977. Deadly Logic: The Theory of Nuclear Deterrence.
22. Snyder, Glenn H. and Paul Diesing. 1977. Conflict Among Nations.
23. Russet, Bruce. 1967. Pearl Harbor: Deterrence Theory and Decision Theory. Journal of Peace Research.
24. Morgan, Patrick. 1983. Deterrence Theory: A Conceptual Analysis.
25. Christopher H. Achen and Duncan Snidal, "Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies," World Politics, 41, 2:143-169, 1989.


4. The Individual: Perceptions (September 18) B
1. George, Alexander. 1969. The Operational Code: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making. International Studies Quarterly. 13:190-222.
2. Axelrod, Robert. 1981. The Cognitive Mapping Approach to Decision Making, In Robert Axelrod, ed. The Structure of Decision, pp. 3-17.
3. Robert K. Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1976.  Chpts. 1 & 13.
4. Hermann, Richard K. and Michael P. Fischerkeller, "Beyond the Enemy Image and Spiral Model: Cognitive-Strategic Research After the Cold War," International Organization, 49(3), Summer 1995.


1. Morgan, (pp. 107-125 and Chpt. 3).
2. Sullivan, (Chpt. 2).
3. Holsti, Ole. 1962. The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 3:120-131.
4. Jervis, Robert. 1976. Perception and Misperception in International Politics.
5. White, Ralph K. 1965. Images in the Context of International Conflict: Soviet Perceptions of the US and the USSR. In Herbert Kelman, ed., International Behavior. pp. 236-276.
6. Shapiro, Michael J. and G. Matthew Bonham. 1973. Cognitive Process and Foreign Policy Decision Making. International Studies Quarterly. no. 2, 17:147-174.
7. Holsti, Ole. 1981. Foreign Policy Formation Viewed Cognitively. In Robert Axelrod, ed. The Structure of Decision, pp. 18-54.
8. Axelrod, Robert. 1981. The Analysis of Cognitive Maps. In Robert Axelrod, ed., The Structure of Decision, pp. 55-73.
9. Falkowski, Lawrence S. 1979. Predicting Flexibility Responses with Memory Profiles, In L. Falkowski, ed., Psychological Models in International Politics, pp. 46-69.
10. Conover, P.J. and S. Feldman. How People Organize the Political World. In Robert Axelrod, ed., The Structure of Decision, pp. 55-73.
11. Walker, S. 1977. The Interface Between Beliefs and Behavior: Henry Kissinger's Operational Code and the Vietnam War. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 21:126-168.
12. Cottam, Martha L. Foreign Policy Decision-Making: The Influence of Cognition, Boulder: Westeview Press, 1986.
13. Hermann, Richard. 1988. The Empirical Challenge of the Cognitive Revolution. International Studies Quarterly. 32:175-203.
14. Boulding, Kenneth. 1959. National Images and International Systems. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 3:120-133.


5. Group Think and Psychological Factors (Group & Individual) (September 25) A

1. Janis, Irving. 1972. Victims of GroupThink. (chpts. 1, 2, & 8)
2. Glad, Betty. 1979. Psychobiography: Contributions to Political Science. In Jeanne Knutson, ed., Handbook of Political Psychology, pp. 296-321.
3. Paul 'T Hart, Eriz Stern, and Bengt Sundelius, 1997,  Beyond Groupthink: Political Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy Making.  Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. (Chapters 1 & 10)


1. Glad, Betty. 1980. Jimmy Carter and the Search for the Great White House, pp. 475-509.
2. George, Alexander L. and Juliette L. 1956 Research Note. Woodrow Wilson and Colonel George, pp. 317-322.
3. Wiegele, Thomas. 1985. Leaders Under Stress: A Psychophysiological Analysis of International Crises. (chpts. 1, 2, & 7)
4. Lasswell, Harold. 1948. Power and Personality.
5. Kelman, Herbert. 1965. Social Psychological Approaches to the Study of International Relations. In Kelman, ed., International Behavior, pp. 3-32.
6. DeRivera, Joseph H. 1968. The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy.
7. Hermann, Margaret. 1974. Leader Personality and Foreign Policy Behavior. In James N. Rosenau, ed., Comparing Foreign Policies. pp. 201-234.
8. Kaplowitz, Noel. 1990. National Self-Images Perceptions of Enemies, and Conflict Strategies: Psychopolitical Dimensions of International Relations. Political Psychology, vol. 11, 1:39-8
Wiegele, Thomas. 1979. Signal Leakage and the Remote Psychological Assessment of Foreign Policy. In Lawrence S. Falkowski, ed., Psychological Models in International Relations, pp. 71-90.
10. Somit, A. 1968. Toward a More Biologically Oriented Political Science. Midwest Journal of Political Science. November.
11. Wiegele, Thomas. 1979. The Biology of International Relations. In Thomas Wiegele, Biopolitics: Search for a More Human Political Science. pp. 101-120.
12. Wiegele, Thomas. 1973. Decision Making in an International Crisis: Some Biological Factors. International Studies Quarterly. September.
13. Kucharski, A. 1984. On being Sick and Famous. Political Psychology 69-81.
14. Irving Janis, 1982, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decision.
15. Paul 'T Hart, A Study of Small Groups and Policy Failure: Groupthink in Government.


6. The Bureaucratic Politics Model (Groups) (October 2) B

1. Graham Allison & Philip Zelikow. 1999. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Longman: New York. (Chpts. 3-7).

2. Christopher M. Jones, “Bureaucratic Politics and Organizational Process Models,” (2009), under review, used with permission of the author.

3.  Jiri Valenta, Jiri. Soviet Bureaucratic Politics and Czechoslovakia. Political Science Quarterly. 1979, 94:55-76.
4.. Bendor, Jonathan and Thomas H. Hammond.  1992.  “Rethinking Allison’s Models,” American Political Science Review 86:301-322.

1. Morgan, pp. 85-107.
2. Allison, Graham T. and Morton Halperin. 1972. Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications. In Raymond Tanter and Richard H. Ullman, eds., Theory and Policy in International Relations, pp. 40-79.
3. Halperin, Morton. 1974. Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy.
4. Art, Robert. 1973. Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy. Policy Sciences. 4:467-489.
5. Valenta, Jiri. 1980. Soviet Decision-Making in Angola. In David E. Albright, ed., Africa and International Communism.
6. Valenta, Jiri. 1980. The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: The Difficulty of knowing where to Stop. Orbis. 2:201-218.
7. Vandenbroucke. L.S. 1984. Anatomy of a Failure: The Decision to Land at the Bay of Pigs. Political Science Quarterly. 471-491.
8. Rosati, J. 1981. Developing a Systematic Decision Making Framework: Bureaucratic Politics in Perspective. World Politics. Jan.
9. Stewart, Philip D., et. al., 1989. Modelling the 1973 Soviet Decision to Support Egypt. American Political Science Review. 83(1):35-59.
10. Bendor, Jonathan & Thomas H. Hammond, Rethinking Allison's Models. APSR, 86(2):301-322.
11. Welch, David A. The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms. International Secuirty, 17(2):112-146.
12. Rhodes, Edward, "Do Bureaucratic Politics Matter?" World Politics, 47, October 1994, 1-44.


14. Kozak, David C., "The Bureaucratic Politics Approach: The Evolution of a Paradigm," in David C. Kozak and James M. Keagle, eds., Bureaucratic Politics and National Security Theory and Practice, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1988, pp. 3-15.

15. Eric Stern, et. al., "Whither the Study of Governmental Politics in Foreign Policymaking? A Symposium." Mershon International Studies Review, vol. 42, supplement no. 2, November 1988, pp. 205-246.

16. George, Alexander L. 1972. The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy. American Political Science Review. 66(3):751-785.

17. Destler, I.M. 1972. Comment. APSR. 66(3):786-790.

18. George, Alexander L. 1972. Rejoinder. APSR. 66(3):791-795.

19. Morgan, (pp. 85-107).
20. Simon, Herbert. 1953. Administrative Behavior. (passim).


7. National Attribute Theory: Democratic Peace Thesis (October 9) A

1. Michael Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” American Political Science Review, 80, 1986, 1151-1169.

2. Russet, Debating the Democratic Peace, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999, pp. 337-350.

3. Layne, Debating the Democratic Peace, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999, pp. 157-201.

4. Spiro, Debating the Democratic Peace, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999, pp. 351-354.



  1. E. Mansfield and J. Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," International Security, 20(1), Summer 1995.
  2. Bruce Russett, "A Community of Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organization," in Charles W. Kegley Jr., and Eugene Wittkopf, eds, The Global Agenda, 5th edn, Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1998, pp. 241-252.
  3. Bruce Russet, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
  4. Daniel Deudney, "Geopolitics and Change," in Michael W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry, eds.,  New Thinking in International Relations Theory, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997, pp. 91-123.
  5. Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., Debating the Democratic Peace. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996.
  6. Gurr, Ted Robert and Barbara Harff, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics, Bourlder: Westview Press, 1994.
  7. Farnen, Russell F., ed., Nationalism, Ethnicity and Identity: Cross National and Comparative Perspectives, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1994.
  8. Stuart A. Bremmer, "Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of Interstate War, 1816-1965, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 36(2), June 1992, 309-341.
  9. Bruce Russett and John Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence and International Organization. New York: Norton.
  10. Bruce Russett, "How Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations Create a System for Peace," in Charles W. Kegley Jr., and Eugene Wittkopf, eds, The Global Agenda, 6th edn, Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2001, pp. 232-242.


8. National Attribute Theory: Clash of Civilizations (October 16) B

1. Huntington, Samuel. "The Clash of Civilizations?," Foreign Affairs, 72(3), Summer 1993, 22-48.

2. "Comments: Responses to Samuel P. Huntington's The Clash of Civilizations," Foreign Affairs, 72(4), September-October 1993, pp. 1-26.

3. Eduard Solovyev, “Russian Geopolitics in the Context of Globalization,” in Douglas W. Blum, Russia and Globalization, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008, pp. 287-306.



1. Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.


9. Comparative Foreign Policy (October 23) A

1. Rosenau, James. "Pretheories and Theories of Foreign Policy. In Rosenau," ed., The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy. pp. 95-149, 1971.

2. Rosenau, James, Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

3. Rosenau, James, “The Two Worlds of Politics,” In Williams, Goldstein and Shafritz, chp. 16.

4. Jerel A. Rosati, Joe D. Hagan and Martin Sampson III, eds., Foreign Policy Restructuring: How Governments Respond to Global Change, University of South Carolina Press, 1994. (Chpts. 1,2 & 12)


1. Wilkinson, David O. 1969. Comparative Foreign Relations.
2. Rosenau, James. 1971. Comparative Foreign Policy: Fad, Fantasy or Field? In Rosenau, ed., The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy. pp. 67-94.
3. Rosenau, James. 1979. Comparing Foreign Policies: Why, What, How. In Rosenau, ed., Comparing Foreign Policies: Theories Findings and Methods. pp. 3-22.
4. Rosenau, James and Gary D. Hoggard. 1979. Foreign Policy Behavior in Dyadic Relationships: Testing a Pre-Theoretical Extension. In Rosenau, ed., Comparing Foreign Policies. pp. 117-150.
5. Wilkenfeld, Jonathan. 1980. Foreign Policy Behavior. 6. Hermann, Charles F., Kegley & Rosenau, New Directions in The Study of Foreign Policy, 1987.
7. Kegley Jr., Charles W., The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy, 1988.
8. Rosenau, James. 1984. A Pre-Theory Revisited: World Politics in an Era of Cascading Independence. International Studies Quarterly. 28:245-305.
9. Hermann, Charles F. & Gregory Peacock. The Evolution and Future of Theoretical Research in the Comparative Study of Foreign Policy. In Hermann, et. al., eds., New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy, 1987, 13-32.
10. Laura Neachk, Foreign Policy Analysis.
11. Juliet Kaarboo, Michael Snarr, Ryan Beasely, and Jeff Lentis, Contemporary Comparative Foreign Policy, Congressional Quarterly, 2001.
12. Robert A. Pastor, ed., A Century's Journey: How The Great Powers Shape the World, New York: Basic Books, 1999.
13. Bahgat Korany, How Foreign Policy Decisions are Made in the Third World.
14. Michael Clarke and Brian White, eds., Understanding Foreign Policy: The Foreign Policy Systems Approach, Edward Elgar, 1995.


10. Classical Realism (October 30) B
1. Thucydides, “ The Pelopennesian War and the Melian Dialogue,” in Williams, Goldstein and Shafritz, chpt. 5.

2. Thomas Hobbes, “Relations Among Sovereigns,” in Williams, Goldstein and Shafritz, chpt. 6

3. Edward Hallet Carr, “The Realist Critiques and the Limitations of Realism,” Williams, Goldstein and Shafritz, chpt.7.

4. Hans J. Morgenthau, “Six Principles of Political Realism,” Williams, Goldstein and Shafritz, chpt. 8.

5. Hans J. Morgenthau, “The Balance of Power,” Williams, Goldstein and Shafritz, chpt. 28.

1. Hans Morgenthau, Scientific Man Versus Power Politics.
2. Henry Kissinger, A World Restored.
3. Richard Rosencrance. Action and Reaction in World Politics, pp. 1-125.
4. E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939.
5. Thucydides, The Peloppensian War.
6. Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society.
7. "The Realist Tradition and Power," in Phil Williams, Goldstein and Shafritz, eds., Classic Readings of International Relations, 2nd ed., Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace, 1999, pp. 30-58.
8. John A. Vasquez, ed., Classics of International Relations, 3d edn., New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1996, Chapter 1.
9. James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of International Relations, 5th Edn, New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 2001. Chapter 2.

11. Classical Liberalism (November 6) A

  1. Hugo Grotius, “The Rights of War and Peace,” Williams, Goldstein and Shafritz, chpt. 1.
  2. Michael W. Doyle, Kant’s Perpetual Peace,” Williams, Goldstein and Shafritz, chpt. 2.Woodrow Wilson, “The Fourteen Points,” Williams, Goldstein and Shafritz, chpt. 3.
  3. Hedley Bull, “The Idea of International Society, Williams, Goldstein and Shafritz, chpt. 4.
  4. Mark W. Zacher & Richard Matthew, "Liberal International Theory: Common Threads, Divergent Strands," in Charles W. Kegley, ed., Controversies in International Relations Theory:  Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995, pp. 107-150.



  1. John A. Vasquez, ed., Classics of International Relations, 3d edn., New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1996, Chapters 2-3.
  2. "Selected Readings," from Gilpin, Keohane, & Krasner in Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, eds., International Relations Theory, 3d edn., 1999.
  3. Immanual Wallerstein, "Chapter 1: The Inequalities of Core and Periphery",  in Immanual Wallerstein, The Modern World System, 1979.
  4. Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics Revisited," in Charles W. Kegley, ed., Controversies in International Relations Theory:  Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995, pp. 83-106.


12. Neorealism (November 13) B

  1. Kenneth Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” Williams, Goldstein and Shafritz, chpt.9.
  2. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001), pp. 14-54.
  3. John J. Mearsheimer, "Structural Realism," in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith, eds., International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 71-88.
  4. Stephen G. Brooks, "Dueling Realisms," International Organization, 51(3) Summer 1997.



1. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics,  1979. Chpts. 3, 5-6.

2. David Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism.

3. Joseph M. Grieco, Realist Theory and the Study of World Politics, in Michael W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry, eds.,  New Thinking in International

Relations Theory, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997, pp. 163-201.

4. John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future," International Security, 15(1), Summer 1990, also in Michael Brown et. al., eds., The Perils of Anarchy, Cambridge,

MA: 1995.

5. John Mearsheimer, "The Future of the American Pacifier," Foreign Affairs, September/October 2001, pp. 46-61.


13.  Neoliberalism & Regime Theory (November 20) A

1. Robert O. Keohane, “Cooperation and International Regimes,” Williams, Goldstein and Shafritz, chpt. 32

2. Robert Axelrod, “The Evolution of Cooperation,” Williams, Goldstein and Shafritz, chpt. 33.

3. Donald J. Puchala, “The Integration Theorists and the Study of International Relations,” Williams, Goldstein and Shafritz, chpt. 34.

4. Arthur Stein, "Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World," in David A. Baldwin, Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary

Debate, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993, pp. 29-59.



1. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition,  

2nd, ed., 1989.  (Chapters 1-3).

2. Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984.

3. Charles W. Kegley, Jr., Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenges, 1995.

4. Michael Doyle and G. John Ikenberry, New Thinking in International Relations Theory, 1997.

5. Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and its Critics, 1986.

6. Stephen D. Krasner, "Overviews," in Krasner, eds., International Regimes, Ithaca: Cornell Unversity Press, 1993, pp. 1-21.

7. Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, "Advancing Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," in David A. Baldwin, Neorealism and 

Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993, pp.85-115.


14. Contstructivism and Debating Rival Theories  (December 4) B

  1. Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It:  The Social Construction of World Politics," International Organization, 46(2), 1992, 391-425.     

Also in Williams, Goldstein and Shafritz, chpt. 35.

  1. J. Ann Tickner, “A Gendered Perspective on National Security,” Williams, Goldstein and Shafritz, chpt. 36.
  2. Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation,” Williams, Goldstein and Shafritz, chpt. 37
  3. John J. Mearshimer, “One World, Rival Theories,” Williams, Goldstein and Shafritz, chpt. 38.



1. Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald, "Norma and Deterrence: The Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboo," in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, pp. 114-152.

2. John Gerard Ruggie, "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution," International Relations Theory, 3d edn., Allyn & Bacon, 1999, pp. 331-341.

3. John Gerard Ruggie, "Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution," in John Gerard Ruggie, ed., Multilateralism Matters, 1993, New York: Columbia

University Press, 1993.

4. Ken Booth, "Security and Self:  Confessions of a Fallen Realist," in Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, eds., Critical Security Studies: Concepts and

Cases, London: UCL Press, 1997, pp. 83-120.


15. Critical Theory

  1. Richard Devetak, "Critical Theory," in Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater, eds., Theories of International Relations, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995.
  2. WynR Jones, "Message in a Bottle? Theory and Praxis in Critical Security Studies," Contemporary Security Policy, 16(3), 1995.
  3. Francis Fukuyama, "Women and the Evolution of World politics," Foreign Affairs, 78(1), Sept/Oct. 1998, 24-39 and responses.
  4. Martin Hoffman, et. al., Beyond the Inter-Paradigm Debate: Critical Theory and International Relations.



  1. Jacqui True "Feminism," in Scott Burchill and Andrew Linlater, eds., Theories of International Relations, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995.J. Ann Tickner in Grant and Newland, eds., Gender and International Relations, Buckingham: Open University Press and Millennium Press, 1991.
  2. Andrew Linklater, Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations.
  3. R. Grant and K. Newland, Gender and International Relations, Indiana University Press, 1991.
  4. V. S. Peterson, ed., Gendered States, Lynne Rienner, 1992.

16. National Attributes: Borders/Frontiers and War

  1. Pearson, Frederic S. 1974. "Geographic Proximity and Foreign Military Intervention," Journal of Conflict Resolution. 18:432-460.
  2. Starr, Harvey and Benjamin A. Most. 1976. "The Substance and Study of Borders in International Relations Research," Inter-national Studies Quarterly. 20:581-620.
  3. Garnham, David. 1976. "Dyadic International War 1816-1965: The Role of Power Parity and Geographic Proximity," Western Political Science Quarterly. 29:231-242.
  4. Kratochwil, "Of Systems, Boundaries and Territoriality: An Inquiry inot the Formation of the State System," World Politics, 39 (October 1986), 27-52.
  5. Weede, Erich. 1976. "Overwhelming Preponderance as a pacifying condition among Contiguous Asian Dyads," 1950-1969.
  6. Garnham, David. 1976. "Power Parity and Lethal International Violence," 1969-1973. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 20:379-94.
  7. Starr and Most. 1983. "Conatgion Effects on Contemporary African Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution. 20:395-411
  8. Starr and Most. 1978. "A Return Journey: Richardson, Frontiers and Wars in the 1946-1965 Era," Journal of Conflict Resolution. 22:441-468.


17. Leadership in Foreign Policy Decision-Making

  1. Burns, James MacGregor. 1978. Leadership. (Part 1).
  2. Tucker, Robert C. 1981. Politics as Leadership.
  3. Wallace, Michael D. and Peter Suedfeld. 1988. Leadership Performance in Crisis: The Longevity-Complexity Link. International Studies Quarterly, 32:439-451.
  4. Chirot, Daniel. Modern Tyrants. Free Press. 1994.
  5. Holsti, Ole R. and James N. Rosenau. 1984. American Leadership in World Affairs: Vietnam and the Breakdown of Consensus. (chpts 1 & 2).
  6. Neustadt, Richard E. 1960. Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership from Carter to FDR.
  7. Hermann, M. G. 1978. Effects of Personal Characteristics of Leaders on Foreign Policy.In, Why Nations Act, edited by M.A. Beverly.
  8. Bunce, Valerie. 1981. Do New Leaders Really Matter:
  9. Breslauer. 1982. Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders.


18. National Attributes: Alliances and War.
1. Ostrom, Charles W. and Francis W. Hoole. 1978. Alliances and Wars Revisited. International Studies Quarterly. 22: 215-236.
2. Thompson, William, Robert D. Duval and Ahmed Dia. 1979. Wars, Alliances and Military Expenditures. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 23:629-654.
3. Siverson, Randolph M. 1980. Attributes of National Alliance Membership and War Participation, 1815-1965. American Journal of Political Science. 24:1-15.
4. Kegley, Charles W. and Raymond Gregory. 1982. International Studies Quarterly. 26:572-595.
5. Weede, Erich. 1983. Extended Deterrence by Superpower Alliance. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 27:231-254.


19. Cybernetic and Incremental Approaches (Group & Individual) (October 2)

1. Lindblom, Charles E. and David Braybrooke. A Strategy of Decision and Policy Evaluation as a Social Process. In James Rosenau, ed., International Politics

and Foreign Policy, pp. 207-216.

2. Steinbrunner, John. 1974. The Cybernetic Theory of Decision. (chpts. 1, 3, & 8)

Schulman, P. R. 1975. Non-Incremental Policy Making: Notes Toward an Alternative Paradigm. APSR 64:1354-1370.


1. read relevant sections of Sullivan (Chpt. 3) and Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (Chpts. 11 & 12).
2. Horelick, Arnold, A. Ross Johnson and John D. Steinbrunner. 1975. The Study of Soviet Foreign Policy: A Review of Decision-Theory-Related Approaches.