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Terrorism
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1. Introduction
Terrorism, as a form of politically motivated violence, is as ancient as organized warfare itself, emerging as soon as one society, pitted against another in the quest for land, resources, or domination, was moved by a desire for vengeance or found advantages in military operations against noncombatants or other ‘soft’ targets. It is sanctioned and glorified in holy scriptures and has been part of the genesis of states and the expansion of empires from the inception of recorded history. The United States itself emerged through the systematic ethnic cleansing of native Americans, a nearly 300-year campaign that featured the destruction of homes and crops, the theft of land, forced expulsions, massacres, and tears.1

While terrorist violence has been employed by both sides in the conflict over Palestine for over 80 years, the prevalence of the rhetoric of ‘terror’ to describe Arab violence against Israeli and Western targets is a more recent phenomenon. For more than three decades, this rhetoric has fostered the popular perception that Arab terrorism is the central problem in the Middle East crisis, and that once solved, progress can be made on other issues. Nothing could be more illusory. The Western obsession with Arab terrorism not only overlooks the fact that terrorist activity between Arabs and Jews has been reciprocal, but, more generally, that attempts to remove an effect without touching its causes are utterly futile. Terrorism between Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Jews is the product of deep divisions, entrenched strategies, and fundamental grievances and will not disappear so long as both sides cling to their present political ambitions and convictions. No informed discussion of its normative status can ignore its historical and political context. At
the same time, terrorism is also the most tragic and sensational aspect of a bitter struggle for control of territory, and any serious attempt to grasp and assess the goals, methods, and passions of either party must recognize its centrality in giving the conflict the particular contours it has.

The object of this chapter is to investigate the role of both terrorism and the rhetoric of ‘terror’ in creating, sustaining, and resolving the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Four questions are paramount:

• What exactly is terrorism?
• How has terrorism shaped the Israeli–Palestinian conflict?
• Does the rhetoric of ‘terror’ help or hinder efforts to understand political violence among Israelis and Palestinians?
• Can any terrorist actions or campaigns of terrorism in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict be morally justified?

2. What is terrorism?

The current ‘war on terror’ has increased the attention given to the very concept of terrorism, to what it means to wage war on terrorism, and to whether ‘war’ is the appropriate response to terrorist violence. Virtually, all discussions of these matters take for granted that terrorism is a problem, and much of the normative debate concerns how it might best be resolved. Obviously, no advance can be made on this front without first delineating the subject matter. Yet, there is considerable disagreement on the very meaning of the term ‘terrorism.’ It is sometimes used so broadly as to become synonymous with ‘coercion’ or ‘coercive intimidation,’ hence, no different from ‘violence’ (Wilkinson, 1986, p. 51; Primoratz, 2004a, p. 16). Often, an explicit definition is not even attempted, and even a cursory glance at the relevant literature reveals that there is no single universally accepted definition of the term—even the various agencies of the U.S. Government are not united.²

While lack of unanimity on a definition need not be a problem for rhetorical purposes, policy-making, legislation, and scholarship about terrorism require a definition in order to identify the phenomenon, justify ascriptions, and motivate moral judgments. In order to understand both the purposes and the effects of the contemporary rhetoric of ‘terror,’ and to set the stage for the investigation of the moral issues noted above, it is important to establish a meaning that is both suitably clear and unbiased, permits consistent ascriptions, and reflects common
usage. Otherwise, how can we determine which actions and agents are ‘terrorist’ and which are not? How else can we fashion policies and statutes to deal with what some regard as a fundamental challenge to world peace? How else could proponents of a war on terrorism identify the enemy and justify their actions?

Most writers on the topic agree that terrorism is (i) a deliberate use or threat of violence, (ii) politically motivated, and (iii) directed against non-military personnel, that is, against civilians or noncombatants. Taking these as the only essential features of terrorism, perhaps the simplest and more accurate reportive definition is this:

Terrorism is deliberate, politically motivated violence, or the threat of such, directed against civilians.\(^5\)

Several terminological points must be addressed to clarify what I will henceforth refer to as this standard definition of ‘terrorism’. First, where ‘violence’ refers to any coercive action or policy that causes physical harm, then violence is politically motivated if caused by desires to achieve certain political goals, where such desires are those of the agent or those of others whose actions have moved the agent to react. This allows that action born out of frustration over a political situation, brought about others pursuing their political agendas, is politically motivated even if the agent does not act from a plan in which terrorism is a means to a definite political goal. By a ‘political goal’ is meant any end concerned with establishing, maintaining, altering, or ending control or authority over regions, persons, or organizations.

Second, the term ‘civilian’ is ambiguous. In the widest sense, ‘civilian’ designates any person who is not a member of a state’s military organizations, and in this sense the notion of civilian is different from that of noncombatant, a concept also used to define ‘terrorism.’ In a narrower sense, ‘civilian’ applies to all and only noncombatants, where a combatant is a member of any organization that uses force or the threat of force in order to establish or sustain a particular political order, or any individual who employs arms for such purposes. For simplicity’s sake, I will use ‘civilian’ in this narrower sense, hence allowing it to be freely interchanged with ‘noncombatant’.\(^4\)

Third, the occurrence of ‘deliberate’ implies that the perpetrator is intentionally using or threatening violence to achieve political objectives and is identifying the victims as civilians. Some insist that the perpetrator must also view the victims as ‘innocent’ (thus, Primoratz, 2004a, p. 240), but this requirement would make terrorism much rarer than usually supposed.
Those who act from outrage over perceived injustices perpetrated by a certain state may view its adult civilians as not ‘innocents’ and as parties to the aggression—say, in virtue of paying taxes, supporting or benefiting from its policies, or, simply, being members of that political body—and thereby, deserving of their fate (see Section 9 below).

Fourth, while the combination of ‘deliberate’ with the phrase ‘directed against’ suggests that actual or threatened violence is intentional, harm to civilians might be incidental to the main aim of a terrorist action, say, to destroy property, to gain attention, to provoke a government’s response. For example, if the attacks on the World Trade Center towers were aimed solely at provoking an American military action, then, while harm to civilians was foreseen and deliberate, it might not have been viewed as essential to the action plan intended, and so, was not itself intentional. What was intentional was destroying those buildings in order to engage the U.S. militarily in the Middle East, not killing civilians. Even if one insists that intentional harm to civilians is essential to terrorism, it need not be the primary objective. Some distinguish the primary targets of terrorism, viz., those whom the perpetrators wish to move in some way, typically, governments, from the secondary targets, namely, the civilians, harm to whom is viewed as a means of moving the primary targets (Wellman, 1979; Primoratz, 2004a). Not all terrorism exhibits this duality; an act of vengeance caused by politically induced grievances might involve no distinction between primary and secondary targets, yet would still qualify as terrorism on the standard definition.

Fifth, it might be thought that etymology demands that terrorism involve the creation of terror, fear, and alarm. While several writers speak of such psychological effects as essential to terrorism, the use of ‘deliberate’ in the definiens of the standard definition once again requires care. Fear and alarm are typically the byproducts of actions that deliberately expose civilians to violence, and certainly many instances of terrorism have had such effects, especially since they are unexpected and unpredictable. But if the perpetrator’s aim is simply to cause outrage and thereby provoke a response in order to achieve political objectives, then fear and alarm may very well be unintended and inessential. In this way, also, terrorists might carefully choose their secondary targets, making it erroneous to require that an act of terrorism be ‘random,’ ‘indiscriminate,’ or ‘irrational.’

Sixth, the standard definition does not imply that terrorism is unjustifiable. It might seem to have that implication given the use of ‘deliberate’ and ‘civilians,’ but a separate argument is needed to establish that a given act of violence directed against such persons is morally unjustifiable. Definitions that explicitly make terrorism illegitimate through
such adjectives as ‘unlawful’, ‘random’, ‘indiscriminate’, and so on make it much more contentious to classify a given action as a terrorist act. A definition that avoids this implication, by contrast, has the advantage that a moral assessment can be defended upon an examination of the case rather than being settled by arbitrary stipulation.

Seventh, the standard definition excludes no kind of person or organization—including a government or state—from being an agent of terrorism. There are several reasons to resist the stipulation that terrorism is practiced only by non-state agents or clandestine state agencies, never states (see Note 2). For one thing, there are no semantic grounds for restricting ‘terrorism’ to non-state agents, if we are to judge from the most recent editions of the *Oxford English Dictionary*, *Webster’s Dictionary of the English Language*, the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, and the *Encyclopedia Americana*. Etymologically, ‘terror’ and, hence, ‘terrorism’ imply nothing about the identity of the agent. For another, ‘terrorism’ has been, and still is, applied to certain violent actions by states. Moreover, the restriction to non-state actors is disingenuous. The term ‘terrorism’ has acquired a pejorative connotation, and for better or worse, it has become the term of art in labeling illegitimate methods of political violence. Exempting states from being agents of terrorism yields an unfair rhetorical advantage to established governments, especially since the weaponry and organization that modern states have brought to bear in pursuing their ends through violence against civilians consistently dwarfs any amount of harm achieved by non-state actors engaged in terrorist activity. That states can commit criminal acts of warfare has long been recognized, as shown by the emergence of international agreements like the Hague Conventions of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and ongoing discussions in the UN. Insofar as the moral difficulties with terrorism concern *jus in bello*—not *jus ad bellum*—they have to do with nature of its victims, the methods employed, or the intentions with which it is done, not the identity of its agents.

Finally, there are different kinds of terrorism depending on motivations, modes, and mechanisms whereby harm is threatened or carried out. Terrorism is strategic if violence or coercive threat is part of a plan to achieve a political goal, but reactive or retaliatory (Khatchadourian, 1988) to the extent that it derives from an emotional response to politically induced grievances, for example, vengeance for confiscation of land or assassinations of leaders. Of course, since strategy and emotion can be jointly operative, and actions can have multiple agents, a given act might be both strategic and retaliatory. A further contrast concerns
the causal route whereby harm is inflicted. An act of direct violence consists in assault or an immediate threat to do so, for example, killing or maiming someone or giving the orders to do so. However, violence can be committed by other means, say, by imprisoning people, depriving them of essentials, like clean water, food, or necessary medical supplies, or by damaging the institutional fabric of their society such as hospitals, schools, factories, and businesses, through legal and other authoritative mechanisms. States, in particular, accomplish such structural violence—to use John Galtung’s term—when they systematically harm civilians by forcibly implementing or impeding certain institutions, laws, policies, and practices as a means to achieving political goals.

3. Strategic terrorism in establishing a Jewish state

The roots of terrorism in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict are not difficult to discern. Sheer demographics posed what was, and what continues to be, the central moral problem for Zionism, namely, that its seemingly noble—and to some, intensely spiritual—vision of a Jewish state with a decisive Jewish majority, could be fulfilled only at the expense of another people, the Arab inhabitants of Palestine. Despite the popular fiction that Palestine was ‘a land without people’ waiting for ‘a people without a land,’ the Zionist leadership was aware of an indigenous population, but argued that Jewish needs and rights to a homeland that Jews had been unjustly deprived of 1900 years earlier outweighed the claims of the Arabs. Faced with a demographic imbalance heavily favoring the Arabs, how was the Zionist vision to be achieved? Theodore Herzl’s visionary book, The Jewish State, published in 1894, did not address the problem, but subsequently, he and other Zionist leaders came to favor a two-step program for demographic change: first, to promote massive Jewish immigration into Palestine, and second, to encourage the emigration of the Arabs into the neighboring countries. The first step was partly achieved during the 1920s and 1930s when Great Britain opened the doors of Palestine to an influx of European Jews (see Chapter 1, Section 6).

The second step in the program of demographic change proved more daunting. Official Zionism advocated peaceful coexistence with the Arabs, insisting that there was ample room in Palestine for both peoples, that the Jews had no intention of dispossessing people of their property and that the Arabs stood to benefit by cooperation with the Jews. But the maximalist idea—that there is no room for two peoples sharing sovereignty in Palestine—predominated among Zionist leaders, such as
Chaim Weizmann, Israel’s first president, David Ben-Gurion, Israel’s first prime minister, and Vladimir Jabotinsky, the leader of the Revisionist movement within Zionism. In 1914, Moshe Shertok (Sharett), Israel’s first foreign minister and second prime minister, insisted that ‘if we cease to look upon the Land of Israel as ours alone and if we allow a partner into our estate—all content and meaning will be lost to our enterprise’ (Morris, 1999, p. 91). With that end in view, the prospect of transferring the Arabs came to be seen as the ‘obvious and most logical, solution to the Zionist’s demographic problem’ (Morris, 1999, pp. 140–1; Morris, 2001, p. 40; Smith, 2004, pp. 167–8).

In 1919, British authorities in Palestine, interviewed by the American King-Crane Commission (Chapter 1, section 7), indicated that the Zionist project could never be achieved ‘except by the force of arms’ since the Arabs would resort to violence in order to stop a Jewish state from being established in their land (Khalidi, 1971, p. 216). One Palestinian, Pasha Dajani, summed up the Arab attitude in 1919: ‘If the League of Nations will not listen to the appeal of the Arabs, this country will be come a river of blood’ (Morris, 1999, p. 91). Men like Ben-Gurion understood this as well and began preparing the Jewish community for armed conflict and a forcible transfer of Arabs that would be easier in wartime (Pappe, 2006b, p. 9). The Haganah (Defense) was established in 1919 and fielded nearly 2000 men by 1921. Jabotinsky, one of its founders, stated that intentional demographic change was a necessary evil that was neither unprecedented nor a historical injustice (Brenner, 1984; Gorny, 1987, p. 270). In 1937, Ben-Gurion noted in his diary that,

we must first of all cast off the weakness of thought and will and prejudice – that [says that] this transfer is impracticable…. Any doubt on our part about the necessity of this transfer, any doubt we cast about the possibility of its implementation, any hesitancy on our part about its justice may lose [us] an historical opportunity that may not recur. The transfer clause in my eyes is more important than all our demands for additional land. (Morris, 2001, pp. 42–3)

Speaking before the Jewish Agency in 1938, Ben-Gurion declared, ‘I am for compulsory transfer; I don’t see in it anything immoral.’9

Forcible removal of a population from their homes and lands for the sake of establishing a political order concerning which that population has no say constitutes violence against civilians; hence, one of the mechanisms of demographic change adopted by Zionist leaders was—and continues to be—terrorism. Attempts at transfer would expectedly
evoke outrage, resistance, and similar terrorism by Arabs against Jews. Jabotinsky predicted this, but seeing no other alternative, he insisted that the tit-for-tat violence was something that the Jewish community had to endure. Since the end of Zionism is moral, he contended, so are the means necessary to achieve it, even if this requires an ‘iron wall’ of military might to prevail against Arab opposition. In a nutshell, this reasoning was the most simple and straightforward Zionist attempt to show that terrorism is not only rational, but morally justifiable.

Terrorism between Arabs and Jews germinated between the world wars, and it is idle to speculate on who initiated the violence or to describe one side as engaging in ‘terrorism’ and the other in ‘retaliation.’ In the broad perspective, the Zionists have been the aggressors in the territorial conflict, but, from the outset, both sides were quick to resort to the gun to settle differences. Rioting in Jerusalem in 1920 took the lives of five Jews and four Arabs, with scores injured, while in the Galilee, eight Jews were killed in battle, including Yosef Trumpeldor who acquired heroic status with his reported last words: ‘It is good to die for our country’ (Segev, 2000, pp. 124–5). In the following year, Jewish demonstrations in Jaffa provoked intercommunal violence that led to the deaths of 43 Jews and 14 Arabs, while subsequent fighting around Jewish settlements took the lives of another 47 Jews and 48 Arabs. Although a British fact-finding commission vindicated the Arab position, Ben-Gurion spoke of the carnage as ‘the slaughter of 1921’ and blamed Arab politicians for inciting the violence.10

Despite British–Arab negotiations during the 1920s to defuse the tense situation, Britain continued to allow Jewish immigration. In 1929, increased belligerence from some Zionist factions advocating a Jewish state spawned more violence in Jerusalem and surrounding towns. For the first time, native Palestinian Jews were targeted, including 64 civilians massacred in Hebron after local Arabs heard that the mosque of Omar was endangered and that Arabs had been killed in Jerusalem (Morris, 1999, p. 114; Hirst, 2003, p. 191). By the end of the fighting, a total of 133 Jews and 120 Arabs were killed (Smith, 2001, p. 130). Although another British commission faulted Zionist demonstrations, Weizmann was assured that Great Britain would continue to promote Jewish immigration and land settlement. Negotiations were suspended (Hirst, 2003, p. 195).

By the mid-1930s, as Jewish immigration accelerated and land sales to Jews increased, Arab tenant farmers were turned off the lands they had worked and lived on and were forced into cities under steadily deteriorating economic conditions. Their discontent was fertile ground
for the revolutionary ideas of men like Sheikh Izzeddin Al-Qassam who
called for an Islamic-based resistance to the Zionist invaders and their
British protectors. Al-Qassam urged *jihad* (struggle) and exhorted his
followers to ‘die as martyrs’ before he and some of his companions
were killed by British forces in November 1935 (Hirst, 2003, p. 200).
His example, together with rising unemployment and reports of Jewish
efforts to stockpile weapons, led Palestinian Arabs to initiate a three-year
campaign of attacks upon Jewish settlements and a revolt against the
British forces.

The 1936–39 revolt featured a surge in the growth and development
of terrorist tactics. The fighting that took place in this period rein-
forced the vision in both camps that armed struggle was inevitable and,
among the Zionist leaders, that a separation between the two peoples
was ‘achievable only by way of transfer and expulsion’ (Morris, 1999,
p. 139). It also witnessed the first instances of indiscriminate bombing of
civilians. Though the British allowed the Haganah to arm itself legally,
Jewish underground groups were formed, notably, the *Irgun Zvai Leumi*
in 1937. Its ideologue, Jabotinsky, urged ‘retaliating’ against Arabs who
had targeted Jews and Jewish property and denied that there was a choice
between pursuing ‘bandits’ and punishing a hostile population. Instead,
the choice is between ‘retaliating against the hostile population or not
retaliating at all’ (Schechtman, 1961, p. 485). Underground terrorism
became increasingly sophisticated as the Irgun planted bombs in Arab
marketplaces that killed 77 Arabs in three weeks in 1937 (Smith, 2001,
p. 143), and in July 1938 massive marketplace bombs in Haifa, Jerusalem
and Jaffa killed over 100 more Arabs, with the most devastating bomb
taking the lives of 53 Arabs in Haifa (Segev, 2000, p. 386; Hirst, 2003,
p. 225). Arabs responded by bombing Jewish civilians. In 1938 alone,
292 Jews were killed in Arab raids, while over 1600 Arabs were killed
in British and Jewish attacks, including 486 that the British identified
as civilians (Smith, 2001, p. 143). Greater force prevailed, and by 1939,
British forces had crushed the Arab revolt, disarmed the Arab fighters,
and exiled their leadership. Approximately 5000 Palestinian Arabs, 463
Jews, and 101 British were killed in the fighting during 1936–39 (Khalidi,

Despite defeat, the Arab recourse to arms succeeded in changing
British policy. In 1939, Britain issued the MacDonald White Paper in
which the government abandoned its intention of establishing a Jewish
State and announced restrictions on further Jewish immigration and
land sales. This reversal immediately brought the Jewish community
in Palestine into direct conflict with the British authorities as well as
Palestinians, violence that was heightened after the Second World War. In 1946 alone, Jewish terrorists killed 373 persons, 3000 of whom were Palestinian civilians (Wagner, 2003, p. 122). The single most spectacular incident occurred when the Irgun bombed the British Headquarters in Jerusalem’s King David Hotel, killing 91 people, the majority of them civilian workers, including 41 Arabs and 17 Jews (Clarke, 1981, p. 294). The mastermind of this attack, the Irgun leader Menachem Begin, subsequently rose to the top of Britain’s most wanted list, yet his efforts were instrumental in causing Britain to refer the problem of Palestine to the United Nations and to announce its intention to terminate the Mandate by May 15, 1948.

Immediately after the passage of the United Nations partition plan in November 1947, fighting between Jews and Palestinians was renewed, with Jewish forces being more numerous, under a unified command, better trained, and better armed. Despite superior numbers, the Palestinian Arabs had no unified fighting force, but only loosely organized, ill-equipped, and rival groups waging localized battles (Hirst, 2003, pp. 258–9). Terrorism now occurred with greater frequency and on a larger scale than ever before. On the night of April 9, 1948, members of the Irgun and Lehi militias attacked the Palestinian village of Deir Yassin on the road between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, killing scores of villagers and parading the survivors in Jerusalem while urging the Arab residents to flee.\textsuperscript{11} Arabs retaliated with attacks upon Jewish soldiers and civilians, but Deir Yassin and similar massacres at Tantura and Dawaymeh precipitated a large-scale flight of Arab villagers and townspeople from their homes into what they felt would be safer areas (Morris, 1987, p. 200). By the time the state of Israel was declared on May 14, 1948, over 300 000 Palestinians had fled from their homes and villages for fear of a similar fate, especially since the better armed and better organized Haganah had crushed the Palestinian resistance. In accordance with the Haganah’s Plan D (Dalet), thousands more Arabs were forcibly expelled from their homes by Israeli forces after armies from five Arab countries entered the fray (Khalidi, 1988; Pappe, 2006a,b). Upon signing an armistice in 1949, Israel destroyed 531 Arab villages and emptied 11 urban neighborhoods of their Arab inhabitants (Pappe, 2006b, p. 7). Jerusalem was divided between the Israelis and Jordanians. No Palestinian Arab state was created, and the approximately 750,000 Arabs—more than half the Arab community in Palestine at the time—who had fled or been expelled from what is now Israel, became refugees in camps established in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and the surrounding Arab countries.\textsuperscript{12}
Here was strategic terrorism at its most effective; through violence, Zionists had taken a decisive step forward in solving the demographic problem and ensuring a Jewish majority in the newly formed Israel. Without removing a large portion of the Arab population, there would have been roughly equal numbers of Jews and Arabs living in the area designated by the Partition Plan for the Jewish state (Cohen, 1982, p. 273). After the war had ended, Menachem Begin wrote, ‘Of the about 800,000 Arabs who lived on the present territory of the State of Israel, only some 165,000 are still there. The political and economic significance of this development can hardly be overestimated’ (Begin, 1977, p. 164). For Chaim Weizmann, Israel’s first president, the exodus of the Arabs was ‘a miraculous clearing of the land: the miraculous simplification of Israel’s task’ (McDonald, 1952, p. 176). The conclusion is straightforward, yet shocking: without the use of strategic terrorism, it is unlikely that a Jewish state with a ‘decisive Jewish majority’ would ever have emerged in Palestine.

4. The deadly cycle of strategic terrorism

A miracle for one was a catastrophe (al-nakbah) for the other. With three-quarters of their homeland taken, and well over half their numbers in refugee camps, the Palestinians were initially too stunned and scattered to mount any serious attempt at reconquest, return, or reprisal. In the early 1950s, some refugees attempted to infiltrate across the ceasefire lines for social and economic reasons (Morris, 1993, p. 11, pp. 29–30) while the will to strike back led others to launch sporadic raids into what had become Israeli territory in the early 1950s. The Israeli Government responded to this predominately retaliatory terrorism with terrorism of its own, following a policy that Ben-Gurion had urged in 1948:

Blowing up a house is not enough. What is necessary is cruel and strong reactions. We need precision in time, place, and casualties. If we know the family, strike mercilessly, women and children included. Otherwise the reaction is inefficient. At the place of action there is no need to distinguish between guilty and innocent. (Ashmore, 1997, p. 107)

In one incident, after a Jewish mother and her two children were killed by Palestinians in the town of Yahud in October 1953, Ben-Gurion sent in a military unit under the command of Ariel Sharon that unleashed an artillery barrage against the West Bank village of
Qibya. After being cleared of resistance, Israeli soldiers demolished 45 houses and the village mosque with explosives, killing 69 villagers (Morris, 1993, p. 246). All the victims were civilians, and three-quarters of them were women and children. A similar massacre occurred outside the village of Kafr Qassim in October 1956, when 47 villagers, including 15 women and 11 children, were shot dead by Israeli troops (Morris, 1993, p. 417; Hirst, 2003, pp. 312–3). These events exemplified a pattern that successive Israeli governments have followed to the present day.  

Benny Morris estimates that in the period 1949–56, up to 250 Israelis were killed by Palestinian infiltrators, while as many as 5000 Palestinians were killed by Israel, the ‘vast majority’ of them being unarmed.  

Palestinian resistance became more organized after the establishment of Al-Fatah organization in 1959 under the leadership of Yassir Arafat. Its periodical, Falastinuna, declared in its September 1964 issue: ‘Israel says, “I am here by the sword.” We must complete the saying—“and only by the sword shall Israel be driven out” ’ (Hirst, 2003, p. 402). In the early 1960s, many restless refugees, dreaming of a return to their homeland, came to see armed violence by fedayeen (those who sacrifice themselves) as the ideal for Palestinians wishing to return to their homeland. Their resistance accelerated after Israel captured the remainder of Palestine during 1967 war, and Palestinians realized that they could not wait for Arab governments to solve their political problems. Fatah came to dominate the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) founded in 1964 and mounted many operations against the Israeli military in 1967–68, often from inside the occupied territories. Approximately 100 attacks were launched in 1967, a number that rose to about 2000 in 1970 (Pappe, 2004, p. 193). While Fatah had initially claimed that it would not target Israeli civilians, especially not women and children, this guideline was often ignored. One Fatah fighter, captured in 1968, told an Israeli court that he had been ordered to sabotage everything he could. Asked whether that meant the killing of children too, he replied, ‘Yes, to destroy everything, because we haven’t forgotten Deir Yassin’ (Hirst, 2003, p. 431).

Despite some successes, PLO attacks against the Israeli military proved largely ineffective. After most of the PLO fighters were pushed out of the West Bank in 1968, some Palestinians resorted to more sensational terrorist tactics. These featured such events as rocket attacks against the Israeli town of Kiryat Shimona beginning in 1969, airplane hijackings by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) in 1968–70, and, most spectacularly, taking Israeli athletes hostage during the 1972 Munich Olympics, culminating in the deaths of 11 Israelis...
and five fedayeen in the crossfire between the Palestinians and German police. In 1974, there were two highly publicized attempts to take Israeli hostages and exchange them for Palestinians held in Israeli prisons. These ‘suicide’ missions resulted in the deaths of 18 Israelis in Kiryat Shmona (eight of them children), 20 young Israelis in Ma’alot, and the Palestinian fedayeen.

Palestinian violence had its own strategic logic. In their minds, the Palestinians were victims of a massive injustice and, like all other peoples, possess rights of self-defense and self-determination in their traditional homeland. In an imperfect world, these rights cannot be won peacefully, and because attacks on Israel’s military are largely ineffective, they must demonstrate that they can do enough damage by other means so that, eventually, their demands would be addressed and their rights secured. Terrorism, they felt, would also achieve three important intermediary steps in working towards this goal. First, by demonstrating an ability to strike against their enemies, a sense of unity and confidence would be heightened within their own community, thereby strengthening the Palestinian will to resist. Second, through violence against civilians, the Israeli sense of security would be undermined and Israeli leaders would be forced to consider the high price of continued occupation. In 1983, Mahmoud Abbas, years before he became the first prime minister of the Palestinian Authority, rivaled Ben-Gurion in articulating this steely strategy of violence:

The human element is forever the most difficult problem… it constitutes the Achilles heel of the Zionist project… All military operations should target population centers to inflict the greatest magnitude of losses on the enemy by striking its most precious possession. This would erase what little sense of security remains from the hearts of settlers and plant doubt in their psyches about their future… We have only to know the joint that aches most. (Hroub, 2000, p. 248)

Third, through spectacular violence, the Palestinians could draw attention to their cause, neglected for over two decades by the world community. Here, they succeeded dramatically; probably some 500 million people witnessed the events in Munich on television, and as one Palestinian leader put it:

The sacrifices made by the Munich heroes… didn’t bring about the liberation of any of their comrades imprisoned in Israel… but they did obtain the operation’s other two objectives; world opinion was
forced to take note of the Palestinian drama, and the Palestinian people imposed their presence on an international gathering that had sought to exclude them.  

Though repelled by their tactics, thoughtful observers began to ask why the Palestinians had suddenly appeared on the world stage in so violent a manner. What are their grievances? What do they hope to achieve? Having grabbed the spotlight, by 1974, the PLO denounced the hijackings of radical Palestinian factions and expressed willingness to work towards a negotiated resolution of the conflict. It was rewarded with official recognition in many of the world’s capitals and its leader, Arafat, addressed the UN General Assembly, declaring that he carried a ‘freedom fighter’s gun’ in one hand, and a warning not to let the ‘olive branch’ in his other fall to the ground. Despite the setbacks of the Lebanese civil war that began in 1975 and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the PLO emerged as a negotiating partner in the peace negotiations that began in 1991 and led to the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993. Just as Menachem Begin had done 14 years earlier, Arafat underwent the miraculous metamorphosis from strategic terrorist to Nobel Peace Prize laureate.

Yet, the Palestinians paid a heavy price for availing themselves of this strategy. As the Israeli offensive against the PLO gained momentum, Palestinians were gradually transformed in the Western media from ‘guerrillas’ into ‘terrorists’ (see Section 8 below), and in some quarters, their cause became more difficult to defend. Some of the initial sympathy for Palestinians diminished, while those already favoring Zionism found new ammunition for their opposition to Palestinian aspirations for self-determination. Moreover, to undermine the diplomatic gains of the PLO, Israel began to eliminate moderate Palestinians capable of addressing a Western audience (Abou Iyad, 1981, p. 104; Hoffman, 2002; date of access: November 12, 2006) while exiling pro-PLO leaders from the occupied territories. Finally, as the Israeli military continued to pursue Ben-Gurion’s policy of fighting terrorism with terrorism, Palestinian and other Arab civilians in Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon bore the brunt of attacks by the Israeli air force (Hirst, 2003, chap. 7, passim). Casualties in these air raids far exceeded those of the incursions that prompted them; after Munich, for example, between 200 and 500 people, mainly civilians, were killed by Israeli bombs (Hirst, 2003, p. 378).

In the years that followed, neither the Israeli government nor Palestinians militants have abandoned the pattern of countering one
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act of terrorist violence with another. Yet, the balance of terror has continued to be weighted against the Palestinians. From the emergence of the PLO in the mid-1960s through the 1980s, the total number of Israeli civilians who died at the hands of the Palestinians is estimated to be 436, whereas a conservative estimate of Palestinian civilians killed by Israelis in the period 1973–88 is well over 15,000, a ratio of approximately one to thirty (Khalidi, 1989, pp. 23–8). In 1978, after 38 Israelis were killed in crossfire during a bus hijacking in central Israel, Israeli forces invaded southern Lebanon, killing between 1500 and 2000 people and causing more than 100,000 villagers to flee northward into Beirut. This figure dwarfed by the roughly 19,000 Lebanese and Palestinians killed during Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon, slightly more than 84 percent being civilians, not including the victims of the Sabra and Shatilla massacre (see Section 8 below). From 1988 to 1997, 421 Israeli civilians were killed by Palestinians while at least 1385 Palestinians in the occupied territories were killed by Israeli security forces (all but 18 of these were civilians). In the period from 1998 to 2006, over 1000 Israelis lost their lives as against approximately 5000 Palestinians; in both cases, approximately three-quarters of the fatalities were civilians. In 2006 alone, B’tselem reported that 23 Israelis were killed by Palestinians, whereas 660 Palestinians were killed by Israeli security services, among which were 322 that had taken no part in hostile acts, including 141 children. Israeli abuses of human rights have included the use of children as human shields.

5. Structural terrorism in the occupied territories

[A] Jewish state in part [of Palestine] is not an end, but a beginning…Establishing a [small] state…will serve as a very potent lever in our historical efforts to redeem the whole country.


During the 1967 war, the remainder of Palestine came under direct control of Israel. Since then, Israel has expanded and annexed East Jerusalem, with one of its first acts being to evict 5500 Arab inhabitants of the Jewish quarter from their homes (Hirst, 2003, p. 361). In the following years, Israel has established a ring of civilian settlements around East Jerusalem, occupied the Gaza Strip until the summer of 2005, and maintained control over the West Bank, arguing that its presence is necessary to ensure its security in the absence of an overall peace settlement. ‘Security’ has been largely a ruse, for successive Israeli
governments have embarked upon a transformation of the landscape by progressively confiscating both public and private lands for the expansion of Jewish settlement throughout the area.

By 2006, at least 280 areas of Israeli settlement were spread throughout the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, with nearly 50 per cent of the West Bank under direct control of the settlement network (see Map E). These settlements surround every major Palestinian population center, are often built on high ground, and are connected to each other and to Israel via a road network spanning almost 400 kilometers. They are situated to ensure Israeli authorities maximal surveillance and control over movement in the territories. Home to over 400,000 Jewish settlers, nearly half of whom surround East Jerusalem, the settlement blocs sit astride major West Bank aquifers from which Israel draws one-third of its water supply. While many of the settlers are ordinary Israelis taking advantage of the Government subsidized housing, others are armed zealots who openly advocate expulsion of the Palestinians and justify it in religious terms (see Friedman, 1992). Many of the latter belong to militant organizations, such as the Gush Emunim, Kach, Kahane Chai, and Zo Artzenu, whose members have repeatedly engaged in terrorist actions against the resident Palestinians.

The establishment and maintenance of the settlement system is a violation of the provisions of Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention and numerous United Nations resolutions. The presence of settlements in the midst of a hostile population has only exacerbated tensions throughout the region and contributed to an ongoing cycle of violence. Thus, once established, the settlements had to be protected. To do this, Israel has subjected the Palestinian population to a vast institutional framework featuring land expropriation, destruction of property, regulation of movement, and a variety of restrictions affecting economic, educational, and cultural development. Loss of land, buildings, and orchards, restrictions on movement, and the stifling bureaucracy of permission and denial have inhibited the development of Palestinian institutions at each of these levels and impeded the Palestinians’ ability to provide essential services to their own population. These Israeli measures constitute a subtle form of structural terrorism, for not only do they damage the institutional fabric of Palestinian society and well-being of its members, they are directly linked to the brutality of the on-going occupation and have increasingly taken their toll on the lives of Palestinian civilians.

Predictably, Palestinians protested the confiscation of land, settlement building, increased restrictions, and steady erosion of opportunity.
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, they sought legal redress, demonstrated, went on strikes, their youth threw stones at Israeli soldiers and, occasionally, the more militant among them took up arms. Time and again, their efforts to bring about change were met by refusal as Israeli forces responded with more direct forms of violence, including house demolitions, destruction of trees, curfews, nightly raids, detention without trial, deportations, torture, shootings, and assassinations. This method of dealing with Palestinian protests accelerated during the first *Intifada* of 1987–93, when at least 1283 Palestinian civilians were killed by Israeli soldiers, including 120 Palestinians in undercover operations (Human Rights Watch, 1993, p. 1). Over 130 000 Palestinians were sent to hospitals with injuries, more land was confiscated, over 2500 houses demolished, and thousands of trees were uprooted. Of the Palestinians fatally shot, 271 were 16 years of age or younger, and this age group constituted almost 40 per cent of the total number of Palestinians injured. Of medically treated injuries to Palestinian children under 15 years of age, 34 per cent were caused by gunfire, 50 per cent by beatings from soldiers, and almost 15 per cent by tear gas.20 These patterns were repeated throughout the second *Intifada* that broke out in September 2000, with much more deadly results. As many as 5000 Palestinians were killed by Israelis during the period from September 2000 through December 2006, and over 40 000 were hospitalized with injuries.21 These *intifadas*, and the iron-fisted response with which they have been met, are unintelligible apart from the structural terrorism that accompanies Israel’s colonization of captured territory (Roy, 2007, p. 251).

6. Suicide terrorism

I am going to fight instead of the sleeping Arab armies who are watching Palestinian girls fighting alone; it is an intifada until victory.

Ayat Akhras, age 18, shortly before killing herself and two Israelis in Jerusalem market on March 29, 2002.

Having endured the violence and humiliation of occupation since 1967, with little hope for an immediate end, Palestinian militants in the occupied territories have struck back with a more deadly form of terrorism. Drastically outclassed by superior Israeli arms, and motivated by both strategic reasons and desires for vengeance, they have chosen to hit whatever Israeli targets they could by the most effective means available. Since the 1970s, Palestinians who embarked upon attacks upon the Israeli military or Israeli civilians have known that there was little
likelihood that they would return to tell about it, that, at best, they
would be remembered as ‘martyrs’ for their homeland. In the past
ten years, young Palestinians who have spent their entire lives under
military occupation have resorted to a form of terrorism in which the
chance of survival is reduced to zero—suicide bombings.

Suicide destruction of oneself along with one’s enemies might astound
those who have never known political oppression. Yet, the strategy is
ancient. It existed in the Near East with the ancient Jewish Zealots and
Sicarii—even before that if we can believe the story of Samson and the
Philistines (Judges 17)—and in the eleventh and twentieth centuries
with the Ismaili Assassins (Pape, 2005, pp. 11–2). In 1971, the historian
Arnold Toynbee predicted that Palestinians would also resort to such
measures:

Today, the Palestinian faces the human stone wall, and it is no
wonder if, after beating his head against it in vain, he seizes a stick of
gelignite and blows up himself, the wall, and his unresponsive fellow
human beings on the far side. What else is he, or anyone of us, to
do? (Toynbee, 1971, p. 3)

Palestinians were not the first to use this technique. In the 1980s, the
use of human beings as mobile bombs was employed by the Lebanese
Shi’ite group Hezbollah in its battle against occupying forces from
the United States, France, and Israel. It has since been used by libera-
tion movements in Sri Lanka, Kashmir, Turkey, and Russia. In a detailed
study of 18 suicide terrorism campaigns and 315 attacks from 1980 to
2003, Robert Pape concluded that desires for national self-determination
and an end to military occupation were at the root of every instance of
this form of terrorism (Pape, 2005, p. 79).

They first occurred after the PLO and Israeli Government signed the Oslo
Accords of 1993 and continued sporadically during the 1990s despite
the continuance of the unprecedented peace process between Israelis
and Palestinians. The underlying reasons are not difficult to discern;
the apparent progress towards peaceful relations masked developments
on the ground which pointed in the exactly the opposite direction. As
negotiations continued, Israeli consolidated its control over the territ-
ories, expanded the existing settlement network, and nearly doubled the
number of settlers in the West Bank. The Palestinian economy suffered
because of Israel’s closure policy that limited movements of goods and
people within and from the territories. Per capita GNP declined from

...
$2684 in 1992 to $1896 in 1999, and the Palestinian GDP declined 18 per cent even though it increased in surrounding countries. Unemployment rates tripled and poverty increased; although over 100 000 Palestinians from the territories were regularly employed by Israel in 1992, that number had been cut in half by 1999. Besides uprooting some 80 000 olive and fruit trees to permit Israeli construction, the Israeli military also established various mechanisms of control to isolate Palestinian ‘self-rule’ pockets from each other by means of fencing, checkpoints, and other fortifications (see Map F).22

On February 25, 1994, a Jewish settler from Kiryat Arba, Baruch Goldstein, massacred 29 Palestinian worshippers at the Ibrahimiyya mosque in Hebron before losing his own life at the hands of outraged Palestinians. His suicidal terrorism was reported to be both retaliatory and strategic; while motivated to avenge the deaths of Jews at hands of Arabs, Goldstein also wanted to undermine the peace process that he and other Israeli settlers feared would lead to an Israeli withdrawal from the territories.23 His action precipitated a wave of suicide bombings that took the lives of scores of Israeli civilians, carried out by Palestinian militias such as the Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya (Hamas). Founded in 1988, Hamas advocates jihad as the only means of liberation from the yoke of occupation. Initially, it confined its military action to what it regarded as legitimate military targets in the occupied territories, but after the Goldstein massacre and the failure of the Israeli Government to respond to its May 1994 offer of an ‘armistice’ in which civilians would be removed from the area of struggle (Hroub, 2000, p. 246), Hamas sent istashaideen (those who martyr themselves for an exalted purpose) on suicide missions against Israelis.

Like Jewish extremists, Hamas has offered a religious justification for the violent pursuit of its maximalist ends of an Islamic state throughout Palestine, though it has also appealed to the right of self-defense. It has argued that since the Zionists are intent on dispossessing the Palestinians of the remaining 22 per cent of their homeland through an occupation that has generated a continuing stream of ‘downright terrorism’ (Alexander, 2002, p. 346), then, by all laws, human and divine, people have a right to defend themselves against those who employ violence to dispossess them of their homeland. Since appeals to justice and the world’s conscience have been futile in stopping Israel’s aggression, and since attacks against the Israeli military have been unable to abate Israel’s expansionism, making Israel suffer by striking at civilian targets is the only mechanism Palestinians have left for self-defense. Hamas came to view the situation in Palestine in Jabotinskian terms, realizing
that the choice is between ‘retaliating against the hostile population or not retaliating at all,’ and arguing that the effect of striking at ‘the most vulnerable spot in the Zionist body’ will be to exhaust Israel and weaken both its tourism and immigration programs. As with Goldstein, its terrorism has been retaliatory as well as strategic, for Hamas maintained that its specific operations are carried out to avenge massacres and assassinations (Hroub, 2000, pp. 245–51). Recovering from an assassination attempt by Israel in early June 2003, the Hamas political leader, Abdel Aziz Rantisi, said: ‘Our people will teach the Israeli enemy tough lessons until the Israelis stop their terror and crimes’ (Chicago Tribune, June 12, 2003). His assassination by an Israeli missile strike in April 2004 led to renewed terror against Israelis.24

Hamas, the Islamic Jihad, and Al-Fatah’s Al-Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades, have been at the forefront of armed resistance in the second intifada that began after Palestinians realized that the Oslo process had only reduced their own economic prospects while allowing Israel to consolidate its hold on the territories. Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Jerusalem mosques on September 28, 2000, accompanied by 1000 Israeli police—the same sort of incident that sparked the violence of 1929 (Beinin, 2003, p. 22)—was the spark that set off a round of terrorism by both sides that eclipsed any previous level of violence seen during the previous 33 years of occupation. During the next two days, as Palestinians protested Sharon’s visit, Israeli police and army killed 15 Palestinians, including four children, whereas one Israeli had been killed. By the end of the first three weeks, over 80 Palestinians and eight Israelis were dead, and an Israeli journalist reported in Ma’ariv, an Israeli newspaper, that the IDF had fired a million bullets in the occupied territories (September 6–13, 2002).

Strategic and retaliatory motivations were combined in this second intifada. If the leadership of the principal militant groups used terrorism as a strategy, their willing operatives have often been those who, out of outrage and despair, have sought vengeance against their oppressors (see El Sarraj, 2002, and the articles by Amira Hass, ‘Driven by Vengeance and a Desire to Defend the Homeland,’ Ha’aretz, July 17, 2002; Stephen Franklin, ‘Jerusalem Bomber Identified,’ Chicago Tribune, January 31, 2002; and Greg Myre, ‘A Young Man Radicalized by His Months in Jail,’ The New York Times, May 30, 2003). Young Palestinians, having lived under military occupation their entire lives, watching increasing numbers of their friends and relatives fall victim to Israeli soldiers, and finding little hope for improvement in their situation, began volunteering for suicide missions. As the violence swung into high gear, young women joined the ranks the martyrs, including Ayat Akhras, who
heaped scorn upon ‘sleeping Arab armies’ in a farewell video. Before her, Wafa Idris, a volunteer medic at clashes between Palestinians and Israelis, killed herself and an Israeli. ‘She is the first, but not the last,’ said a middle-school teacher who knew her. ‘You shouldn’t think we don’t love life and don’t want to live. We do this only because it is the last thing we can do.’ A student of psychology at the Islamic University in Gaza put it this way:

Israels play a major role in inducing the boys to choose a martyr’s death. The arbitrary killing that we’ve experienced during the Intifada has caused every young person to say, ‘If in any case I am destined to die, why shouldn’t I die with dignity?’ (*Ha’aretz*, July 17, 2002)

Suicide operations have not been confined to youth. On November 23, 2006, Fatma Omar An-Najar, a 64-year-old grandmother, blew herself up in a revenge suicide attack—the oldest of the 100 suicide bombers in the last six years—against Israeli forces sweeping the Jebaliya refugee camp. The Associated Press quoted her daughter as saying that the Israelis ‘destroyed her house, they killed her grandson – my son. Another grandson is in a wheelchair with an amputated leg’ (*Grandmother Blows Herself Up in Gaza,* aolnews.com, November 24, 2006).

Some in the Western media attempted to explain the outbreak of violence by citing religious hatred and a fanatical desire on the part of Palestinian militants to ‘destroy Israel,’ but more astute observers have cited the underlying causes as being the expansion of the settlement network—as claimed in the Mitchell Report of May 2001—and the failure of the Oslo peace process to end the Israeli occupation (Pape, 2005, 48). From 1994 to 2005, there were more than 120 Palestinian suicide attacks directed against Israeli targets in Israel or the occupied territories, yet during this time, Palestinians launched no terrorist attacks against Americans, Europeans, Christians, or Jews living outside Palestine. ‘The pattern of the suicide attacks over the past decade suggests that the Palestinian terrorists are concentrating their fire against the state that is actually occupying the territory they view as their homeland’ (Pape, 2005, p. 51).

Facing a greater proportion of armed Palestinians in this second intifada, Israel responded with more firepower than ever before, including the use of tanks, fighter jets, and attack helicopters. Prime Minister Sharon’s directive to eliminate the ‘terrorist infrastructure’ involved the Israeli military more deeply in a war on civilians and, once again, attacks against children, a prominent feature of the first intifada, were
renewed (see Note 20). ‘The moment the IDF sends tanks into a densely-crowded refugee camp it puts all the inhabitants at risk’ wrote the Israeli journalist, Gideon Levy. ‘Thus, anyone who decides to send tanks into Jabalya is making a decision to kill civilians’ (‘Terrorism By Any Other Name,’ *Ha’aretz*, March 9, 2003).

Sharon’s government justified its response by claiming that Israel has a right to defend its citizens from physical harm, and the Palestinians pose a terrorist threat to all Israeli citizens. The only effective means of ending this threat, it argued, is through a massive military crackdown in the form of checkpoints, curfews, house-to-house searches, detentions, interrogations, house demolitions, and targeted killings. This line of reasoning has its Israeli dissenters, even from within the Israeli military (see the *Ha’aretz* supplement of September 14, 2001). In 2002, the Israeli Defense Minister Eliezar admitted at the end of the IDF offensive in late April 2002, that ‘it is impossible to eradicate the terrorist infrastructure’ and that ‘military actions kindle the frustration, hatred and despair and are the incubators for the terror to come’ (Zunes, 2003, p. 149).

In a front page article in Israel’s leading newspaper, *Yediot Achronot*, Israeli journalist Alex Fishman, commenting on the November 23, 2002 assassination of Mahmud Abu Hamoud, a Hamas leader, wrote that there had existed an agreement between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority that ‘Hamas was to avoid in the near future’ suicide bombings in Israel. Fishman wrote that ‘Whoever decided upon the liquidation of Abu Hamoud knew in advance that the agreement with Hamas would be shattered. The subject was extensively discussed both by Israel’s military echelon and its political one’ (‘A Dangerous Liquidation,’ *Yediot Achronot*, November 25, 2001). As Fishman predicted, Hamas struck back less than a week later with suicide bombings in Jerusalem and Haifa that killed 25 Israelis. The effect of this cycle of violence heightened tensions and weakened the constituency in Israel and the U.S. favoring peace negotiations (Bleier, 2003; date of access: November 12, 2006).

Palestinian outrage over the Israeli assault led to widespread support of attacks against Israel. One 2002 poll found that the 65 per cent of Palestinians in the occupied territories who favored suicide operations at the time cited as a main reason Israeli military incursions (Pape, 2005, p. 50). While the frequency of these suicide operations was something new, the violence conformed to the established pattern. For over three-quarters of a century, incident after incident in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict has shown that terrorism has succeeded in intensifying the propensity for violence on all sides, with ever more deadly results
from the Israeli point of view. In the first intifada, there were 11 dead Palestinians for every dead Israeli, while during the second, the ratio was closer to four to one. One Palestinian, whose house was destroyed in Ramallah after Israeli soldiers blew up the building next door, reacted in this way: ‘This just stirs up hatred. Now I want to blow myself up along with them [the Israelis]. Where can I go? The grave of the martyr is better for me’ (Chicago Tribune, December 3, 2003).

Palestinian suicide terrorism is no different from similar suicide terrorist campaigns of the past 25 years. The underlying cause is not radical Islam, a hatred of Western values, or rabid anti-Semitism, as reported in numerous writings (e.g., Netanyahu, 1986, 2001; Dershowitz, 2003; Frum & Perle, 2003), but a combination of sentiments, ranging from the understandable desire to throw off the yoke of foreign military occupation to the more deadly emotions of despair, outrage, and vengeance.25

7. The use and abuse of ‘terrorism’

The depiction of terrorism and the venomous rhetoric of ‘terror’ cannot be ignored in any informed discussion of contemporary terrorism. Attempts to understand, evaluate, and craft a proper response to terrorism must come to grips with the fact that labeling someone a ‘terrorist’ is itself, more often than not, a political act in its own right. As a consequence, the words ‘terror’, ‘terrorism,’ and ‘terrorist’ have become important weapons for molding thought and stimulating consent, weapons whose reach extends from the propaganda arsenals of government agencies and associated ‘think tanks’ through the popular media into political discussion, scholarly publications, classrooms, and, thereby, into the private thoughts of nearly everyone.

To appreciate the impact of this rhetoric, one must recognize two salient facts that underlie the political employment of the terms ‘terrorist’ and ‘terrorism.’ The first fact is that these words have acquired an intensely negative connotation in contemporary discourse. On the one hand, terrorism is perceived as breaking the rules of legitimate political violence by refusing to respect the distinction between belligerents and civilians, and, on the other, by using methods that should not be employed, for example, hijacking commercial airliners or killing hostages. As such, terrorism and its agents have come to be viewed as morally reprehensible.26

The second fact is that the terms are used as though they have an indexical, egocentric, or perspectival character, essentially dependent
upon a speaker’s point of view, much like the words ‘stranger’, ‘foreigner’, or ‘enemy’. Obviously, no one is an enemy as such, but only an enemy to someone or other, so that when I use ‘the enemy’ I am inevitably talking about my enemy or our enemy. Similarly, when we hear people speaking of ‘terrorism,’ in actual practice they are talking about violence directed against ‘themselves,’ or, in first-person terms, against ‘us.’ No one has a monopoly here, and neither the American media nor the U.S. Government is unique in its speaker-oriented bias. Other countries, including Israel, Great Britain, Russia, India, and Egypt, routinely do the same, and so might any state in describing militant insurgents opposed to its policies, for example, the Nazis in describing resistance fighters in the Warsaw ghetto (Herman & O’Sullivan, 1989, p. 261). For this reason, the common observation that one man’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter is not off the mark, especially since it allows that a person can be both.27

The two facts together explain why there is a manifest inconsistency in ascriptions of terrorism. Because of the negative connotation, no one wants to be accused of terrorism, and because of the indexical character, it is nearly incoherent to describe one’s own actions, or those of your allies, as ‘terrorist’. Thus, people who are labeled ‘terrorist’ are not all and only those who commit politically motivated violence against civilians; instead, the label is ascribed selectively to fit the perspective of the speaker and audience. To illustrate, it is unquestioned in the mainstream Western media that those who flew hijacked planes into the World Trade Center towers, or young Palestinians who have turned themselves into suicide bombers, are engaged in terrorist activity. But many actions that would qualify as terrorist under most definitions—certainly under the standard definition—are not described as such, nor are their perpetrators referred to as ‘terrorists.’ Some of these were committed by sub-national groups, for example,

- massacres of Bosnian civilians in the mid-1990s;
- assaults upon villagers by death squads in Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El Salvador during the 1980s;
- the massacre of over 2000 Palestinian civilians by the Israeli-supported members of Lebanese militias in the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps in Beirut in 1982;
- attacks upon Palestinian civilians by Jewish settlers in the West Bank from the early 1980s to the present.
If we broaden our scope and examine some of the overt actions committed by states, then there are numerous examples that are not usually labeled as ‘terrorist’ though they qualify as such under those definitions that allow for state terrorism. These include,

- bombing by American and British forces in Iraq 2003–4 featuring the use of cluster bombs and phosphorus bombs;
- the destruction of Grozny by Russian forces during the Chechnya war in 1999;
- the U.S. invasion of Panama in 1990;
- the U.S. bombing of Tripoli, Libya in April 1986;
- the Israeli aerial and land bombardment of Beirut in the summer of 1982;
- the Syrian army’s attack on the city of Hama in the spring of 1982;
- the Iraqi and Iranian missile attacks on each other’s cities in the mid 1980s;
- the Indonesian invasion and occupation of East Timor, 1975–98.

These terrorist actions pale in comparison to more large-scale campaigns such as,

- the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam and Cambodia during the Vietnam war;
- the Allied bombing of German and Japanese cities near the end of WWII; for example, from March to August 1945, nearly 800,000 Japanese civilians were killed in U.S. air raids against Japan’s 62 largest cities, and about 85,000 of these died on March 9 1945 on the first day of the bombing in Tokyo.
- the Nazi mass murders of civilian populations during Second World War.

If we consider the provisions of *jus in bello* as set forth in relevant Hague and Geneva Conventions as a part of international law, then governments have repeatedly used—in the words of the FBI definition—‘force or violence’ unlawfully ‘to intimidate or coerce a government, [a] civilian population, or [a] segment thereof,’ in order to achieve ‘political or social objectives.’

At the opposite extreme, some actions are routinely labeled ‘terrorist’ that do not qualify as terrorist under the standard definition nor under the definitions championed by U.S. governmental agencies. For example, the U.S. media is replete with references to ‘terrorist’ actions by
Lebanese and Palestinians against Israeli soldiers in occupied territory, targets that do not qualify as civilians or noncombatants under any acceptable definition. Apart from the State Department's unusually strict definition of 'noncombatant' (see Note 2), the same can be said for actions directed against the U.S. military, say, the bombing of the USS Cole in Yemen in October 2000, or the bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut in October 1983.31

The inconsistencies are striking, perhaps understandable in light of the two mentioned facts about the contemporary rhetoric of 'terror', yet, ultimately, unjustifiable. Unlike the term 'enemy', nothing in the semantics of 'terrorism' warrants the egocentric usage. The standard English language dictionaries and encyclopedias indicate that the term depicts a mode of violence independently of identifying its agents. But even if we acknowledge that the term has evolved semantically to encompass a perspectival usage, that alone would afford not basis for moral claims about terrorism, for instance, that it is an unjust or immoral use of violence. Just as there is no automatic moral taint to being an enemy—many good people have been enemies to someone or other—so too, if a terrorist act is wrongful, it is not because it is politically motivated violence directed at us. If an action is morally wrong, it is because it possesses some universalizable morally relevant characteristic, say, that it is violence directed at civilians, or against innocent people, or that it uses improper means, or that it is politically motivated violence, or—from a pacifist perspective—that it is violence. For the purposes of making a moral claim, the egocentric character of the term 'terrorism' is irrelevant. Finally, it goes almost without saying that the mere negative connotation of a term is no grounds for moral opprobrium towards whatever or whomever it applies to. The terms 'enemy', 'stranger', 'foreigner' all harbor a degree of negativity, but they apply to everyone, saint and sinner alike. These subtleties of indexical usage and moral relevance are lost upon the general public, but not upon the numerous 'terrorism experts' whose job it is to denigrate those opposed to American, Israeli, and European policies in the Islamic world. As a consequence, the two features of the contemporary rhetoric of 'terror,' its pejorative overtones and its egocentric orientation, serve to distort the popular conception of who is and who is not carrying out wrongful actions in the world.

What's worse, the distortion is deliberate, not an innocent or accidental byproduct of linguistic usage. The rhetoric of 'terror' serves political ends as the labels 'terrorism' and 'terrorist' are used selectively by governments, their associated media, and propaganda agencies to
describe those who forcefully oppose certain governmental policies. Because of their negative connotations, these labels automatically discredit any individuals or groups to whom they are affixed, placing them outside the norms of acceptable social and political behavior, and portraying them as ‘evil’ people that cannot be reasoned with. As a consequence, the rhetoric of ‘terror’ effectively dehumanizes any individuals or groups described as ‘terrorist,’ and thereby,

- erase any incentive an audience might have to understand the point of view of the ‘terrorists’ so that questions about the nature and origins of their grievances and the possible legitimacy of their demands will not even be raised;
- deflect attention away from one’s own policies that might have contributed to the grievances of the ‘terrorists’;
- repudiate any calls to negotiate with ‘terrorists’;
- pave the way for the use of force and violence in dealing with ‘terrorists,’ specifically, by making it easier for a government to exploit the fears of its citizens and stifle any objections to the manner in which it responds to terrorist violence;
- obliterate the distinction between national liberation movements and fringe fanatics (whose recourse to violence is either unrelated to a legitimate grievance or a manifestly ineffective or disproportional response to an alleged offense).

The general strategy is nothing new; it is part and parcel of the war of ideas and language that accompanies overt hostilities. The term ‘terrorism’ is simply the current vogue for discrediting one’s opponents and paving the way for violent action against them, before the risky business of inquiry into their complaints can even begin. If individuals and groups are portrayed as evil, irrational, barbaric, and beyond the pale of negotiation and compromise, then asking why they resort to terrorism is viewed as pointless, needlessly accommodating, or, at best, mere pathological curiosity.  

Rhetoric of this magnitude is bound to produce results in a context of political turmoil, especially among agitated people looking for solutions. The language of ‘terror’ fosters shortsighted belligerence among those oblivious to its propagandistic employment, while increasing the resentment of those who are so labeled. Far from contributing to a peaceful resolution of conflict, it prepares both types of person for more violence. Moreover, by so effectively erasing any incentive to understand the motives behind terrorist violence or to critically examine governmental policies, the rhetoric serves to silence meaningful political debate. Those
normally inclined to ask ‘why?’ are fearful of being labeled ‘soft’ on terrorism, while the more militant use the ‘terrorist’ label to deface the distinction between critical examination and appeasement. Obviously, to point out the causes and objectives of particular terrorist actions is to imply nothing about their legitimacy—that is an independent matter—nor is it a capitulation to terrorist demands. To ignore these causes and objectives is to seriously undermine attempts to deal intelligently with terrorism, since it leaves untouched the factors motivating recourse to this type of violence.

More dramatically, for these reasons the rhetoric of ‘terror’ actually increases terrorism in at least four distinct ways. First, it magnifies the effect of terrorist actions by heightening the fear among the target population. If we demonize the terrorists, if we portray them as arbitrary irrational beings devoid of a moral sense and beyond all norms, we amplify the fear and alarm among civilians generated by terrorist incidents, regardless if this forms part of the political objectives of the perpetrators.

Second, those who succumb to the rhetoric contribute to the cycle of revenge and retaliation by endorsing violent actions of their own government, not only against those who commit terrorist actions, but also against those populations from whose ranks the terrorists emerge, for the simple reason that terrorists are frequently themselves civilians, living amid other civilians not so engaged. This policy, explicit in the thinking of Ben Gurion and Jabotinsky, was echoed in repeated remarks by U.S. President George W. Bush when he declared that we ‘will make no distinction between terrorists and those who harbor them’ (‘A Nation Challenged,’ The New York Times, October 8, 2001). The consequence has been an increase in politically motivated violence against civilian targets—‘terrorism’ under any other name—under the rubric of ‘retaliation’ or ‘counter-terrorism.’

Third, short of genocide, a violent response is likely to stiffen the resolve of those from whose ranks terrorists have emerged, leading them to regard their foes as people who cannot be reasoned with, as people who, because they avail themselves so readily of the rhetoric of ‘terror,’ know only the language of force. As long as they perceive themselves to be victims of intolerable injustices and view their oppressors as unwilling to arrive at an acceptable compromise, they are likely to answer violence with more violence. The latter can be either strategic, if directed against civilians to achieve some political objective, but, with the oppression unabated, it increasingly becomes the retaliatory violence of despair and revenge.
Terrorism

Fourth, and most insidiously, those who employ the rhetoric of ‘terror’ for their own political ends, are encouraging actions that they understand will generate or sustain further violence directed against civilians. Inasmuch as their verbal behavior is intended to secure political objectives through these means, then it is an instance of terrorism just as much as any direct order to carry out a bombing of civilian targets. In both cases, there is purposeful verbal action aimed at bringing about a particular result through violence against civilians. Here, as the rhetoric of ‘terror’ prepares public opinion to accept actions against civilians through a steady process of demonization, it has itself become a deadly weapon, with powerful psychological effects, designed to make it easier for governments to carry out their own terrorism. Thus, what is not often understood is that the rhetoric of ‘terror’ not only serves to increase the amount of terrorism in the world, it is one of the means whereby states carry out their terrorism. As such, the rhetoric is itself part of the problem of terrorism.

In his novel, 1984, George Orwell described doublethink as ‘the power of holding two contradictory beliefs in one’s mind simultaneously, and accepting both of them,’ and he portrayed it as a device for destroying the capacity for independent critical thinking. Something like doublethink is occurring as the result of the rhetoric of terror. In condemning terrorism, well-meaning people think of it as something bad and to be eliminated at all costs, yet, in urging retaliation under the guise of ‘counterterrorism,’ they are insouciant about the massive destruction this might entail. In sanctioning the use of military force against terrorism, regardless of its impact upon civilian populations (see Note 33), people advocate the very thing they condemn—and this is closer to doublethink that we should ever wish to be.

My point is not to sweep the problem of politically motivated violence against civilians under the rug by denying the existence of this controversial mode of violence. It is all too real a problem. Rather, the point is that there is little hope of progress in solving this problem without examining the causes from which it springs, and the extent to which the rhetoric of ‘terror’ impedes rather than illuminates this examination is itself part of the problem.

8. The reign of ‘terror’ in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict

I have already observed that one price Palestinians paid for their recourse to terrorism was in terms of the violent reprisals by the Israeli military upon their communities. A second price has been their demonization
in the mainstream Western press. In the late 1960s, Palestinian militants, working within groups like Al-Fatah, were described in the international press as ‘guerrillas,’ ‘commandos,’ and ‘fedayeen.’ It was not until after the September 1970 civil war in Jordan when the Palestinian resistance turned towards more desperate measures such as the highly publicized hostage takings in the early 1970s, that the Israeli designations of Palestinian fighters as ‘murderers,’ ‘saboteurs,’ and ‘terrorists’ became more commonplace. Too often, the Palestinians’ complaints were lost in the sensationalism of the deed, and in the minds of many, disgust with the means outpaced sympathy with the plight of Palestinian refugees and trumped the patience needed to understand core grievances. As the 1970s wore on, and various leftwing groups in Europe and elsewhere made headlines with similar sorts of violence, the ‘terrorists’ came to be viewed as a new species of barbarians whose willingness to hijack airplanes, take hostages, and especially, carry their struggle into foreign lands, placed them outside the bounds of civilized behavior.

Israeli leaders realized that the rhetoric of ‘terror’ had now become a preeminent propaganda device, one that could be used not only to discredit their opponents, but also to obfuscate and to deflect attention away from their own controversial policies. A prime example is a widely circulated book edited by Benjamin Netanyahu entitled, *Terrorism: How the West Can Win* published in 1986, featured in *Time* Magazine shortly thereafter, and often used as a text in courses in American universities during the late 1980s and 1990s. While the book offered the standard definition of ‘terrorism,’ the editor and the contributors used the ‘doublethink’ strategy by applying the term selectively and echoing the arguments of Ben-Gurion and Jabotinsky that the only way to combat terrorism is to ‘to weaken and destroy the terrorist’s ability to consistently launch attacks,’ even at the ‘risk of civilian casualties’ (pp. 202–5). Very little was said about the possible causes of terrorist violence beyond vague allusions to Islam’s confrontation with modernity (p. 82), or passages of this caliber from Netanyahu’s own pen:

> The root cause of terrorism lies not in grievances but in a disposition toward unbridled violence. This can be traced to a worldview that asserts that certain ideological and religious goals justify, indeed demand, the shedding of all moral inhibitions. In this context, the observation that the root cause of terrorism is terrorists is more than a tautology. (p. 204)
The scholar can pass off comments like these as pure propaganda—if not a brand of psychological lunacy—but it is significant that Netanyahu's book reached a large audience, especially since its contributors included not only academics and journalists but important policymakers as well. Netanyahu himself went on to become the Israeli Prime Minister, and among the American contributors were the Secretary of State George Schultz, UN Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick, and Senators Daniel Moynihan and Alan Cranston, each of whom voiced sentiments similar to those of Netanyahu. The upshot was that powerful people perpetuated the image of a terrorist as a carrier of ‘oppression and enslavement,’ having ‘no moral sense,’ ‘a perfect nihilist’ (pp. 29–30), and whose elimination is the only rational means for the West to ‘win.’

Netanyahu’s book—like numerous others, including Netanyahu (2001), Frum and Perle (2003), and Dershowitz (2003)—conceals an unspoken agenda (as pointed out by Beinin, 2003). By classifying Palestinian resistance to Israeli policies as ‘terrorism,’ and by portraying ‘terrorists’ as some sort of monsters unworthy of moral dialogue, the intent was to shift political focus away from the designs, policies, and actions of the Israeli Government in the occupied territories, for example, its land confiscations, settlement building, human rights abuses, and blatant violations of Security Council resolutions, towards the more sensational reactions by the Palestinians. Its strategy manifests this logic: to commit a crime, demonize your victims.35

The most devastating uses of ‘terrorism’ in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict have been to justify horrific actions against Palestinian refugees. In September 1982, for example, after the evacuation of PLO fighters from Beirut, Israeli officials contended that some ‘2000 terrorists’ remained in the refugee camps Sabra and Shatilla in southern Beirut, a claim repeatedly echoed in the Israeli and American press. On September 15, the Israeli Defense Minister, Ariel Sharon, authorized entry of what were presumed to be members of various Lebanese militias into the camps that were then sealed off by Israeli tanks. The only resistance they encountered came from a few lightly armed boys. For the next 38 hours, aided by Israeli flares at night, the militiamen raped, tortured, mutilated, and massacred as many as 300 civilians under the eye of IDF personnel (Kapeliouk, 1982, pp. 93–4; Hirst, 2003, pp. 553–60). An International Commission of Inquiry under the chairmanship of Sean MacBride found that Israeli authorities were involved in the massacre (Cattan, 2000, p. 180). Though Sharon was subsequently removed as Defence Minister because of ‘indirect responsibility’ for the massacre,
four years later he was permitted to carry his chutzpah to remarkable heights in an op-ed piece entitled ‘It’s Past Time to Crush the Terrorist Monster’ (The New York Times, September 20, 1986) in which he called upon Western countries and Israel to stage a coordinated ‘war on terrorism’ through pre-emptive strikes on ‘terrorist bases’ and sanctions against the state supporters of terrorism.\(^\text{36}\)

As Prime Minister of Israel, 20 years after the events in Lebanon, Sharon was able to act on his ambitions once again, refusing to negotiate with the Palestinian leadership, intensifying settlement building in the West Bank, and adopting an iron fist approach to Palestinian resistance. After the on-going battles of the Al-Aqsa Intifada led to a rash of suicide bombings in Israel in March 2002, Sharon sent troops, tanks, and helicopter gunships into the Palestinian-controlled areas of the West Bank, vowing to destroy the Palestinian ‘terrorist infrastructure.’ The most brutal incident of the campaign occurred at the Jenin refugee camp, home to 14,000 residents and containing some 160 armed militants from the Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigades groups. From April 4 to 13, the Israeli military besieged the camp, meeting fierce resistance at the outset. In the early morning hours of April 6, helicopters fired missiles into the camp, often striking civilian homes where no Palestinian fighters were present. The missile fire caught many sleeping civilians by surprise, and in the subsequent chaos, the army was able to move closer to the center the fighting had ended, resulting in a total leveling of Hawashin neighborhood down to the last house. According to Human Rights Watch the ‘extensive, systematic, and deliberate leveling of the entire district was clearly disproportionate to any military objective that Israel aimed to achieve.’\(^\text{37}\)

That the Israeli government could so easily succeed in convincing people that Israel was eliminating the ‘terrorist infrastructure’ of the Palestinians—rather than a good deal of the institutional structure of Palestinian society—illustrates how the rhetoric of ‘terror’ is a causal factor in generating even more terrorism. Pro-Israeli articles immediately appeared in major Israeli and American publications explicitly justifying the deaths of Palestinian civilians.\(^\text{38}\) On one side, the bulk of the Israeli public and the American Congress were led to endorse the actions of the Israeli military. For example, when Amnesty International (AI) pointed out that the Israeli army violated human rights and international law in its crackdown in the West Bank, the House of Representatives rejected AI’s findings by a vote of 352-21, declaring that ‘Israeli military operations are an effort to defend itself…and are aimed only at dismantling the terrorist infrastructure in the Palestinian areas.’
The Senate echoed this sentiment in a 94-2 vote, referring to the Israeli assault as ‘necessary steps to provide security to its people.’ And after the attack on the Jenin refugee camp during which Israel fired missiles into houses where no fighters were present, used Palestinian civilians as shields, and leveled entire residential districts with armored bulldozers, President George W. Bush was able to speak of Israel’s Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, as a ‘man of peace’ without being laughed off the editorial pages of the country’s newspapers, and prominent senators could urge the country to ‘stand with Israel against Arab tyranny and terror.’ On the other side, the flames of outrage and revenge were fanned, once again, among Palestinians and their sympathizers, and a rash of suicide bombings took the lives of scores of Israeli civilians in the aftermath. Once again, the skewed portrayal of cause and effect cleared the road for continued violence against noncombatants on both sides, hence, to more terrorism, not less.

The attack on the Jenin refugee camp, like that on Sabra and Shatilla 20 years earlier, are two examples of how the rhetoric of ‘terror’ has made it easier for the world to accept Israeli violence. The overwhelming impression conveyed is that Israel is reacting to Palestinian aggression and attempts to destroy the Jewish state. Little is said or understood about the historical origins of Palestinian grievances, about Palestinian support for peace talks and a two-state solution, or even about the fact that Israeli forces are occupying Palestinian territory. Lost in the media sensationalism over terrorist incidents is the subtle fact that successive Israeli governments, through a dual campaign of media manipulation and continual provocation, successfully perpetuated the image of Palestinians as violent rejectionists and paved the way for its own brand of state terrorism. In so doing, it has employed the rhetoric of ‘terror’ as an instrument of terror.

9. Can terrorism be justified?

In the current climate of opinion, attempts to justify terrorist actions on moral grounds are likely to be met with expressions of incredulity, at both the scholarly and the popular level. Robespierre’s ominous ‘virtue without terror is powerless’ lost whatever credibility it might have appeared to have long ago, at least as a moral maxim. It is more common to hear sweeping denunciations of terrorism on the grounds that it is a brutal violation of the human rights, fails to treat people as ‘moral persons’ (Khatchadourian, 1998), does not differ from murder (French, 2003), indiscriminately attacks the innocent (Walzer, 1988,
targets those who are innocent of the grievances from which it stems (Primoratz, 2004a, p. 21; Jaggar, 2005, p. 212), or, simply, is a violation of the *jus in bello* discrimination rule. Terrorism is also likely to generate disgust, hatred, and vengeance, not only within the targeted community, but also among the external audience with little understanding of the relevant history, rendering it a strategy that backfires by increasing the determination and volume of one’s enemies. Michael Walzer contends that no sort of ‘apologetic descriptions and explanations,’ for example, that it is effective, a last resort, the only alternative, or not distinct from other forms of political struggle, provide an excuse for terrorism (Walzer, 1988, pp. 239–42). Recalling Kant’s insistence that war can be justified only if it is expected to contribute to future peace, it is precisely because terrorism is capable of generating intense feelings of hatred and vengeance that it threatens to undermine trust and the possibility of future coexistence (Khatchadourian, 1998). As Kant realized, criminal stratagems raise the frightening possibility that genocidal annihilation of one or both parties might be the only way to end a conflict.39

Yet, it is not obvious that these considerations trump all others if terrorism is the only means available to secure an overwhelmingly justifiable end, that is, when not committing terrorism would have morally worse consequences than engaging in terrorism. Can such a scenario ever exist? We have already noted that history is replete with defenses of terrorism as a necessary means of conquering territory, or, with Robespierre and Trotsky, as a mechanism for advancing the interests and safety of ‘the people.’ Apart from such dubious identifications of the public good or glorifications of territorial theft, some have justified state terrorism on defensive grounds, say, in the case of ‘supreme emergency,’ and others have added that terrorism by communities other than states might be justified in similar cases of self-defense.40

To investigate this issue, let us generalize the notion of a community to include any society of persons having some level of geographical and political unity and containing entire families that ensure its continued existence through the usual reproduction of individuals who *ipso facto* become members. States are communities possessing sovereignty over territory, but there are various levels of non-state communities as well, for example, those constituting political or regional divisions within a state, local municipalities, religious communities, ethnic minorities, and so on. Any community can be subjected to threats and attacks stemming from civil disorder, government oppression, foreign invasions, and occupations. Normally, the job of defending a community is vested in the
sovereign power, but the sovereign might not deliver, especially if it is too weak, has been decimated or destroyed, or, is itself the aggressor. Just as individuals have a right of self-defense in the absence of police protection, so too, a community has the right to collective self-defense when state protection is unavailable—at least when it is legitimately constituted within the territory where the aggression occurs (see Chapter 1 on legitimacy). If so, the constraints imposed by just war theory can be considered in relation to non-state agents (Valls, 2000).

Nowhere is the justice of collective self-defense more manifest than when a community faces an aggressive threat to its very existence. This can take different forms (Gilbert, 2003, p. 26), with attempted extermination of its members being the clearest threat warranting a community’s recourse to self-defense. But even where extermination is not at issue, an aggressor might try to destroy a community in other ways, say, by enslavement or forced conversions of its members, destruction of its vital institutions (economic, agricultural, political, and cultural), appropriation of its natural resources, and seizure of its territory and dispersion of its members. Each of these threats to a community’s survival is an existential threat and, typically, will be viewed as unjustifiable from that community’s perspective. A right of collective self-defense need not be limited to existential threats to survival, for it can also arise when there are threats to a society’s political independence, territory, resources, technological and military capabilities, or ‘basic freedoms of its citizens and its constitutionally democratic political institutions’ (Rawls, 1999a, p. 91).

Let us confine attention to existential threats and inquire how collective self-defense to be pursued. This depends upon the broader legal and political orders that the community exists under, but the following are what might be called the standard measures of self-defense that a community may take when threatened by an aggressor:

- Offers of direct negotiation with the aggressor to resolve the problem.
- Appeals to external agencies, institutions, and laws in order to arbitrate and work towards a peaceful solution of the problem.
- Appeals to a recognized sovereign, or to external powers to forcibly intervene to stop the aggression.
- Resort to non-violent resistance to halt or retard the aggression.

If these measures fail, then the community has the right to,
• Resort to military resistance, whether through conventional or guerilla warfare, against the aggressor’s military forces.

While this latter measure is usually accorded to organized states, if a community is not being protected by a state then it has the right to direct its members to take up arms in pursuit of collective self-defense. This is not a surprising allowance given that a state might persecute its own population or a segment thereof.

So far, so good. Now consider the situation from the standpoint of generalized just war theory, for we should not expect any community—state or non-state—to be justified in resorting to violence unless it has a just cause and uses violence as a last resort, through a competent authority, with expectations of success, and so on. Refusing to apply the considerations of \textit{jus ad bellum} and \textit{jus in bello} to violence waged by non-state agents would be to delegitimize any resistance to repression by a non-state community, including all revolutions, national liberation movements, and resistance to tyrannical government. That is an implausible conclusion.

Suppose now that members of a community faced with an existential threat have good reason to believe that the aggression is unjustifiable by widely accepted canons (say, applicable international conventions), thereby presupposing that their own community is worth preserving. Suppose further that the leadership of the community under threat has resorted to each of the standard measures for self-defense against the aggression. In particular, this leadership has appealed to the aggressor for direct negotiations, publicly argued its case by appeal to international law, requested assistance from international organizations (say, the United Nations), regional alliances, and major world powers, resorted to non-violent methods of protest, and confronted the aggressor’s military within the standard \textit{jus in bello} guidelines. Suppose, furthermore, that repeated efforts of these sorts have proved unsuccessful. In such circumstances, the targeted community faces a radical existential threat, namely, a situation when it is subject to an unjustifiable existential threat, and its recourse to the standard measures of self-defense have failed to end or abate that threat. A situation of radical existential threat qualifies as a ‘supreme emergency’ and a paradigmatic just cause—namely, to eliminate or reduce the threat—if anything does.

Would terrorism be a justifiable option when a community faces a radical existential threat? If so, then we allow that the \textit{jus in bello} principle of discrimination can either be overridden or suitably refined. Accordingly, any defense of terrorism would either have to be conducted
outside the bounds of generalized just war theory, or, be buttressed by a reasonable modification of the discrimination principle. The latter option is favored herein, but before articulating it, let us first observe how the other criteria of generalized just war theory can be satisfied by communities contemplating a campaign of terrorism.

In a situation of radical self-defense, the criterion of just cause is readily satisfied. Without a protective sovereign, the community is justified in taking self-defense into its own hands through strategies that it judges will best end or abate the threat, whether these involve acquiescence, surrender, flight, or resistance. The situation is similar to what we, as individuals, encounter when assaulted or threatened with assault in the absence of police protection; we have a right of active self-defense. However, for a community to justifiably defend itself, its chosen courses of action must also satisfy the requirement of competent authority, either through endorsement by the acknowledged leadership of the community or by the community itself through the best available means of determining consent. Moreover, if the goal of the agents of that contemplated action is to end or reduce the existential threat, then they act with right intent. Nothing prohibits satisfaction of these conditions.

By the very way a radical existential threat is described, recourse to terrorism might also satisfy the requirements of proportionality and last resort given that the aggression is unjustified and that standard measures of self-defense have been tried and have failed. Terrorism would then be a Machiavellian course of action since it would violate widely shared standards for the sake of an overriding just goal, namely, to reduce or end an unwarranted existential threat. Machiavelli’s allowance for occasional cruelty was offered as a ‘last resort’ strategy for the sovereign, but, in a situation of radical existential threat a community is its own sovereign. In plain fact, communities have and still do face radical existential threats, and some have tried the standard measures of self-defense before resorting to terrorism. It is precisely because of gross disparities in economic and military resources between oppressor and oppressed, and because of the continual technological improvements in protection of military personnel, that terrorism might be the only means of resistance available. Suicide terrorism, in particular, is viewed by its agents as a strategy of last resort when embroiled in a ‘zero-sum’ conflict (Pape, 2005, pp. 89–94).

If a proposed act or campaign of terrorism is to satisfy the last resort condition, not only must it be assumed that terrorist acts can be carried out, its proponents must have evidence that there is a reasonable
hope of success that they might enable the community to reach the
goals related to the just cause. This is often the most difficult *jus ad bellum* condition to satisfy (Fotion, 2004, pp. 49–53), but a few points
should be kept in mind. First, although some argue that terrorism never
works to advance a group’s ultimate goals (thus, Walzer, 1988, p. 240;
Khatchadourian, 1998, p. 27; Carr, 2002), there is a number of counter-
examples. For one thing, state terrorism has frequently achieved desired
goals; the American ‘manifest destiny’ was partly achieved through
terrorism against native Americans, and it has been argued that the
terror bombing of Japanese cities in 1945 hastened the end of Second
World War. Non-state terrorism has also been effective (see Wilkins,
1992, p. 39; Pape, 2005, pp. 61–76). As argued above, terrorist tactics
have been effective in achieving both short-term and long-term goals
by non-state groups in the struggle over Palestine.

In the case of a radical existential threat, there are different ways in
which a threatened community’s resort to terrorism against powerful
unwarranted aggression could be successful in advancing its goal of self-
preservation.

1. The aggressor concludes that the price of its aggression is too high
   and, to avoid the effects of terrorism upon its own civilian popula-
tion, decides to desist from that aggression.42
2. External states and alliances are caused to intervene to bring an end
to the aggression.43
3. By retaliating against aggression, the threatened community gains
   credibility and recognition, both from external parties and from other
members of their own community who might thereby become more
confident, more hopeful, and more committed to joining a resistance
whose likelihood of success is increased with greater participation
and unity.44

The probability of success is enhanced if the aggressor has itself used
terrorism in either its direct or structural modes. Such parity of means
in the method of violence might strengthen the conviction in external
parties, as well as in the aggressor’s own population of, either that it
is appropriate to return terrorism for terrorism or that tit for tat viol-
ence has escalated out of proportion. An asymmetrical use of terrorism,
by contrast, runs the risk of evoking contempt for the threatened
community among external parties and in alienating members of the
threatened community who would normally be opposed to such tactics.
Up to this point, the argument has been consequentialist; communities have a right to defend themselves against radical existential threats by terrorist means because the consequences of failing to act in this way are worse. Barring a pure utilitarian consequentialism, however, concern for a just distribution of the value of the expected consequences must also be factored in. And here we come to a direct challenge to any attempt to justify terrorism. If one party is innocent of an aggression against another, then the latter’s violence against the former in pursuit of redress would be a gross violation of justice (Primoratz, 2004a, pp. 20–1). So, how could violence against civilians be justified if they are innocent of the terrorists’ grievances?

Answer? Violence directed against an innocent person cannot be justified, but it is incorrect to suppose that civilians are automatically ‘innocent’ of their community’s aggression against another community. They might be culpable of that aggression in a number of ways and in varying degrees (Holmes, 1989, p. 187). For one thing, civilians might participate by voluntarily paying taxes or by publicly supporting political, economic, or national policies and activities that generate and sustain that aggression. For another, the aggressor might have a representative political system that operates under the principle of popular sovereignty, namely, that ultimate political power is vested in the citizenry and exercised by the governing institutions through the consent of that citizenry. Popular sovereignty entails shared responsibility for the laws, policies, and actions of the state insofar as these represent the consent of the collective of which each individual is a member. Those who voluntarily join any association or institution share in responsibility for its actions, and citizenship in a representative system is voluntary; it can be renounced, even if there are dramatic consequences for so doing such as imprisonment or exile. Responsibility in a representative system is not avoided by belonging to the political opposition or having been critical of the government’s policies and acts, even though, in such cases, one’s culpability might be of a lesser degree. In sum, terrorism is justified only if a further culpability condition is satisfied, namely, that those who would direct violence against civilians within the aggressor community must have evidence that those civilians share in the responsibility for that aggression.45

While this might seem a brute tossing of the jus in bello rules to the wind, the departure is less dramatic than might appear. The jus in bello demand of proportionality can continue to be respected; not every imagined act of terrorism by the threatened community could
be justified, and no more should be used than is necessary to end or reduce the existential threat. Furthermore, the prohibition on using illegitimate means can be respected; the weapons used by terrorists, bombs, guns, knives, and so on are more primitive forms of the weapons in the arsenals of state militaries; that some terrorism is justified does not imply that terrorism through any means, for example, nuclear weapons, nerve gas, and so on, would also be justified. Similarly, the requirement of treating prisoners of war humanely is satisfiable; even though the weaker parties in asymmetric conflicts usually do not have the resources to take prisoners of war, when they do, there is no reason they could not respect the standard conventions on prisoners of war. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, while the principle of noncombatant immunity is abandoned in the case of a radical existential threat, a modified principle of discrimination, remains: in redressing a grievance, those innocent of that grievance are to be immune from harm. In yet other words, there is no reason why terrorism cannot discriminate, targeting only those members of the aggressor community who are guilty of that aggression (Valls, 2000, p. 76). The truly non-culpable, for example, children, the mentally ill, and so forth, should be immune from attack.

Let me now bring this to a head. I have argued that where various conditions are met, then terrorism against an aggressor can be justified. More precisely, if the members of a community have adequate evidence that

- their community is subjected to an unjustifiable radical existential threat from an identifiable aggressor (hence, that the *jus ad bellum* just cause and last resort conditions are met);
- a projected campaign of terrorism would satisfy the *jus ad bellum* conditions of competent authority, proportionality, right intent, and reasonable hope of success;
- the aggressor is using terrorism against their community (parity of means condition);
- the adult civilians of the aggressor are culpable of the aggression that constitutes the existential threat (the culpability condition);
- the *jus in bello* demands of proportionality, legitimate means, humane treatment of captives, and discrimination (do not target innocents) are to be respected;

then their recourse to terrorism against the aggressor community for the purposes of ending or reducing that threat is morally justifiable.
10. Justified terrorism in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict

Terrorism in the Arab–Israeli conflict has been both a deliberate and an inevitable consequence of the aims of both parties. As described above, Zionist strategic terrorism in 1948 was an effective means of creating a Jewish state with a decisive Jewish majority in Palestine, and since 1967, the combination of Israeli structural and direct terrorism has been instrumental extending Israeli control beyond the 1949 armistice lines. Palestinian terrorism, strategic and reactive, stems from a decided determination to resist the loss of a traditional homeland by any means possible. While it has not brought about Palestinian self-determination, it has achieved some of the desired objectives towards that ultimate goal, and, as with Zionist terrorism, it is likely that it was essential in so doing.

Has any of this terrorism been morally justified? No doubt, plenty of instances have not been. But we have seen that there are those on both sides of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict who have found terrorism to be a rational strategy for defending and ensuring the independence of their people. Given a conviction in the morality of their goals, they have also argued that their violence is completely justifiable. The real question is whether their respective ends of national self-preservation and self-determination—as conceived by each side—confers overriding moral significance upon the terrorism each has inflicted upon the other. Both the ends and the envisioned means must be examined more carefully.

There are the maximalists on both sides of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict who, believing that they are in a zero-sum game, take terrorism to be the only way to succeed in achieving an exclusive possession of the entire region under dispute. As far as their means-end thinking is concerned, they are absolutely correct; establishing either a completely Jewish or a completely Arab state throughout Palestine would necessitate violence against civilians. The more controversial issue is whether either maximalist goal is of such overriding importance as to justify terrorism. Here, it is very important to distinguish the inherent desirability of an end from the justifiability of pursuing that end given standing demographic and political realities. The vision of a nation-state established on a defensible and economically viable territory in which people are able to develop its culture without interference from outside is not in itself wrongful, even though the principle of self-determination does not grant any collective a right to such a state (as argued in Chapter 1). But since maximalist programs for implementing that vision in Palestine
would entail massive violence against civilians who are legitimately living in the region of mandated Palestine, whether Arab or Jew, and pose a threat to peace throughout southern Asia, and since there are reasonable alternatives to solving the conflict that avoid these extremes, then there are moral grounds for holding that the maximalist ends on either side cannot justify terrorism.

Justifications in terms of maximalist ends are not the only arguments available for defending terrorism. Let us consider the major terrorist strategies in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict that are independent of maximalist assumptions.

10.1. Terrorism in establishing a Jewish state within Palestine
If the end of Zionism—the establishment of Jewish state in Palestine with a decisive Jewish majority—was of overriding importance, then the Jewish recourse for strategic terrorism against the Palestinians was justifiable. Given that the Palestinians were determined to retain and reside in their homeland, then achieving the end of Zionism required the use of violence against civilians in order to dismantle the Palestinian Arab community and remove as many Arabs as possible from the targeted area. However, this justification for terrorism against Palestinians cannot be anchored in the foregoing self-defense argument. The Palestinians were not the aggressors in the overall conflict, and since the importation of thousands of European Jews into Palestine during the Mandate period was against the will of the majority of Palestine’s residents, then whatever existential threat the Palestinians posed to that Jewish community, it was not a threat to a community that was legitimately constituted in Palestine, hence, not an unjustifiable threat if a threat at all. Furthermore, as argued in Chapter 1, achieving the goal of Zionism was not itself justifiable since realizing it meant violating the principle of self-determination. Yet, even if the League of Nations Mandate and the UN-GA Resolution 181(II) justified the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, those decisions did not sanction removal of the resident Palestinian population. Such expulsion was the effect of explicit strategic decisions made by the Zionist leadership to create a Jewish state with a decisive Jewish majority in as much of mandated Palestine as could be captured. Since that end did not have overriding moral significance, then the terrorist strategy to secure it could not be morally justified.

10.2. Terrorism in expanding the Jewish state within Palestine
Assuming that recognized international law is a reliable guide to a sound international morality, then Israeli structural terrorism in the
occupied territories has not been morally justified. The political end which this terrorism serves, namely, the expansion of Israel control in the West Bank, requires the acquisition of territory by force, forbidden under international law (Cattan, 1976, chap. VII; Quigley, 1990, part 4; Boyle, 2003, chap. 5) and constitutes a violation of the principle of self-determination. Moreover, the policies of the Israeli occupation violate both the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits colonization of occupied territory, and the major conventions protecting the civil, political, economic, and cultural rights of the resident population. Despite the claims that Israel needs this territory to ensure its own survival (e.g., O’Brien, 1991, p. 230), the Palestinians in the occupied territories have never posed an existential threat to Israel given the gross asymmetry of power between Israelis and Palestinians and the massive imbalance in the terror inflicted. Israel is one of the world’s strongest military powers, equipped with some of the most advanced weapons on the planet. Palestinians have no weaponry to compare with Israel’s F-16 fighter planes, Apache helicopters, Merkava tanks, and the like. Although the Israeli Government has a right to defend its population against unwarranted aggression, its structural and direct terrorism in the occupied territories exists for the sole purpose of expanding the Jewish state and, hence, both are offensive and provocative rather than defensive. Israel has other alternatives for countering threats from Palestinians to its population, specifically, ending its occupation of the West Bank and seriously working with the Palestinian leadership towards achieving a just compromise of their long-standing conflict.

10.3. Palestinian strategic terrorism in self-defense

Using the argument from radical self-defense developed, discussed in Section 9, there is a prima facie case for the legitimacy of both past and current Palestinian terrorism directed against Israelis. The proof is in the details.

First, the Palestinian community throughout Palestine, and the Palestinian communities in various regions within Palestine, have faced, and still face, an existential threat from Zionism. Palestinians have perceived this threat early on. In a letter to the British High Commissioner in Palestine in December 27, 1934, the Palestinian leader, Haj Amin El-Husseini, spoke of Arab fears that the ‘inevitable result’ of continued Jewish immigration ‘would be the destruction of the Arab race in Palestine.’ This threat has been demonstrated in many ways:
• Israel’s expulsion of Palestinians in 1948 and again in 1967 and the refusal to repatriate Palestinian refugees.

• Israel’s colonization, land confiscation, and other forms of structural terrorism in the occupied West Bank that began in 1967 and have continued until the present, including during the period of the Oslo Accords.

• Israel’s systematic violation of Palestinians’ human rights in the occupied territories.

• Israel’s refusal to comply with international resolutions calling for its withdrawal from the territories occupied in the 1967 war.

• Israel’s opposition to peace initiatives, for example, repeated calls for an international peace conference on the Middle East, the Rogers Plan of 1969–70, the Reagan Plan of 1982, Prince Fahd’s peace plan of 1981–82, the PLO’s offer of peace in 1988, and the Arab League’s proposals of 2002.

• Israel’s deliberate efforts to destroy the PLO’s capacity to establish and maintain an independent state in the occupied territories (Yaniv, 1987, passim).

• Israel’s deportations of Palestinian political leaders during the 1970s (Lesch, 1979).

• Israel’s assassinations of Palestinian political leaders, extending from the 1970s to the present.

• The expressed intention by the dominant Israeli political parties to retain control of the West Bank or large segments thereof, as demonstrated by the Labor Party’s early support of the Allon Plan and its subsequent expansion of the settlement network during the 1990s, the Likud’s election platform vows to retain all of the West Bank and its rapid acceleration of settlement building when in power, and the publication of official Israeli maps showing the West Bank as part of Israel. The only difference between the leading political parties in Israel concerns how much of the West Bank is to be incorporated into the Jewish state (Reinhart, 2002, chap. ix).

• Israel’s refusal to permit establishment of a viable Palestinian state in the occupied territories, as revealed by Moshe Sharett’s agreements with Abdullah (Rogan, 2001), Ehud Barak’s breaking off talks at Taba in January 2001 (Reinhart, 2002, chap. II), and Ariel Sharon’s rejection of the Arab League’s peace overtures in spring 2002, the 2002 Geneva Accords between moderate Israelis and Palestinians (Shuman, 2003; date of access: June 17, 2006), and the call for establishing a Palestinian state in the Bush Administration’s 2002 ‘Road Map’ for
peace (see Journal of Palestine Studies 32, 3, 121, for more on the reception of the Bush administration's Road Map).

- The virtually unquestioned support for Israeli policies by the government of the United States.46

That this existential threat is unjustifiable is due to its violation of the human rights of Palestinians, including the right of self-determination (see Chapters 1 and 2).

Second, in light of this threat, the Palestinians have a just cause for resorting to violence, not so much for achieving political independence as for survival of their community. A group’s goal of self-determination is not always overriding and cannot, by itself, justify a campaign of terrorism, for not every impediment to a national group’s quest for political independence poses a radical existential threat. The Palestinians’ quest is for their survival as a community in their home territory, and in this sense their case is arguably different from the situation faced by Kurds, Tamils, Basques, Irish, and so on, however legitimate the demands for self-determination for these groups might be.

Third, the Palestinians have attempted the standard measures of self-defense noted above. (i) As early as 1913, Palestinian leaders sought accommodation with the Zionists (Hirst, 2003, p. 154). The major Palestinian political organization, the PLO, has tried diplomacy by entering into direct negotiations with representatives of the Israeli government and various Israeli groups and individuals (Shehadeh, 1997), and in 1988 the Palestine National Council ratified the two-state solution, thereby explicitly recognizing Israel’s right to exist. The Palestinian Authority in the occupied territories has repeatedly stressed its acceptance of the two-state solution, yet Israel has not reciprocated, since it has steadfastly refused to negotiate any deal with the Palestinians that would grant them a viable state in Palestine. The claim that Israel’s leadership is seriously interested in a meaningful compromise with the Palestinians is undermined Israel’s actions, specifically, the direct and structural terrorism described in Sections 4–6, or in the persistent vilification and dehumanization of Palestinians noted in Section 8. (ii) The Palestinians have also appealed to external agencies for assistance (e.g., the League of Nations, the United Nations, and the Arab League) and to external powers, they have supported international resolutions calling for a two-state solution to the conflict (see the record summarized in Finkelstein, 2005, pp. 294–300), and in April 2003, they endorsed the Bush Administration’s Road Map. (iii) Palestinians have repeatedly used techniques of non-violence in combating the Israeli occupation
and have sought and received the help of like-minded Israelis, but to no avail. (iv) The Palestinians have resisted established militaries, viz., the British military in 1936–39, the Zionist forces in 1947–48, and the Israeli military since the establishment of the Jewish state. None of these measures has been successful in ending or abating the existential threat they face, much less in securing their self-determination. In the atmosphere of ongoing hostilities accompanying the American occupation of the Middle East, there is even less likelihood that availing themselves of these standard measures of self-defense will be successful. By emasculating Palestinian diplomacy, intensifying the control over the West Bank, Israel has deprived young Palestinians of hope, leaving terrorism one of the few avenues of active resistance left. Thus, there is good reason to conclude that the Palestinians in the West Bank face a radical existential threat, in which case terrorism presents itself as a last resort strategy for that community.47

Fourth, there is evidence that recourse to terrorism has produced at least some desired results for the Palestinians, even though it has not yet secured Palestinian self-determination nor ended the existential threat posed by Israel. In plain fact, Palestinian terrorism has succeeded in perpetuating the cycle of violence that Israelis and Palestinian have been locked in for over 80 years. One result is that considerable attention is kept riveted upon the conflict and, thus, upon Palestinian suffering and Palestinian demands. As indicated in Section 4, the result is that not only have many people pressed for answers to questions about why this sort of violence is occurring, but many people throughout the world have become more sympathetic and supportive of the Palestinians. For over 80 years, beginning with the British commissions of the 1920s, extreme violence has caused external players to play a more active role in resolving the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. It has led some Israelis to question policies of the Israeli government in the occupied territories, and, in a few instances, it has caused the Israeli government to make some concessions to the Palestinians (Pape, 2005, chap. 5). Given the intentions of the Israeli leadership, quiet acquiescence on the part of Palestinians would have resulted in slow strangulation. Furthermore, striking back against their oppressors has also alleviated the Palestinians’ sense of impotence against a powerful adversary and, thereby, strengthened the confidence, resolve, and unity among Palestinian communities.48

Fifth, the remaining conditions for justifying the Palestinian’s campaign of terrorism appear to be satisfied. Palestinian militancy...
Terrorism has received enough popular support from the Palestinian residents of the territories to sanction at least the general strategy of violence against Israeli civilians (see the figures reported in Finkelstein, 2005, pp. 298–9). This kind of support intensifies whenever the Israeli military increases the amount of terrorism it employs against the Palestinians (Sections 3–5). Not only is the parity of means condition satisfied, thereby, but since Israel is a representative democracy with large percentages of its adult citizens publicly supporting the measures that constitute the existential threat to the Palestinians, then the culpability condition is also met. The Israeli electorate has placed in power men with a record of violence against Palestinians civilians, including Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir, terrorists from the 1940s, Yitzhak Rabin who directed the forced expulsion of Palestinian from their homes in 1948 and implemented the ‘iron fist’ policy in the Occupied territories in the 1980s, and Ariel Sharon with a record of 50 years of aggression against Palestinians. The Israeli public was not blind to the pasts and polices of these men, and this is concrete evidence that it supported terrorism against Palestinians (Steinhoff, 2004, pp. 103–5; Finkelstein, 2005, pp. 300–1). In 2004, despite the deaths of over 3000 Palestinians since September 2000, they returned the Likud party to power, doubling its number of seats in the Knesset. According to a March 2002 poll, 46 per cent of Israelis favored expulsion of Palestinians from the occupied territories and 60 per cent favored ‘encouraging’ Palestinian citizens of Israel to leave (Ammon Barzilai, ‘More Israeli Jews Favor Transfer of Palestinians, Israeli Arabs, Poll Finds,’ Ha’aretz, March 12, 2002). In a 2005 poll, 65 per cent of Israelis expressed opposition to a full Israeli withdrawal to the 1949 armistice lines or abandoning the ‘neighborhoods’ that surround East Jerusalem—the very settlements that ‘have destroyed the contiguity of the West Bank and cut Palestinians off from Jerusalem and each other’(Abunimah, 2006, p. 52). These facts certainly do not justify every act of terrorism committed by Palestinians, but they constitute a strong *prima facie* case that the Palestinians have been justified in resorting to terrorism in some instances. Not all Palestinians agree. Since the recourse to terrorism has also damaged Palestinians’ reputation, and provided the Israeli government with a pretext to tighten its control over the West Bank, to impose further restrictions upon its residents, and to intensify its own violence, many thoughtful Palestinians have condemned such actions on the following grounds:
Suicide bombings deepen the hatred and widen the gap between the Palestinian and Israeli people. Also, they destroy the possibilities of peaceful co-existence between them in two neighboring states. They strengthen the enemies of peace on the Israeli side and give Israel’s aggressive government under Sharon the excuse to continue its harsh war against our people. There is a need to re-evaluate these acts considering that pushing the area towards an existential war between the two people living on the holy land will lead to destruction for the whole region. (‘Urgent Appeal to Stop Suicide Bombings,’ Al Quds, June 20, 2002)

On the other side, there is no reason to assume that if the Palestinians had not responded to Israeli policies with violence that the Israelis would have desisted from their plans to colonize the West Bank and undermine the Palestinian presence there through structural terrorism. The undeniable fact remains that the Israeli political leadership has always been determined to expand the Jewish state beyond the 1949 armistice lines, and the settlement program is an integral phase in this expansion. Not only are the settlements projected as irreversible facts on the ground, they are instrumental to the argument that the only way to end hostilities is by separating the two communities by either transferring the Palestinians out of the area or isolating them within increasingly infeasible ‘bantustans’ (Reinhart, 2002, chaps. V, IX). It is ludicrous to think that these settlements in occupied territory are driven by a desire for security; if anything, they multiply Israel’s security concerns, for not only must the Israeli government continue to expend large amounts of money in protecting the settlements and their inhabitants, but Palestinian outrage and frustration will only intensify with every dunum confiscated and every Israeli house built. Unless there is a collective decision on the part of Palestinians to concede defeat and evacuate their ancestral homeland, these emotions will seek outlets.

11. Concluding remarks

No one should be sanguine about any attempt to defend terrorism. Given our massive uncertainty about the future, consequentialist justifications are always tenuous, and this should sober anyone who would advocate, pursue, or defend a campaign of terrorism. Yet, before making any final moral judgments about violence between Israelis and Palestinians, it is important to keep some final observations in mind.
The burden of ending this tragic violence lies primarily with the stronger party, Israel, especially since the Palestinian leadership and the Arab states have repeatedly expressed their willingness to accept a compromise by recognizing Israel in exchange for a Palestinian state in the occupied territories. Israel has a sufficiently strong military to defend itself against armed threats without itself engaging in terrorism. The Jewish desire for security is a powerful one, and fully understandable, in light of the prejudice, discrimination, and persecution that Jews have experienced throughout their remarkable history, but it is doubtful that long-term security can be achieved by antagonizing the rest of the Middle East. The ambitious arrogance, and perhaps, the short-sightedness, of Israeli leaders and their supporters in the United States and elsewhere, are chiefly to blame for the ongoing cycle of violence, even if they are triumphant in the short run. The gross asymmetry in military and economic power between the two sides fosters skepticism that the Palestinians can ever succeed in achieving self-determination in Palestine by any means. As such, the conclusion of the previous section is best viewed as conditional rather than categorical; if Palestinian recourse to terrorism is likely to defeat or even diminish a radical existential threat to their community, then given that the other conditions for justified political violence are met, some instances of Palestinian terrorism can be justified. Whether this antecedent is fulfilled is a deep and complex matter, for, as noted, there are powerful considerations on both sides.

If recourse to violence is likely not to be successful in ending an existential threat, can terrorism be justified by any other argument? In particular, could purely retaliatory terrorism (Section 2) be justified? Here, one must distinguish between there being no reasonable hope of ending or reducing an existential threat and there being no hope of successfully carrying out a punitive act against the aggressor. If the latter holds, a contemplated act of terrorism would be futile. But suppose there is a way of harming the aggressor, even if it would not succeed in ending or reducing the aggression? Would inflicting harm under such circumstances be morally justified as long as the other jus ad bellum and jus in bello conditions are observed? There are at least three reasons for claiming that it would be.

1. Under the assumption that every community, like every human being, has a moral right of self-defense against unjustified aggression, then allowing terrorism under a radical existential threat conveys the message to future governments and generations that existential aggression against others will generate violent responses, whether
from the victim or from those who sympathize with the victim. Concern for the safety and future of their own civilians may very well function as a deterrent that would stay the hand of the would-be aggressors, especially in an era of advanced weaponry when the actions of a disaffected group might obliterate an entire city. Rules permitting punitive retaliation for grievous wrongs have too great a deterrence value to warrant their suspension in the absence of a reasonable hope of success of ending or reducing a particular existential threat.

2. Denying the legitimacy of retaliation against powerful adversaries would give every society, every state, every political faction, a reason for the acquisition of overwhelming power. Suppose a society acquired enough power to make it very clear that any opposition to its aggression against another society would likely be unsuccessful. Suppose, further, that its military and leadership have nearly immunized themselves from retaliation, leaving only terrorism—violence against the more exposed, yet culpable civilians—as a means of retaliation. If the lack of a reasonable hope of success in ending the aggression is the only thing that keeps such proposed terrorism from being right, then a corollary of the might makes right formula would triumph under the guise of might makes wrong: acquire enough power so that your opposition cannot justifiably retaliate. Who could resist such immunization? Adherence to that precept would be a greater danger to the world, and a greater offense to human dignity, than adherence to any rule permitting retaliatory terrorism against an unjustified aggressor.

3. Few situations are worse than being faced with a humiliating unjustified annihilation of oneself and all that one holds dear without the power of retaliation. No human being should be morally required to passively submit to such a fate; each has a right to alleviate the suffering caused by such a condition and preserve one’s dignity as a human being through the available means. Some might have the strength to preserve dignity through non-violent resistance, peaceful acquiescence to their fate, or even solitary stoical suicide, and no one can criticize their decision. But not everyone has had the philosophical luxury, religious and moral training, or the saintly strength of spirit to transform such ideals into viable practical alternatives capable of sustaining a course of action when threatened with humiliating extermination. The first impulse when attacked is to fight back, and when the attack is viewed as uncalled for then that impulse is strengthened. To most humans, the conviction that those guilty
of a crime are to be punished is too compelling a practical maxim to abandon even when it is reasonable to expect that the crime will be committed regardless of what one does. The decision to strike back against overwhelming odds can be a valuable means for reducing misery and retaining dignity while enduring the threat of destruction, before the twilight falls.

On each of these grounds, then, retaliatory terrorism against those who pose a radical existential threat is morally justifiable. Neither individuals nor communities can be morally required to passively submit to their own future extermination without the right of resistance against those responsible. If an existential threat is so severe that it would be carried out in the absence of resistance, then, for the reasons given, terrorism against unjustified aggressors is better than the available alternatives.

Before passing final judgment on the Palestinian response to the threat they are facing, it is worth reflecting on the lives of young Palestinians brought up under Israeli military occupation. From birth, they have been subjected to the brutality of midnight searches, beatings, imprisonment, torture, restrictions on their movement, and to the ongoing spectacle of watching their parents, their relatives, their friends being humiliated on a daily basis.\textsuperscript{49} According to a 2004 survey of 944 youths in Gaza, age 10–19, nearly half showed symptoms of severe post-traumatic stress disorder. Among them, the most prevalent types of trauma exposure were witnessing funerals (94.6 per cent), witnessing shooting (83.2 per cent), seeing injured or dead who were not relatives (66.9 per cent), seeing family members injured or killed (61.6 per cent), and witnessing their fathers being humiliated or beaten by Israeli soldiers (55 per cent).\textsuperscript{50} In many cases, the dead and injured were children, like themselves. Add to this the fact that they have continually been reminded that this land used to belong to them, the Palestinians, the Arabs, for centuries before the catastrophe of 1948, of how those distant fields belonged to their village, of how they had free access to the rest of the country, to the holy cities of Jerusalem (\textit{Al-Quds}) and Hebron (\textit{Al-Khalil}), to the Dead Sea, and to the hills of the Galilee. If, throughout their lives, this is what they have seen and heard, then it is understandable when they become young adults they would be consumed by four powerful emotions:

- \textit{humiliation}, derived from a violation of dignity and honor;
- \textit{outrage}, derived from a violation of a sense of justice;
• despair, derived from nearly four decades of life under the structural terrorism of the Israeli occupation and the failure of the world community to end it;
• vengeance, derived from humiliation, outrage, and despair.

Is it surprising that they should react in the desperation of suicidal terrorism in which they fail to see their victims as innocent? When members of a society repeatedly resort to vengeance of this magnitude, we must not fall for the incredible suggestions that it is because of their cultural or religious beliefs, or, even more ludicrously, their ‘hatred of freedom,’ their ‘desire to kill without cause,’ or their ‘disposition toward unbridled violence.’ That large numbers of Palestinians are so consumed by humiliation, outrage, and despair that they find violence to be the only outlet, is a vivid testimony to the political failure of international diplomacy and the moral failure of the world community. Their final act is very likely a plea that the pain and horror they have endured throughout their lives ought not be tolerated by any human being or community.

Apart from the issue of justification, enough has been said to show that in the absence of a just peace, terrorism in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict will continue as long as both parties retain their current aims and passions, or, until one side is utterly crushed or eliminated (Gordon and Lopez, 2000, p. 112). The signs are ominous. Not only has the Israeli leadership consistently opposed a viable Palestinian state west of the Jordan River, but a sizeable segment of the Israeli public openly supports the idea of compulsory transfer. Wholly outgunned, the Palestinians will be unable to stop the expansion of the Jewish state without a significant change in either Israeli public opinion or the global political status quo, and their continual victimization will continue to have profound repercussions upon the future, even if the details cannot be presently ascertained. Throughout history, intense struggles have never ceased to produce astonishing outcomes. While Israeli Jews presently enjoy a strong vigorous state, it cannot yet be determined whether Zionism’s victory and expansion by force at the expense of another people can long be tolerated or sustained. While Palestinian Arabs have gained recognition and a place at the negotiating table, it is too early to tell if either their diplomatic efforts or their resort to violence will secure their self-determination in Palestine or survival as a distinct people. One thing is clear from the past 90 years; combating terrorism with more terrorism will not stop the intercommunal violence so long as both parties are left standing and determined.
Notes

1. See the descriptions in Brown (1970), Churchill (1997), and Mann (2005). Holy scriptures were not far from the minds of those Americans who supported atrocities against native Americans. In 1794, George Henry Loskiel wrote that the American settlers ‘represented the Indians as Canaanites who without mercy ought to be destroyed from the face of the earth, and considered America as the land of promise given to the Christians’ (cited in Mann, 2005, p. 151).

2. The U.S. State Department (http://www.state.gov; date of access: January 18, 2005) takes its definition from Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d): ‘The term “terrorism” means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience. (The term “noncombatant” is interpreted to include, in addition to civilians, military personnel who at the time of the incident are unarmed or not on duty.)’ The FBI (http://www.fbi.gov/publications/terror/terror2000_2001.htm; date of access: January 18, 2005) endorses a definition found in the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations: ‘Terrorism is the unlawful use of force and violence against person or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in further of political or social objectives.’ The U.S. Defense Department (http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf; date of access: July 23, 2007) describes terrorism as ‘the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.’

3. Similar definitions can be found in several sources, for example, Garnor (2001, date of access: November 15, 2006), Coady (2004c), and Netanyahu (2001). Controversy has surrounded attempts to define ‘terrorism’ in the United Nations [Thalif Deen, ‘Battle Rages Over UN Anti-Terror Treaty,’ Online Asia Times, November 30, 2001 (http://www.atimes.com/front/CK30Aa02.html; date of access: November 15, 2006). In Article 2(b) of its International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (May 5, 2004), the United Nations provided this definition of terrorism: ‘any act intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to a civilian or non-combatants, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such an act by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.’ An interesting list of definitions of ‘terrorism’ appears in Best and Nocella (2004, pp. 9–13).

4. The U.S. State Department employs a broad notion of noncombatant to include military personnel who are unarmed or who are not on duty. There is some rationale to this if we relativize the notions of combatant and noncombatant to specific courses of action. If a course of action is any action or plan of action that can be intentionally undertaken, whether throwing a particular hand grenade, planning an ambush, invading a country, and so on, then a combatant relative to an act of violence, say, a battle, is
an agent who plays some role in the conduct of that action, whether as fighter, director, or support staff. A combatant relative to given military campaign, for example, an occupation of a city, is one who takes part in that campaign. This allows that a person might be a combatant with respect to a given campaign but not relative to a particular battle within that campaign. Accordingly, if terrorism is violence against noncombatants, then this relativization of combatant affects what gets counted as terrorism as well. This is understood, I will avoid the complications of such relativization in the text.

5. Several writers have pointed out that being random, indiscriminate, or irrational are not essential to politically motivated violence against civilians, see, for example, Valls (2000, p. 67), Coady (2004c, p. 7), and Young (2004, pp. 56–7). Those who describe terrorism in this manner, for example, Walzer (1988, pp. 238–40), typically do so with the intent to discredit terrorism.

6. The terms ‘terroriste’ and ‘le terreur’ were initially applied to the actions of the revolutionary Jacobin government in eradicating its enemies (Laqueur, 1987, p. 11). During Robespierre’s Reign of Terror, it is estimated that some 400,000 men, women, and children were imprisoned by government authorities, and some estimates place the number executed as high as 40,000. By the late nineteenth century, ‘terrorism’ was used to signify anti-government activities, for example, the campaigns of Irish dissidents in the 1860s and of Russian revolutionaries of the 1880s (Laqueur, 1987, chap. 1). The United Nations, in its convention on terrorism, allows that states can be the agents of terrorism. Selden and So (2004) defines state terrorism as ‘systematic state violence against civilians in violation of international norms, state edicts, and precedents established by international courts designed to protect the rights of civilians’ (p. 3). See also Ashmore (1997), Primoratz (2004b), and Jaggar (2005).

7. See Glover (1991, p. 257, 273), Gordon and Lopez (2000, pp. 110–1), Pilger (2004), and Jaggar (2005, p. 208). A contrary view is presented in Robert Pape’s study of suicide terrorism (2005), which defines ‘terrorism’ as ‘the use of violence by an organization other than a national government to intimidate or frighten a target audience’ (p. 9). Pape does not restrict the targets of terrorism to noncombatants and argues that broadening the definition to include governments as agents of terrorism ‘would distract attention from what policy makers would most like to know: how to combat the threat posed by non-state actors to the national security of the United States and our allies.’ Also, because states and non-state actors have ‘different levels of resources, face different kinds of incentives, and are susceptible to different types of pressures’ … they ‘require separate theoretical investigations’ (2005, p. 280). Pape’s qualification reflects a scholar’s explicit decision to abide by the canons that enable him to comment on U.S. foreign policy. Without doubt, terrorism, as he defines it, exists. The drawback of his definition is that, apart from the considerations already raised, it classifies all political violence by non-state actors that might ‘intimidate or frighten’ as terrorist, including the actions of all revolutionary, resistance, and national liberation movements, no matter how justified.
8. In his diary, Herzl wrote: ‘We shall try to spirit the penniless population across the border by procuring employment for it in the transit countries, while denying it any employment in our own country…Both the process of expropriation and the removal of the poor must be carried out discreetly and circumspectly’ (Patai, 1960, vol. I, p. 88).

9. See Flapan (1987, p. 103), Morris (1999, p. 659, 2001, p. 44). Tom Segev writes that despite attempts by Ben-Gurion’s biographers to distance Ben-Gurion from the idea of forcible transfer, his ‘stand on deportation, like that of other Zionist leaders is unambiguous and well-documented’ (1999, p. 407). The expedient of forced transfer also entered into the recommendations of the 1937 Peel Commission Report which first recommended a partition of Palestine into separate Jewish and Arab states. The Commission stated that if the Arabs who lived in the area assigned to the Jews did not leave of their own accord, then their removal should be ‘compulsory’ (Morris, 1999, p. 138).

10. Hirst (2003, pp. 169–73). Subsequently, Ben-Gurion was more candid. In 1938, addressing the Mapai Political Committee, Ben Gurion said, ‘When we say that the Arabs are the aggressors and we defend ourselves—that is only half the truth. As regards our security and life we defend ourselves…politically, we are the aggressors and they defend themselves’ (Flapan, 1979, p. 141).

11. The exact number of Palestinian victims is disputed. The figure of 254 fatalities can be found in Hirst (2003, p. 250), while Morris (1987, p. 113) cites a figure of 250. The number 350 is suggested in De Reynier (1971, p. 764), whereas Morris (2002b, p. 127) concludes that the figure closer to 110, and Pappe (2006, p. 91) reports a figure of 93, explaining that ‘dozens’ of Palestinians killed in fighting were not included in the official list of massacre victims. Pappe describes other massacres that had larger numbers of Palestinian victims, for example, at Tantura and Dawaymeh (2006a, pp. 133–7, 195–7). Menachem Begin denied any massacre of Arab civilians had occurred at Deir Yassin, but he acknowledged that the story ‘invented’ about what happened there ‘helped carve the way to our decisive victories on the battlefield’ (Begin, 1977, p. 165).

12. In the years after the 1947–49 war, the story was perpetrated that Arabs left their homes at the behest of Arab leaders who pledged to cleanse the area of Zionist forces—see, for example, a speech by Abba Eban (Laqueur, 1976, pp. 151–64). This myth, perhaps initiated by the American Zionist, Joseph Schechtman (Khalidi, 2005, pp. 43–4), has long since been debunked (see Flapan, 1987; Morris, 1987; Khalidi, 2005; Pappe, 2006a; much earlier, Childers, 1961). Before his assassination by members of the Jewish Lehi militia in September 1948, Count Folke Bernadotte, the UN Mediator in Palestine, wrote: ‘The exodus of Palestinian Arabs resulted from panic created by fighting in their communities, “by rumors concerning real or alleged acts of terrorism, or expulsion…There have been numerous reports from reliable sources of large-scale looting, pillaging and plundering, and of instances of destruction of villages without apparent military necessity”’ (UN document A/648, part I, chap. V).

13. See Alon (1980, pp. 68–81), which mentions that the Israeli policy of combating ‘international terrorism’ included the proviso that civilian
populations that ‘shelter anti-Israeli terrorists’ will not be immune from punitive action. See also Gal-Or (1994) for a discussion of Israeli policy, as well as the earlier study of Blechman (1971).

14. Morris (1993, pp. 136–7, p. 415). In 1979, Livia Rokach, the daughter of Moshe Sharett, Israel’s first foreign minister and its second prime minister (1954–55), published excerpts from his diary that revealed more details of Israel’s strategic terrorism [appearing in English in Rokach (1980)]. She notes how Israel’s leaders were unhappy with the 1949 armistice borders and never seriously believed in an Arab threat to the existence of Israel. To expand, Israel had to provoke Arab states into confrontation, a campaign that ‘inevitably presupposed the use of large scale, open violence’ and the glorification of terrorism and revenge. In every case, whether against Qibya or other West Bank villages, for example, upon Nahalin in 1954, Israel portrayed its military actions as ‘retaliation.’ These facts, as well as others noted in this section, belie the contention in O’Brien (1991, pp. 24–5) that Israel has made ‘serious efforts’ to ‘avoid civilian damage.’

15. Abou Iyad (1981, pp. 111–2) and see Hirst (2003, pp. 439–40) and O’Brien (1991, chap. 1). Not only did the Olympics Committee exclude the Palestinians, it refused to respond to letters from the Palestinians requesting that they be allowed representation in the Olympic Games, causing considerable indignation and rage among young Palestinian militants (Abou Iyad with Eric Rouleau, 1978, p. 106).

16. Khalidi (1989) summarizes the statistics compiled from several sources. He notes that the number of Israeli soldiers killed by Palestinians from 1965 to 1988 was 432 as against approximately 2824 Palestinian combatants killed by the IDF. Countering terrorism was the pretext for the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982—dubbed ‘Operation Peace for the Galilee’—as the Israeli Government claimed its security was threatened by PLO cross-border raids and shelling. However, the Lebanese–Israel border had been largely quiet for 11 months due to a cease-fire negotiated by the Reagan emissary Philip Habib. After the reelection of Menachem Begin in mid-1981 and the appointment of Ariel Sharon as Defense Minister, air raids on Lebanon occurred with greater frequency (Bleier, 2003; date of access: November 12, 2006). Israeli troops began massing at the border in the spring of 1982, days in advance of an attempted assassination of an Israeli diplomat in London that Israel used an excuse to launch an invasion. The purpose of this invasion was to crush the PLO politically and remove it from Lebanon (Chomsky, 1999, pp. 198–208; Hirst, 2003, pp. 528–53). Throughout the subsequent 22-year occupation of southern Lebanon, Israeli forces frequently shelled civilian centers. For example, Operation Accountability in July 1993 killed some 120 civilians and injured another 500, with an estimated 150 000–200 000 displaced from their homes. In April 1996, nearly 200 civilians were killed in Operation Grapes of Wrath, including 102 who had taken refuge in a United Nations center in town of Qana.

17. B’tselem’s report on the use of human shields was posted at its website, www.btselem.org, on 8 March 2007. Figures on casualties are listed in various sources, including B’tselem’s, the Israeli Ministry of Defense at http://www.israel-mfa.gov.il, the Palestine Monitor at http://www.palestinemonitor.org, and Miftah at http://www.miftah.org. In one instance,
a family of eight was killed by Israeli shelling as they were having a picnic on a Gazan beach (see the report issued by Human Rights Watch http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/06/20/israb13595_txt.htm; date of access: July 3, 2006).

18. There is a vibrant strain of religious nationalism within Zionism, fueled by popular justifications for Zionism in terms of divine promise and the religious mission of the Jews. The Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi from 1921 to 1935 in Palestine, Avraham Kook, taught that redemption of the land is as important as redemption of the people, and he lauded the young Jews of Jabotinsky’s Betar movement for being ‘willing to sacrifice their lives in the cause of their Holy Place’ (Smith, 2001, p. 89). ‘The arousal of desire in the whole nation to return to its Land, to the essence of its spirit and character, reflects the glow of repentance. It is an inner return, despite the many veils that obscure it’ (Shimoni, 1995, p. 148). His son, Zvi Yehuda Kook, inspired the messianic Gush Emunim (Bloc of the Faithful) movement which has been at the forefront of Israeli settlement in the West Bank. He declared that the Halakha forbids giving up any land that has been restored to Israel: ‘There is no Arab land here, only the inheritance of our God – and the more the world gets used to this thought, the better it will be for them and for all of us’ (Friedman, 1992, p. 19). Holding that Eretz Israel should be settled and defended at any cost, Kook’s followers settled on the outskirts of Hebron in 1970 and in the center of the city in 1979. As settlers protested in the summer of 1995 against any withdrawal of Israeli troops from the territories, a group of rabbis (the Union of Rabbis for the Land of Israel) reiterated Kook’s Halakha prohibition and urged soldiers to disobey evacuation orders, angering Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin (Chicago Tribune, July 13, 1995). Yigal Amir, Rabin’s assassin some months later, stated that he had been directed by God to prevent Rabin from endangering Israel by handing over land to Palestinian rule: ‘Everything I did was for the God of Israel, the Torah of Israel, the people of Israel and the Land of Israel’ (New York Times, March 28, 1996).

19. According to B’Tselem—the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories—Israeli settlers killed at least 11 Palestinians between September 2000 and September 2001 and injured dozens more. The Palestine Monitor reported that settlers killed at least 54 Palestinians during 2000–5 (http://www.palestinemonitor.org; date of access: July 11, 2006). Settlers have also attacked Palestinian homes, destroyed stores, automobiles and other property, uprooted trees, prevented farmers from reaching their fields, blocked major roads, stoned Palestinian cars, including ambulances, and targeted humanitarian workers, diplomats, and journalists. The Israeli authorities rarely intervened to stop or prevent settler attacks against Palestinians or to investigate them. When they did, perpetrators received disproportionately light sentences if they were punished at all.

20. See, for example, Graff (1991, 1997) for discussions of deliberate killing of Palestinian children by the Israeli army. Finkelstein (1995, p. 47) cites a ‘Save the Children’ study that concluded that more than 50 000 Palestinian children required medical attention for injuries due to gunshots, teargas, and beatings inflicted by the Israeli military. Israeli actions are documented by numerous reports issued during this time by Physicians for Human Rights.

21. Casualty estimates vary; see for example, reports by B’tselem http://www.btselem.org and the Palestine Monitor at http://www.palestinianmonitor.org. Statistics for the first four years of the intifada can be found in the Journal of Palestine Studies, xxxiv, 2, Winter 2005. The Palestine Authority also reported that over 7000 private Palestinian houses were destroyed in this period, 4785 of them located in Gaza Strip alone, 645 buildings belongs to the public sector and the security facilities were completely or partially destroyed, over 76 867 dunums of land were razed, and hundreds of thousands of trees were uprooted.


23. David Hirst claims that Goldstein’s massacre was no mere isolated act of a madman. A follower of New York’s Lubavitcher Rebbe, his act was praised by extremist rabbis who delicately called it an ‘act,’ ‘event,’ or ‘occurrence.’ ‘Within two days the walls of Jerusalem’s religious neighborhoods were covered with posters extolling Goldstein’s virtues and lamenting that the toll of dead Palestinians had not been higher’ (Hirst, 2004; date of access: June 7, 2006). Hirst reports that the view of extremists within the Gush Emunim is that ‘force is the only way to deal with the Palestinians. So long as they stay in the Land of Israel, they can only do so as ‘resident aliens’ without ‘equality of human and civil rights,’ those being a foreign democratic principle’ that does not apply to them. But, in the end, they must leave. There are two ways in which that can happen. One is ‘enforced emigration.’ The other way is based on the biblical injunction to ‘annihilate the memory of Amalek.’ In an article on ‘The Command of Genocide in the Bible,’ Rabbi Israel Hess opined that ‘the day will come when we shall all be called upon to wage this war for the annihilation of Amalek.’ He advanced two reasons for this. One was the need to ensure ‘racial purity.’ The other lay in the antagonism between Israel and Amalek as an expression of the antagonism between light and darkness, the pure and the unclean’ (Hirst, 2004; date of access: June 7, 2006) ‘Amalek’ is a term that Jewish religious extremists use in referring to Palestinians; see for example, Begon (2002, p. 47).

24. Despite its readiness to return violence with violence, Hamas has frequently declared a willingness to negotiate. For example, in early 2003, a Hamas official said, ‘Hamas is sticking by its proposal formulated a year ago by recommending an end to attacks on civilians on both sides,’ and pledged that, ‘Hamas would stop attacking Israeli civilians without distinction for geographic boundaries if Israel stops attacking, killing and arresting Palestinian civilians and blockading their towns and villages’ (Agence France Presse, January 19, 2003).
25. See Sections 11 and 12 and also Hoffman and Lieberman (2002) as well as Steven Erlanger, ‘Years of Strife and Lost Hope Scar Young Palestinians,’ The New York Times, March 12, 2007. Pape (2005) reports that the most active suicide terrorist group of the past 25 years has been the Tamil Tigers, whose ideology is Marxist, employing 143 suicide operations between 1987 and 2001. Pape’s claim concerning that a quest for self-determination underlies suicide terrorism is confirmed by the campaign of suicide bombing in Iraq after the 2003 invasion by the United States. Prior to the American occupation, Iraq had never experienced a single suicide terrorist attack in its history (Pape, 2005, p. 246). Similarly, the Palestinian citizens of Israel have not engaged in suicide terrorism. Former Attorney General of Israel, Michael Ben Yair put it this way: ‘The intifada is the Palestinian people’s war of national liberation. Historical processes teach us that no nation is prepared to live under another’s domination and that a suppressed people’s war of national liberation will inevitably succeed. We understand this point but choose to ignore it. We are prepared to engage in confrontation to prevent an historical process, although we are well aware that this process is anchored in the moral justification behind every people’s war of national liberation and behind its right to self-determination’ (‘The War’s Seventh Day,’ Ha’aretz, March 3, 2002).

26. The terms ‘terrorist’ and ‘terrorism’ have not always been associated with a negative connotation. The Jacobins used ‘terror’ with a positive connotation during their Reign of Terror, though after the fall of Robespierre their opponents associated a negative connotation with the term, a connotation preserved in the writings of Edmund Burke (Laqueur, 1987, p. 11). Geoffrey Nunberg has noted that... the word “terrorism” led a double life—a justified political strategy to some, an abomination to others' http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2001/10/28/IN159328.DTL (date of access: November 22, 2005). The Russian revolutionaries who assassinated Tsar Alexander II in 1881 used the word proudly. As late as 1947, the Jewish Stern Gang in Palestine referred to themselves as ‘terrorists,’ and Ben Hecht wrote approvingly of the Jewish ‘terrorists of Palestine’ in their attacks upon British targets in Palestine and, in the New York Herald Tribune, promised that the Jews of America ‘are working to help you’ (Hirst, 2003, p. 243). On the other hand, Menachem Begin opposed labeling the acts of the Jewish underground as ‘terrorist’ (1977, pp. 100–1).

27. This has been known for some time among many scholars. In 1977, C. C. O’Brien wrote: ‘The words “terrorism” and “terrorist” are not terms of scientific classification. They are imprecise and emotive. We do not apply them to all acts of politically motivated violence or to all people who commit such crimes. We reserve their use for politically motivated violence of which we disapprove’ (O’Brien, 1977, p. 91). Noam Chomsky has repeatedly pointed out that there is a ‘propagandistic usage’ in which ‘the term “terrorism” is used to refer to terrorist acts committed by enemies against us or our allies’ (interview number 5 at http://www.znet.com; date of access: January 7, 2006). Similar points are made by Oliverio (1998, chap. 1). Robert Picard writes that it ‘has become an axiom that terrorism describes acts of violence committed by others, and the similar violence committed by one’s own nation or by those with whom one sympathizes, is legitimate’
(Picard, 1993, p. 3). See also Collins (2002, pp. 163–6), which argues that it is essential that the United States not define ‘terrorism’ at all, since otherwise the United States and its allies would be deemed guilty of terrorism as well. See Best and Nocella (2004, p. 3), and Held (2004b, p. 65), who make similar points. A study by Simmons (1991) confirms this egocentric usage of ‘terrorism’ in major American media, and Donald Wycliff, Public Editor of the Chicago Tribune, explicitly acknowledged an egocentric employment of ‘terrorism’ in a Tribune op-ed piece of March 21, 2002.

28. In January 2005, the Iraq Body Count Database website at http://www.iraqbodycount.net (date of access: January 13, 2006) reported that up to 31,676 Iraqi civilians were killed in the first two years of the American invasion, actions by the U.S. military forces accounting for a sizeable percentage of this total. John Pilger reports that in May 2004, American forces killed approximately 600 civilians in Fallujah, ‘a figure far greater than the total number of civilians killed by the ‘insurgents’ during the past year. The generals were candid; this futile slaughter was an act of revenge for the killing of three American mercenaries’ (Pilger, 2004). See also, ‘What is the Difference Between Their “Terrorism” and our “War”?’ at http://www.axisoflogic.com/artman/publish/article_19213.shtml (date of access: January 13, 2006), which reports that after the American siege of Fallujah in November 2004, 60–70 per cent of all buildings had been damaged enough to render them uninhabitable. The three main water treatment plants, the electrical grid and the sewage treatment plant were severely damaged, leaving Fallujans without any of the basic services they will need to return to a normal life. The full force of America’s arsenal, including F-16s, C-130s, Abrams tanks, and Apache Helicopters were unleashed on a few thousand rebels in a civilian enclave that contained at least 50,000 residents according to Red Cross estimates at the time. Among the 1200 Iraqis killed in the first week of the siege, at least 800 were civilians were killed (Dahr Jamail, ‘800 Civilians Feared Dead in Fallujah,’ Inter Press Service, November 17, 2004), and some estimate that the final total was 6000 (see http://www.dahrjamailiraq.com, and http://www.afsc.org/pwork/0412/041204.htm; date of access: January 13, 2006).

29. The failure to recognize such instances of state terrorism is pointed out in many places, for instance, in Chomsky (1988a,b), Herman (1982), and Falk (1991). See also the examples listed in Herman and O’Sullivan (1991) and George (1991). The truth about Chechnya is similarly suppressed. On February 4, 2000, Russian aircraft attacked the Chechen village of Katyr Yurt. They used ‘vacuum bombs,’ which release petrol vapor and suck people’s lungs out and are banned under the Geneva Convention. The Russians bombed a convoy of survivors under a white flag, killing 363 men, women, and children. It was one of countless, little known acts of terrorism in Chechnya perpetrated by the Russian state (Pilger, 2004).

30. The ‘terrorist’ label is rarely used to describe the structural violence instituted by a government’s policies. Besides the institutionalized repression of Palestinian civilians in the Israeli-occupied territories, there was the campaign against Iraq throughout the 1990s, including both the U.S. bombing of Iraqi technological infrastructure in 1991 and the subsequent
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policy of UN sanctions that led to the deaths of over a million Iraqis. Documentation concerning both cases can be found on the websites of several human rights organizations, including, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Voices in the Wilderness, the World Health Organization, B’tselem, and the Palestine Monitor. U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright admitted that the sanctions were intended to serve a political purpose despite acknowledged harm to civilians. When asked what she felt about the deaths of 500,000 Iraqi children caused by the sanctions, Albright replied that it was ‘a very hard choice,’ but, all things considered, ‘we think the price is worth it’ (60 Minutes interview, aired May 12, 1996).

31. See for example, the State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism 2000 (2001) (Alexander & Musch, 2001, pp. 1–126). In it, one finds Hezbollah attacks on the Israeli targets described as ‘terrorist’ despite the fact that these attacks were directed upon the forces of a military occupation in southern Lebanon (p. 39). Actions by the Palestinian Hamas and Islamic Jihad are described as ‘terrorist’ even when directed against Israeli occupying forces, whereas Israel’s undercover assassinations of Palestinian figures were not so described (pp. 41–5). The use of ‘terrorism’ to describe Palestinian violence against an occupying Israeli military is also a feature of academic studies, O’Brien (1991, p. 224), Pape (2005, passim), and Cordesman (2005, chap. 2). Prudently, Pape and Cordesman do not define ‘terrorism,’ whereas O’Brien’s usage violates his own definition on page 15.

32. See Kapitan (2003, 2005). The strategy of discouraging inquiry into causes is typified in the following statement by Harvard professor Alan Dershowitz: ‘We must commit ourselves never to try to understand or eliminate its alleged root causes, but rather to place it beyond the pale of dialogue and negotiation’ (Dershowitz, 2003, p. 24). Israel and the Western Democracies adopted the use of rhetoric of ‘terror’ in the 1970s to describe those who opposed their policies (see Chomsky, 1991; Herman and O’Sullivan, 1991, pp. 43–6). During this period, terrorists were portrayed as anti-democratic forces supported by Soviet style communism. In the 1990s, after the fall of the Soviet Union, the pro-communist gloss was submerged and terrorists were seen as an expression of radical Islam. In 1999, during the second invasion of Chechnya, Russian authorities themselves began to use the label, calling the Chechnya rebels ‘terrorists.’ Previously, Moscow had identified the rebels as ‘bandits’ (Chicago Tribune, November 3, 2002).

33. A CBS/New York Times poll conducted a few days after September 11, 2001 and whose results were published in The New York Times on 16 September 2001, reported that of 1216 Americans polled, 60 per cent responded affirmatively when asked that if U.S. military action against ‘whoever is responsible for the attacks of September 11 meant that ‘many thousands of innocent civilians may be killed,’ then should such action be taken? The ‘terrorist’ classification is used by the United States to circumvent the applicability of international humanitarian law to detainees in the ‘war on terror’ (see Hajjar, 2006, pp. 31–2, p. 41, Notes 31–2). Mike Donning reports the following: ‘…operating in the midst of a violent insurgency and on unfamiliar terrain, U.S. forces in Iraq often detain people without clear evidence that the prisoners are involved in guerrilla activity…. The taint of association with terrorists can influence the way soldiers treat these prisoners,
said John Hutson, dean of Franklin Pierce Law Center in Concord, N.H. and former judge advocate general of the Navy, the service’s top legal officer: “...These are terrorists and different rules apply” (‘Prisoner Abuse Poses Peril for Bush,’ Chicago Tribune, July 12, 2004).

34. Rokach (1980, pp. 5–10) notes that the Israel government under Ben-Gurion and Sharett understood in the early 1950s that the Israeli public must be inundated with images portraying the Palestinians as monsters, even if this required provocations that endangered the lives of Jewish citizens.

35. Noam Chomsky wrote of this a decade before: ‘The Palestinians are a particularly natural target for Western racism. They are weak and dispersed, hounded on every side, but they refuse to accept their fate and melt away, an affront to civilization—not unlike the Jews. They must be despised, or how are we to justify their fate?’ (Chomsky, 1976; Said, 1988). The American media frequently portrays the Palestinians as initiating violence and the Israelis as retaliating. David Hirst has said that ‘the figures were something like 100 to 8 times that the word “retaliation” referred to what the Israelis did, 100 times to Israelis 8 times to Palestinians, while in it became clearer and clearer as the intifada went on, it was more the other way around. The Israelis were initiating violence and the Palestinians were retaliating. And yet it persisted like this, so that is a very typical reflection on the way in which the American media has covered the intifada’ (http://www.electronicintifada.org, January 9, 2004; date of access: February 17, 2006). The BBC is no different. Pilger (2004) reports that ‘the State of Israel has been able to convince many outsiders that it is merely a victim of terrorism when, in fact, its own unrelenting, planned terrorism is the cause of the infamous retaliation by Palestinian suicide bombers ... BBC reporters never report Israelis as terrorists; that term belongs exclusively to Palestinians imprisoned in their own land. It is not surprising, as the recent Glasgow University study concluded, that many television viewers in Britain believe that the Palestinians are the invaders and occupiers.’

36. Sharon’s article appeared in The New York Times, September 20, 1986. Like Netanyahu’s book, it is a deliberate attempt to align the United States in Israel’s battle against Palestinian nationalism by demonizing as an instance of Arab and Islamic radicalism (see Margalit, 1995; Beinin, 2003, p. 20). The rhetoric of ‘terror’ extends beyond the mainstream media and corporate ‘think tanks.’ Academics also employ it, and thus, Alan Dershowitz, who calls for the organized destruction of a single Palestinian village in retaliation for every terrorist attack against Israel: ‘It will be a morally acceptable trade-off even if the property of some innocent civilians must be sacrificed in the process’ (‘A New Way of Responding to Palestinian Terrorism,’ The Jerusalem Post, March 18, 2002).

37. See the Human Rights Watch report on the IDF’s siege of the Jenin camp at http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/05/jenin0503-prin (date of access: March 27, 2005). Amnesty International and B'tselem published similar reports. The director of the Palestinian Red Crescent Society in Jenin told Human Rights Watch of the difficulty of sending assistance into the camp during the siege. Whenever IDF tanks saw the ambulances, they blocked their way and
occasionally shot at them. They continued to be denied access to the refugee camp until April 15, so that almost no injured persons from the camp were brought to the hospitals by ambulance from April 5 to April 15. Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and B’tselem reported that the Israeli military used Palestinian civilians as shields during the fighting, one of the more horrific war crimes documented by these organizations in the first few weeks after the fighting had ceased. For first hand accounts of the fighting, see Baroud (2002). Israel refused to accept a delegation that the UN Security Council approved for a fact-finding mission to Jenin, and under threat of a U.S. veto the delegation was disbanded.

38. See the statement by Alan Dershowitz quoted in Note 36. Other examples include the columnist Michael Kelly, who urged Israelis to ‘unleash an overwhelming force’ against Palestinians and to ‘go ahead and escalate the violence’ and to ‘destroy, capture, and expel’ (Washington Post, August 15, 2001). Again, columnist Ralph Peters claimed that the killing of Palestinian civilians, including children, who ‘shield’ terrorists—‘human monsters’ who are enemies of Israel or the United States—is ‘justifiable’ (‘Civilian Casualties: No Apology Needed’, Wall Street Journal, July 25, 2002). Israel manipulated the graphic images of suicide bombings to vilify the Palestinian resistance movement, over-looking the much superior and deadlier Israeli violence meted out to the Palestinians. Ilan Pappe, professor of political science at Haifa University, stated that Israeli state terror has effectively pushed the Palestinians to the edge. He told Aljazeera that Israel’s ‘harsh and criminal’ response to the Palestinian uprising was ‘deliberate and calculated’ (Aljazeera.net, http://www.infoimagination.org/islammn/second_intifada.html, July 5, 2004; date of access: January 11, 2005).

39. See Kant’s sixth preliminary article in his 1795 essay, ‘To Perpetual Peace’ (Kant, 1983, pp. 109–10).

40. Walzer (1977, pp. 255–61) and Rawls (1999a, pp. 98–9, 1999b, p. 568) have defended a state’s recourse to terrorism by means of this supreme emergency exemption to the discrimination rule. As for non-state terrorism, Hare (1979) suggests that the terrorism practiced by the European Resistance during Second World War was morally justified, and Wilkins (1992, pp. 26–8) similarly argues that Jews would have been justified in using terrorism against the Germans at that time. More recent defenses can be found in Valls (2000), Honderich (2006a), Young (2004), Held (2004a, 2005), and Dahbour (2005). Both C.A.J. Coady (2004b) and Christopher Toner (2004) point out that the justification Walzer and Rawls provide for state terrorism under supreme emergency implies that individuals and non-state groups may also engage in terrorism against ‘innocents’ in supreme emergencies, and for this reason, both reject the supreme emergency exemption.

41. Andrew Valls writes: ‘if an organization claims to act on behalf of a people and is widely seen by that people as legitimately doing so, then the rest of us should look on that organization as the legitimate authority of the people for the purpose of assessing its entitlement to engage in violence on their behalf’ (Valls, 2000, p. 71). Virginia Held (2005, pp. 185–8) points out that while democratic authorization of a leadership is not always possible when
42. Pape (2005, chap. 5) addresses the issue whether suicide terrorists calculate the benefits of their policies. He says that groups such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, and the Tamil Tigers began with more conventional guerrilla operations, but after these operations proved ineffective, they resorted to suicide attacks with an initial confidence that they would yield more positive results. Governments have entered into negotiations with these groups after the suicide campaigns began (pp. 64–5), and in some cases, governments have been coerced, as with the United States and France in Lebanon in 1983, Israel in Lebanon in 2000, and Sri Lanka in 2001 (p. 55). Pape conjectures that the government of Israel was coerced by Hamas in 1994–5 (pp. 66–73).

43. The motivation of intervening parties can vary. Some might see intervention as a means of either harming or defeating the aggressor or as an opportunity to extend influence over the threatened community. Again, the intervenor might be caused to act because it is alarmed that the violence between the two communities has reached such proportions and poses greater threats to future peace and stability. Such intervention has repeatedly taken place since Second World War, especially in Africa. The intervention by Western powers in the Balkans in the 1990s was partly caused by a desire to halt the continued aggression and atrocities in Bosnia and Kosovo. It is likely that the PLO adopted this strategy by provoking Israel into an extreme reaction that would bring Israel into conflict with neighboring states and discredit it in the eyes of the world community (O’Brien, 1991, p. 13).

44. The positive effects of violence as a confidence building measure and as a means of unity among members of an oppressed community were argued for by Frantz Fanon (1963, 38). Pape (2005, chap. 6), provides further evidence in support for this strategy. Regarding the Palestinians, see Section 4.

45. Similar reasoning can be found in Wilkins (1992) who cites Karl Jaspers’ distinction between the political guilt that people within a community harbor when their state commits crimes and the moral guilt of an individual who participates in, supports, or favors those crimes (Wilkins, 1992, pp. 21–2). Wilkins finds that political guilt is both collective and distributive, and only individuals who completely sever their ties to the political community are exempt from moral guilt (p. 25). On these grounds, he argues that terrorism is justified as a form of self-defense when all other political and legal remedies have been exhausted or are inapplicable and the terrorism is directed against guilty members of the aggressor (1992, p. 28). See also Virginia Held who writes that ‘If a government’s policies are unjustifiable and if political violence to resist them is justifiable (these are very large ‘ifs,’ but not at all unimaginable), then it is not clear why the political violence should not be directed at those responsible for these policies’ (2004b, p. 6; emphasis is in original.). Some writers are skeptical of using ‘collective responsibility’ as a way of widening the range of legitimate targets (e.g., Coady, 2004a, pp. 55–7; Miller, 2005), which argue that one shares in collective responsibility for a rights violation only if one ‘intentionally contributed’ to that violation, and, thus, where intention is lacking, so is the
responsibility. However, the ‘consent’ one gives through membership in a voluntary association is a general intention to abide by, and accept responsibilities for, that association’s policies and acts, whatever these might be. But, quite apart from this, it is doubtful that moral responsibility for a situation requires an intention to bring about or sustain that situation. Criminal law typically allows that one can be responsible for what one rationally foresee will happen as a result of one’s action or inaction.

46. See Section 8. American support for Israel is well documented [see, e.g., Lilienthal, 1982; Christison, 1999; Chomsky, 1999; Aruri, 2003; Swisher, 2004; Mearsheimer and Walt, 2005 (date of access: September 23, 2006); Petras, 2006]. Opposition to Israeli settlements moved from ‘illegal’ under the Carter Administration, to ‘obstacles’ under Reagan, to ‘unhelpful’ under Clinton. A letter from President Bush to Ariel Sharon dated April 14, 2004, stated that ‘it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of the final status negotiations will be a full and complete return to the armistice lines’ (http://www.whitehouse.gov; date of access: November 18, 2006), and in June 2004, the House of Representatives voted 407-9 to endorse the text of Bush’s letter. The statements by some Congressional leaders have been truly astounding. For example, the House Majority Whip in 2002, Dick Armey, publicly advocated Israel’s confiscation of the entire West Bank and the expulsion of the Palestinian population (Abunimah, 2006, p. 102). Again, Senator Hillary Clinton called for ‘total U.S. support of Israeli policy’ while visiting Israel in February 2002. When a reporter asked Clinton whether Palestinians also deserve U.S. sympathy, she replied: ‘The United States’ role is to support Israel’s decisions’ (Chicago Tribune, February 26, 2002).

47. See Section 6 and also Pape (2005, pp. 64–74). The Hamas leader, Dr. Abd al-Aziz Rantisi, assassinated by Israel in April of 2004, justified suicide bombings against Israel saying they were the ‘weapons of last resort’ because ‘Israel is offering us two choices, either to die a meek lamb’s death at the slaughter house or as martyr-bombers’ http://www.infoimagination.org/islamnm/second_intifada.html (date of access: November 11, 2005). Smilansky (2004, pp. 794–5) claims that the Palestinians have not availed themselves of viable alternatives to terrorism. However, he gives a historically skewed summary of the choices Palestinians made and did not make, for example, that they could have had a state in 1948 alongside Israel, that they did not attempt a campaign of nonviolent resistance in the territories, that they, rather than Israel, derailed the progress towards a Palestinian state called for in the Oslo Accords, and that they rejected a ‘generous offer’ by Prime Minister Barak in the summer of 2000. These claims are addressed in the main text above as well as in Chapter 1.

48. Igor Primoratz (2006), while acknowledging that the Palestinian community faces a ‘true moral disaster’ (p. 37), argues that terrorism ‘does not seem to have brought the Palestinians any closer to liberation, self-determination, and repatriation’ and, therefore, cannot be justified since it fails to meet the condition of effectiveness (p. 40). This judgment seems premature. He underestimates Fanon’s emphasis on the role of violence in strengthening determination to combat a much more powerful adversary. The Palestinian cause is at the forefront of ever-widening Islamic resistance to U.S.–Israeli hegemony over the Middle East. The so-called war on terrorism may well strengthen
the willingness of Muslims to support the Palestinians and confront this hegemony as they see their own fate as increasingly linked to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, something that would likely not have happened had not tensions between Israelis and Palestinians been kept before the public eye.

49. Pape (2005) notes that many suicide terrorists have had friends or family members killed by occupying forces, for example, the ‘black widows’ in Chechnya (p. 211). He also writes of Dhanu, a member of the Tamil’s Black Tigresses, who killed Rajiv Gandhi in a suicide bombing. Previously, her home in Jaffna had been looted, her four brothers killed, and she had been gang-raped by Indian soldiers. Being a victim of rape is a stigma that destroys prospects for marriage (pp. 226–30). Among Palestinian suicide bombers, Saed Hotari killed 21 Israelis on June 1, 2001. His father said that ‘he was radicalized by the anger, by the humiliation. Look before your eyes. We are living in a jail. I would be a liar to say I feel sorry for the people who are oppressing us day by day’ (p. 233).

50. The survey was carried out by the Gaza Community Mental Health Program, founded by Dr. Eyad El-Sarraj, whose reports on this and other related studies can be found at its website, http://www.gcmhp.net (date of access: March 12, 2007).